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INTRODUCTION
One of the fascinating, but disheartening aspects of history is
the manner in which some persons or events are continually
trumpeted, even if overrated, while others are too quickly
forgotten. Everyone knows about Bunker Hill, but the Battle of
Saratoga was more important in turning the American
Revolution in favor of the colonies that would become the
United States. Generals George Smith Patton, Jr. and Douglas
MacArthur continue to survive in everyone's collective memory,
while George C. Marshall, and increasingly his Marshall Plan
that essentially saved post-War Europe, are often overlooked.
Babe Ruth remains a household name, while Lou Gehrig is most
associated with a terrible disease, even though Gehrig was a
comparably valuable baseball player.
Recently, the fall of false idol Lance Armstrong revealed how
quickly a true trail-blazing cyclist, who preceded Armstrong, has
faded prematurely from public memory. According to the
typical narrative, the now-disgraced former seven-time Tour de
France champion, Armstrong, was the first to put cycling on the
map in the United States. The problem with this narrative is
that it unfairly overlooks Greg LeMond, who won the Tour de
France three times, twice after a near-fatal hunting accident that
led to a two-year hiatus before his return. This was highlighted
by a dramatic closing-day come-from-behind win by the closest
margin in the history of the event.'
1 LeMond may have lacked Armstrong's public relations flare and sustained
streak of (apparently substance-aided) wins, but LeMond's victories earned him
at least one Sports Illustrated cover (and its designation as "Sportsman of the
Year"), and lots of front page news coverage. See, e.g., Franz Lidz, Vive
Lemond!, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jul. 31, 1989, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1o68628/index.htm (emphasizing LeMond
making up a fifty second deficit to lead during last day's time trial, an almost
unheard of come-from-behind); see generally SAMUEL ABT, LEMOND: THE
INCREDIBLE COMEBACK OF AN AMERICAN HERO (1990) (LeMond lauded for
returning to top cycling form after near-fatal hunting accident); PETER NYE,
HEARTS OF LIONS: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN BICYCLE RACING (1988) (LeMond
viewed as key figure in modern American cycling); SAMUEL ABT, UP THE ROAD:
CYCLING'S MODERN ERA FROM LEMOND TO ARMSTRONG (2007). In addition,
LeMond has been an outspoken critic of the sort of doping to which Armstrong
has now admitted after a decade of false denials. See David Epstein, Kathy
LeMond: Armstrong embarrassed, not truly sorry, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan.
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Insurance executive and attorney, Elmer Sawyer, who was a
prime architect of the Comprehensive General Liability Policy,2
was arguably a "Greg LeMond" of insurance (or perhaps a
"Lance Armstrong" without the performance enhancing drugs),
and seems to have suffered a similar fate. One has to get to high
levels of an insurance company, or within that small group of
academics active in the field, before anyone will recognize the
name Sawyer. Even high-end coverage attorneys will draw a
blank, save for the counsel to an elite policyholder who invokes
his writings in favor of broad coverage,3 and his counterpart,
who is at least forced to glance at Sawyer's writings, while
defending against such arguments.4
18, 2013), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/2o13o118/lance-
armstrong-admission-kathy-lemond-reaction/ ("In 2001, LeMond openly
criticized Armstrong for his affiliation with Dr. Michele Ferrari, who is now
banned for life from the sport. Armstrong subsequently began a campaign of
disparagement against LeMond that included souring LeMond's business
relationship with the Trek bike company. Armstrong's influence led Trek to
drop its long time sponsorship of LeMond.").
2 See ELMER W. SAWYER, COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY INSURANCE (1943).
Woodhull Hay, the editor of a series of insurance source books published by the
Underwriter Printing and Publishing Company during the 1940s, stated that,
"Probably no one is better qualified to treat authoritatively of this complicated
and fluid form [of general liability and the question of the scope of coverage]
than E.W. Sawyer." Woodhull Hay, Editor's Foreword to ELMER W. SAWYER,
COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY INSURANCE (1943).
3 See, e.g., EUGENE R. ANDERSON ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION
§1.Ol, at 1-6 n.ll (2d ed. Supp. 2004) (Sawyer initially cited and then cited
frequently throughout chapter one regarding the origin of the CGL form); see
also JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS §14.01 (3d ed.
Supp. 2013) (citing Sawyer frequently when describing origin and background
of the CGL policy). But see, PETER J. KALIS ETAL., POLICYHOLDER'S GUIDE TO THE
LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE (Supp. 2OO6) (example of a leading treatise that
expressly examines insurance coverage from the policyholder's perspective,
without citing Sawyer).
4 However, a leading insurance coverage treatise, authored by insurer
counsel, does not list Sawyer's book or any of his writings in its table of
authorities and appears not to cite Sawyer in its text. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER &
THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 1853-65
(13th ed. 2oo6); see also ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES:
REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS (Chris Kloeris et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1995) (treatise authored by authority representing insurers in most
instances does not cite Sawyer).
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In this paper, I am not focusing on Sawyer as some sort of
man-on-a-white-horse to which reverence is owed, nor do I
suggest that he would have specifically or completely endorsed
my proposals for a broader approach to the scope of coverage
provided by insurance products. But Sawyer is an important
figure in insurance history - one that deserves remembering, as
does his approach to providing insurance in a manner that can
benefit insurers and their constituencies. Sawyer was in favor of
bundling, rather than disaggregating risks.5 My thesis is that
this approach is correct, not only for general liability coverage,
but also for insurance coverage in general. To paraphrase
George Santayana, those who forget the past are condemned to
repeat it6 - or at least to make mistakes that could have been
avoided or minimized had there been a better sense of history.
The organizing theme of this Fragmented Risk conference is
that insurance embodies a "tension between bundling risk and
fragmenting risk."7 In my view, the tension is one that can
5 See SAWYER, supra note 2, at 11 ("Liability insurance is now in the process
of transition from the multiple separate covers to one comprehensive cover.").
Sawyer was something of a visionary, generally with eclectic sociopolitical views.
Like other big business executives of the era, he disliked the New Deal and what
he regarded as excessive government interference with free enterprise or undue
forcing of economic outcomes. However, he was not an anti-regulaion zealot,
and he appreciated the important socioeconomic role of insurance. See Elmer
W. Sawyer, The Impact of the War on Existing Insurance Coverages (Other
Than Life), A.B.A. SEC. INS. NEGL. & CoMP. L. PROC. 26, 32 (1942). Sawyer also
noted the impact of insurance limitations on business, Id. at 27-29, and
predicted the emergence of the U.S. as "the dominant power" in the world after
the War, despite the relatively recent Pearl Harbor attack and Axis success in
conquest. Id. at 26, 29, 30. Additionally, Sawyer saw a post-War opportunity
for U.S. insurers that could be seized by faster-acting U.K. insurers, Id. at 30-
31, and he viewed the New Deal, and fascist movements, as anti-middle class
and anti-free enterprise. Id. at 32. While he noted the important social impact
of insurance, he also argued that insurance should ordinarily be provided by the
private sector rather than by the government. Id. at 32-33. Sawyer stated,
"[F]ree enterprise must be policed to prevent abuse." Id. at 33.
6 See GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 82 (Prometheus Books 1998)
('"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.").
7 Program Announcement for a Conference on Fragmented Risk, Rutgers
Ctr. For Risk and Responsibility, Rutgers Sch. of Law - Camden, (March 1,
2013), available at http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/upcoming-risk-events (last
visited Nov. 17, 2013).
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usually be successfully resolved in favor of bundling, which will
normally provide insurance in a form more useful to
policyholders, victims, society, and even insurers themselves.
The organizers of this conference well-expressed this view:
Policyholders benefit from bundling risk because coverage is
easier to purchase and more predictable, because there are
fewer gaps in coverage and those gaps that remain are more
easily understood. Insurers benefit because they insure a large
number of policyholders with similar risk profiles so they benefit
from the law of large numbers.8
Despite these undeniable benefits, the insurance industry
appears to be moving away from risk consolidation to more
narrow coverage of specified perils.9 Unlike Sawyer, the current
8 Kirk Hartley, Great Questions About Insurance - Call for Papers for
Rutgers Conference on Fragmented Risks Created by Current Forms of
Insurance Sales, GLOBALTORT (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.globaltort.com/
2012/io/great-questions-about-insurance-call-for-papers-for-rutgers-
conference-on-fragmented-risks-created-by-current-forms-of-insurance-sales/
(quoting original language used for conference announcement).
9 See Donald T. Homstein, The Balkanization of CAT Property Insurance:
Financing and Fragmentation in Storm Risks, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1
(2013) (noting substantial fragmentation of property coverage, particularly in
separation of windstorm and water damage coverage, and the rise of anti-
concurrent causation clauses limiting coverage that was formerly available or at
least arguable); see also Amy O'Connor, Will Wind/Hail Cosmetic Damage
Exclusion Endorsements Become the Norm?, INS. J. (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/o3/o7/28364o.htm
(noting movement toward stripping away coverage where damage to covered
property can be deemed merely cosmetic); see also Christopher C. French, The
Aftermath of Catastrophes: Valuing Business Interruption Insurance Losses
(Vill. L. & Legal Theory Working Papers Series, Paper No. 3020, 2013) (noting a
type of de facto reduction in coverage in that property loss and business
interruption claims can be reduced by insurers assigning lower valuation to the
loss and disputing claims); see also Michael Childress & Daniel Loucks, The
Hidden Conflict: The Secret Insurers Don't Tell Insureds (Mar. 1, 2013)
(manuscript), available at http://www.riskworldwide.Com/2013/03/the-
hidden-conflict-the-secret-insurers-don't-tell-insureds/ (insurers have
economic incentive to unfairly deny or chip away at policyholder claims); see
also Harold Weston, A la Carte Coverage. Unbundling Causes of Losses and
Coverage Grants to Allow Consumer-Insured Selectionjn Rutgers J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y - (forthcoming Dec. 2013) (examining the prospect of increased
policyholder ability to determine coverage contours and finding that, although
promising in theory, it is likely to fall short in practice due to problems of
consumer information and cognition, as well as unpredictability of risk); cf.
Christopher C. French, Profits Over Purpose: The Conflict in Insurance Law
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insurance industry seems to regard bundled insurance products
that provide comprehensive coverage as a luxury the industry
can no longer afford - or at least as a failure to grasp
opportunities for enhanced profit and wealth maximization.
Even those outside the industry, who are critical of the narrowed
or inconsistent coverage, appear significantly more attracted to
disclosure and policy transparency as a solution, rather than
mandated minimally comprehensive coverage.lo
Even when policies are generally broad in scope (or purport
to be), the insurance policy may provide "Swiss cheese" coverage
through a relatively broad insuring agreement, followed by a
lengthy list of exclusions or policy provisions that operate as
exclusions, to limit coverage based on the language of the
policies' definitions, conditions, or endorsements." Insurers
Today (July 2013) (manuscript at 2-11) (describing contraction of coverage
provided by general liability insurance during late twentieth century). In oral
comments regarding my presentation, insurance economist Steven Weisbart,
can be interpreted as at least an implicit endorsement of fragmentation, such
that Dr. Weisbart argues that the broad approach favored by me (and, to a lesser
extent, by Professor Weston) might risk the financial strength of an insurance
industry that is not doing as well as I posit. Dr. Steven Weisbart, Senior Vice
President and Chief Economist, Ins. Info. Inst., Fragmented Risk Symposium,
Remarks to the Rutgers Ctr. for Risk and Responsibility (March 1, 2013).
10 See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance
Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 1263, 1337-48 (2011) (making recommendations
upon empirical analysis demonstrating wide variance in homeowners' policies
tending to create limitations on coverage, and emphasizing disclosure,
transparency, and consumer choice before turning to "default" minimum
coverage). See infra text accompanying notes ("TAN") 265-269 (discussing
disclosure as remedy for ineffective insurance).
11 It is unclear who should receive credit for this popular means of
describing insurance policies that purportedly provide broad cover, but are
ridden with exclusions or limitations. See, e.g., The Byrd Law Firm, Texas
Homeowners Pay For "Swiss Cheese" Insurance, (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://www.txbyrd.com/texas-homeowners-pay-for-swiss-cheese-insurance/;
Shipman & Goodwin LLP, Environmental Insurance: Closing Coverage Gaps-
Turning Swiss Cheese into Cheddar, (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.shipman
goodwin.com/environmental-insurance-closing-coverage-gaps-turning-swiss-
cheese-into-cheddar; Bruce Cappon, Will That Be Swiss Cheese Or Travel
Insurance?, CANADIAN MONEYSAVER, (Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.firstrateinsurance.com/global/pdf/Will%/2oThat%/2oBe%/20Swiss
%2oCheese%20Or%2oTravel%2olnsurance Cappon.pdf ("Recognize a quality
travel health policy from the Swiss cheese variety, the one riddled with holes
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may further widen the "holes" in this Swiss cheese coverage
through aggressive interpretations of coverage-limiting
language.12
and exclusions."); James Strickland, Do You Have Swiss Cheese Liability
Insurance?, 61 CHILD CARE INFO. ExCH., May1988, at 3. In any event, this
Conference and Symposium have probably put the term "Swiss cheese"
permanently into the academic literature. See Sam Friedman, Fragmented
Coverage Widens Knowledge Gap Among Consumers, CLAIMS MGMT. (May 7,
2013), http://claims-management.theclm.org/home/article/Fragmented-
Coverage-Widens-Insurance-Knowledge-Gap (noting that at the conference,
"[o]ne plaintiffs attorney in attendance complained that homeowners' policies
have so many exclusions that the industry has turned standard coverage into
'Swiss cheese."'). My recollection is that more than one Conference attendee
had this view, which was not confined to plaintiffs' counsel.
12 See JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES
DON'T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 62-63 (2010) (providing
examples of aggressive insurer tactics in coverage disputes); French, Profits
Over Purpose, supra note 9, at 30-33, 50-52. Although insurance bad faith
law is supposed to limit such opportunistic behavior, the state-based nature of
insurance law and many coverage decisions issued each year militate against
this. Even if an insurer's construction of a policy term or its conduct in handling
a claim is suspect and at odds with prevailing practice, the insurer can usually
point to at least a few judicial decisions - and probably some state supreme
courts as well - that have occasionally accepted the insurer's non-mainstream
arguments, or at least deemed them a colorable construction of the policy
language or type of policy at issue. See, e.g., Village of Morrisville Water & Light
Dept. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 775 F. Supp. 718, 734-35 (D. Vt.
1991)(court notes that insurer makes this argument, which insurer contended
precludes summary judgment for policyholder in bad faith claim based on
failure to CGL insurer to provide coverage for government-ordered remediation
pursuant to Superfund statute, an issue on which courts have diverged; Court,
although not expressly endorsing argument, finds coverage for policyholder as a
matter of law but denies summary judgment to policyholder regarding alleged
insurer bad faith). See also Ray, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 31300 at *16-20 (D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2013) (insurer's calculation of
amount due policyholder "according to its normal procedures after an
inspection by its adjuster and an engineer" for home damaged by storm
precludes policyholder from prevailing in bad faith action alleging unreasonably
low valuation; to win bad faith case, policyholder must show active misconduct
by insurer in claims process).
In addition, since State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, insurers
have very little incentive (other than reputational concern), not to take chances
with claims involving policies with low limits. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). Under
Campbell, the practical maximum punitive award can be no higher than nine
times the amount of compensatory damage suffered by the claimant alleging
bad faith, at least when the amount of compensatory damages is substantial. Id.
at 425; see generally JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF
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In the not so recent past, however, the trend was in favor of
bundling rather than fragmentation. Leading that trend on
general liability coverage was Sawyer, a lawyer and insurance
executive, generally viewed as the father of the comprehensive
general liability (CGL) policy. The CGL has since been renamed
the "commercial" general liability policy as an example of the
industry's modern retreat from broad coverage. Sawyer viewed
the CGL's broad grant of coverage as a means of aiding both the
industry's fight against adverse selection and its quest for
increased premiums and profits, as well as a means of
simplifying insurance sales practices and providing greater
protection for commercial policyholders:
The objective of comprehensive liability insurance covering
liability hazards other than those insurable under automobile
liability policies is to afford, on as broad a basis as is feasible,
protection against liability for any hazard not excluded .... The
coverage can no longer be limited to the type of business in
which the insured is engaged at the time the policy is written,
but must follow his activities even though the nature of his
business operations change completely. Consequently the
coverage must apply automatically to all operations not
specifically excluded.13
History has proven him right. Notwithstanding losses
related to mass torts - such as asbestos, pollution, and drug
product liability - the insurance industry has profited from the
CGL format that has, despite its operational shortcomings,
largely succeeded in providing both more extensive risk
protection to policyholders and more expansive compensation
to their victims.14 Perhaps because of the seemingly endless
CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM (2008) (prevailing in obtaining a $145 million punitive
damages plaintiffs verdict, later set aside by the U.S. Supreme Court as noted
above, in part because evidence suggested that insurance company had little
incentive to honor policies issued to individual policyholders, absent possibility
of very large punitive damages awards; Insurer's revenue and wealth was so
substantial that even multi-million dollar awards arguably had little deterrent
effect).
13 See SAWYER, supra note 2, at 26-27.
14 See infra TAN 58-87; MARK R. GREENE, RISK AND INSURANCE 147 (4th ed.
1977) (stating standard form general liability and property insurance have been
profitable products for insurers); Eliot Martin Blake, Comment, Rumors of
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parade of asbestos claims still in the litigation pipeline, liability
insurers have lost some of Sawyer's faith, while other areas of
insurance appear equally or more fragmented.i5
But the comprehensive approach has succeeded and can
continue to succeed. In similar fashion to the CGL form,
automobile insurance has largely been a success story 6 - to the
Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information
Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 422-23 (1988) (stating insurers generally make
sufficient amounts of money through investment to profit even when faced with
significant underwriting losses); but see Weisbart, supra note 9 (arguing that
safe and adequate investment income is not more difficult for insurers to
achieve in the current low interest rate environment).
15 See infra TAN 127-188 (describing contraction of former breadth of CGL
coverage and fragmentation of other insurance lines).
16 Although automobile liability insurers often have a combined ratio (total
claims costs and administrative expenses expressed as a fraction over premiums
received) or even a loss ratio (total claims costs expressed as a fraction over
premiums received) exceeding 1.o, or 1OO (authors and organizations differ in
their numerical preference), most auto insurers are quite profitable due to
investment income earned on premium dollars for months, years, or even
decades before a claim is incurred or paid. See MARK S. DORFMAN & DAVID A.
CATHER, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT & INSURANCE 58 (loth ed. 2013);
HAROLD D. SKIPPER & W. JEAN KWON, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE:
PERSPECTIVES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 500-05 (2007); SCOTT E. HARRINGTON &
GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE Ch. 13 (Michele
Janicek ed., 2d ed. 2004); EMMETT" J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE Chs. 2- 3, 5, 7-8 (8th ed. 1999)
(describing, generally, the business model of insurance in which carriers can
profit overall, even if spending more on claims than amount of premiums
received); see also JEFFREY W. STEMPEL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW
16-17 (4th ed. 2011). Furthermore, a number of automobile insurers (e.g.,
GEICO of televised lizard fame) have a combined ratio of less than loo,
suggesting they are quite profitable overall. See Top 100 Groups Ranked by Net
Premiums Written, PROP. CASUALTY 360: NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Jul. 2013, at 34,
34-35 (stating GEICO parent Berkshire Hathaway Group had a combined ratio
of 91.87 in 2012; major insurance groups often had combined ratios of less than
1OO in 2012 and 2011, which means that they were profitable even without
consideration of investment income, which historically is the chief driver of
insurer profits); see also A.M. BEST CO., INSURANCE FACTS AND STATS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 14 (Laura McArdle ed., Supp. 2012
ed.) (stating that the combined ratio has generally been at or slightly below 1OO
for auto insurers overall during the past decade); Top loo Groups, supra, at
34-35 (describing that many of the largest insurers with combined ratios of less
than 1OO reflect profitability even without consideration of investment income
during time between receipt of premium and payment of claim).
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extent one can have a success story within the confines of a
system that provides an inadequate social services safety net,
and instead relies heavily on tort litigation for compensation
and regulation.17
Even regarding liability insurance, and perhaps especially for
property insurance (such as homeowners' policies), the "melting
pot" of insurances has hardened or reversed itself, although
commercial and marine risks appear to continue to be written
on an all-risk basis.18 The "wind vs. water" conundrum
associated with Hurricane Katrina claims is a dramatic example
of the failure of fragmented coverage, but other examples
abound.19 The continuing failure to integrate flood, earthquake,
17 Because of the low liability minimum policy limits required in most states
and the degree of uninsured drivers, notwithstanding state financial
responsibility laws, one can certainly question whether auto insurance has
worked well as a matter of social policy. See ANDREW TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE
BANKERS: EVERYTHING THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY NEVER WANTED YOU TO KNOW
197-204, 276-77 (1982) (criticizing prevailing auto insurance regime and
recommending a "pay at the pump" system, similar to the system of New
Zealand, where auto coverage is funded by a gasoline tax); Marc Lifsher, State
Starts Crackdown on Uninsured Drivers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2oo6,
http://articles.latimes.Com/2oo6/dec/o6/business/fi-suspend6; Study:
Uninsured Driver Problem Costs Oklahoma $8.8M a Year, INS. J. (Jan. 9,
2013), http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/southcentral/2o13/o/o9
/2768o7.htm; News Release: Recession Marked by Bump in Uninsured
Motorists, INS. RES. COUNCIL (Apr. 21, 2O1), http://www.insurance-
research.org/sites/default/files/downloads/IRCUM2o11 042111.pdf ("Across
the United States, chances are roughly one in seven that a driver is uninsured..
• ."); Larry Copeland, One in Seven Drivers Have No Insurance, USATODAY,
Sept. 11, 2oii,http://usatoday3o.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-09-
n/uninsured-drivers/50363390/1. But these arguable failures of auto
insurance, which hardly indicate a complete failure of the system, have not
prevented auto insurers from profiting with an approach that essentially
parallels Sawyer's view of the CGL policy.
18 See Weston, supra note 9 (describing broadening of property and
automobile insurance in similar fashion to the CGL movement during mid-
twentieth century); French, Profits Over Purpose, supra note 9, at 27-29; see
also ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW § 13A[a], at 29-30, § 6oA, at 391-92 (4th ed. 2007) (identifying marine,
life, and liability insurance as essentially written on an all-risk bases); GEORGE
E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENTAND INSURANCE 109 (9th ed. 2005).
19 See infra TAN 199-203; French, Profits Over Purpose, supra note 9, at
29 (describing Hurricane Andrew's responsibility for $23 billion in losses in
1992, Hurricane Wilma's responsibility for $23 billion in losses in 2005, and
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and other property coverage, along with the segmentation of
insurance products overall, underscores how little has been
accomplished in spite of Katrina and other disasters. Only life
insurers appear to have followed the Sawyer model - and it has
been a successful model for them,2o although life insurance is as
much of a financial investment activity as one of risk-spreading,
regarding the risk of premature death.21
In addition, some specialized policies linked to death (e.g.,
flight insurance, accident insurance, burial insurance) are
narrowly drawn.- However, these insurance products are
notoriously bad deals for their purchasers23 (and perhaps for
Hurricane Katrina's cause for $43 billion in losses); see also Bradley G.
Bodiford, Florida's Unnatural Disaster: Who Will Pay for the Next Hurricane?,
21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 149, 156, 161-62 (2010).
20 The typical life insurance policy provides death benefits without regard to
the cause of death, subject to a small (as compared to other insurance products)
number of exclusions involving dramatic risks such as death in combat. See
DORFMAN & CATHER, supra note 16, at 168; REJDA, supra note 18, at io9;
VAUGHN &VAUGHN, supra note 16, at 262.
21 See DORFMAN & CATHER, supra note 16, at 227.
22 Flight insurance, for example, provides life insurance coverage for the
passenger/policyholder, but only for the time when the passenger is en route.
Similarly, accidental death insurance only covers death caused by an accident
and excludes death due to disease or natural causes. The somewhat misnamed
burial insurance (more properly called industrial life insurance) is a small face-
value general life insurance policy that normally covers death due to any cause,
but provides such small benefit amounts that the policy proceeds are largely
consumed by burial expenses, hence the name. See JERRY, II & RICHMOND,
supra note 18, § 13A[2], at 35-36.
23 These narrower versions of life products are inferior because they provide
the policyholder with only limited protection, but do so at a cost that is relatively
high for the amount of coverage received when compared to comparable regular
life insurance. For example, a flight insurance policy provides coverage only if
the life insured perishes on a particular flight. Even for long flights to Europe or
Asia, this means coverage lasts only for hours and perhaps maximally a day or
two. In return, the purchaser typically pays a premium per thousand dollars of
coverage that would buy a much longer period of regular life insurance
coverage, which would also insure against the risk of death by nearly any cause
during that time period (save for extraordinary risks such as war), not merely
the risk of crashing while on a particular flight. See ROBERT H. JERRY II &
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW §32[C] (discussing
flight insurance, which limits coverage only to death occurring as a result of
18o
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beneficiaries as well).24 These products serve to again illustrate
the superiority of bundling and broad-based policies - at least if
the goal of effectively providing insurance is as important as
wringing all possible profits from the enterprise.25
A more comprehensive approach to writing risk coverage
would serve the legitimate interests of insurers and society,
while reducing opportunistic behavior by insurers.26
crashes involving particular flights or over a short time period, as a form of
"Vending Machine Insurance," although the product may also be sold at kiosks
in airports); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Timeless and Ahead of Its Time: Lachs v.
Fidelity & Casualty of New York, 2 NEv. L.J. 319 (2002)(describing nature of
flight insurance and leading case involving this product).
24 For the reasons noted in note 23, the beneficiary of a flight, accident, or
burial insurance policy would have been better off if the policyholder/CQV had
used the same amount of premium dollars to purchase a standard life insurance
policy. This is because the standard life insurance policy would have provided a
larger policy limit, as well as created fewer opportunities for the insurer to
question coverage (e.g., whether the death of an individual was the result of an
"accident" or due to natural causes).
In addition, the narrow and specialized nature of these policies provides
additional risk of post-death coverage disputes. See, e.g., Lachs v. Fid. & Cas.
Co. of N.Y., 118 N.E.2d 555 (N.Y. 1954) (dispute regarding application of
language limiting coverage to flights on "scheduled" airlines results in denial of
coverage successfully overcome by beneficiary, with court split and devoting
substantial resources to resolving dispute); see also STEMPEL, ET AL., supra note
16, at 187-95 (excerpting Lachs as example of problems presented by vending
machine-style marketing of policy at airport); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Timeless and
Ahead of Its Time: Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York: Timeless and
Ahead of Its Time, 2 NEv. L.J. 319, 320-21 (2002) (finding Lachs correctly
decided in favor of coverage, but noting strongly respected opinion to the
contrary, and difficulty presented by marketing of flight insurance as well as
language used to limit insurer risk).
25 In the interests of time and space, this paper assumes that there is
reasonable agreement that insurance, probably more than most enterprises is
affected with a public interest, and that the overall impact on society of a more
comprehensive, as opposed to a more fragmented model of insurance, is as
legitimate a consideration as the profitability of insurers.
26 When insurance products are more fragmented and complex, with more
restrictions on coverage, insurers are presented with more borderline cases of
coverage and hence, greater discretion to accept or reject coverage. This
discretion can be influenced by the size of the claim as well as the importance of
retaining the goodwill and business of the policyholder in question. This also
provides the insurer with further opportunity to engage in opportunistic
behavior, including the denial of claims or the making of inadequate settlement
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Unfortunately, the insurance industry has been moving in the
opposite direction and may never again duplicate the mid-
twentieth century feat of Sawyer and liability insurers, unless
the industry is prompted by government regulation aided by apt
judicial resolution of coverage disputes. Regulation can be
justified on economic, psychological, and moral grounds,
despite objections of the industry and defenders of market-
based product development. Furthermore, despite insurer
resistance, a comprehensive approach can be an effective route
to profitability and sound public policy.
Part I of this article describes the background and theory of
the CGL policy. Part II describes the success of CGL and its
comprehensive approach, successfully taking place in spite of
the asbestos mass tort and other liability challenges of the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Part III notes the
success of other comprehensively written insurance products
during the twentieth century. Part IV addresses the retreat from
the comprehensive approach in general liability insurance and
other property/casualty lines. Part V proposes a recommitment
to the comprehensive coverage ideal and argues that a more
comprehensive approach not only serves policyholder and
public interest, but also serves insurer business interests as well.
Part V addresses the role of regulators, courts, and the insurance
industry's effect on a movement back toward comprehensive
coverage.
I. SAWYER'S APPROACH TO RISK AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE CGL
The CGL policyT7 has its roots in the 193os and was
established during the 1940s. 28 The first standardized CGL
offers as a response strategy. When the policies are sufficiently fragmented and
complex, even harsh coverage denials or claims practices can often be
sufficiently defended so that an assessment of bad faith damages against the
insurer is unlikely.
27 The renaming of the CGL from "Comprehensive" to "Commercial"
General Liability policy took place in the 1986 revisions to the CGL, as the
insurance industry sought to avoid the broad coverage connotation of the word
"comprehensive." As stated in Part 1 of this article, the advent of the CGL policy
is more extensively discussed in STEMPEL, supra note 3, § 14.O, and Jeffrey W.
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form, crafted by the National Bureau of Casualty and Surety
Underwriters and the Mutual Casualty Insurance Rating
Bureau, was issued in 1941.29 In 1943, a revised standard CGL
form was issued and became widely used. The CGL policy was
revised again in 1947, and significantly revised in 1955, 1966,
1973, and 1986.3o The two rating bureaus that crafted the CGL
policy eventually merged into the Insurance Services Office
("ISO"). ISO continues to draft subsequent revisions to the
standard form CGL.31
Liability insurance is "a relatively new line" of insurance
coverage that began in the late nineteenth century in England.32
During the first part of the twentieth century, various types of
more sophisticated liability insurance products arose: Public
Liability Insurance; Owners', Landlords', and Tenants' Public
Liability Insurance; Manufacturers' Public Liability Insurance;
Contractors' Public Liability Insurance; Contractual Liability
Insurance; Owners' Protective Liability Insurance; Contractors'
Protective Liability Insurance; Premises and Operations
Insurance; and other separate liability insurance coverages.33
The CGL policy is derived in significant part from Public
Liability Insurance and Premises and Operations Insurance, but
with additional, more inclusive coverages, as implied by the
name "comprehensive." At roughly the same time, insurers also
began to offer defense of liability claims as part of the insuring
agreement.
Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance
After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 355-58 (2OO6).
28 See SAWYER, supra note 2, Ch. 3 (1943); Insurance Issues and Superfund:
Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 99th Cong. 149
(1985) (statement of Richard A. Schmalz, Am. Ins. Ass'n).
29 See SAWYER, supra note 2, Ch. 2.
30 See EUGENE ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.02 (noting less significant
revisions of the CGL in 1988, 199o, and 1993).
31 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 34 (4th ed. 2005).
32 See ALBERT H. MOWBRAY ET AL., INSURANCE: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES 233 (6th ed. 1969).
33 See SAWYER, supra note 2.
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Prior to the advent of the CGL policy, the aforementioned
types of liability insurance listed above were each sold
separately.34 This presented difficulties for both insurers and
policyholders. Insurers disliked the increased potential for
adverse selection by policyholders, who might purchase only
coverage more likely to be needed, while refusing to buy other
coverages, thereby depriving insurers of potential premium
dollars.35 This also raised pricing problems and fairness issues
because some customers subsidized the coverages of others. It
was also thought that presenting this much choice to some
policyholders would encourage unduly risky behavior as
policyholders gambled on the types of coverages they would
need. Rating the multiple coverages was also difficult because of
the narrow focus of risk assumed and the smaller pools of
premiums for collection and investment.36
In response to the problems of splintered policies and
coverages, the liability insurance industry developed the CGL
policy. Instrumental in the process was Sawyer, an attorney for
the National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters prior
to its merger with the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau to form
the ISO. Explaining the rationale for the move toward
consolidated liability coverage, Sawyer wrote:
Whereas, in the past we have offered multiple
separate liability covers, each excluding hazards
within other covers and each being optional with
the insured, and have insured only against hazards
within the covers chosen by the insured, we now
insure against all of the hazards within the scope
of the insuring clause which are not specifically
mentioned as excluded. Stated differently, instead
of insuring against only enumerated hazards we
now insure against all hazards not excluded....
34 Id. at 13.
35 Id. at 14.
361d. at 12-18.
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Liability insurance is now in the process of
transition from the multiple separate covers to one
comprehensive cover.37
In addition to creating something closer to "one stop
shopping" for businesses, risk managers, and brokers, the CGL
policy was also designed to help insurers manage their liability
exposure and to accept risk transfer profitably. Sale of the more
expansive and bundled CGL policy required business
policyholders, in many cases, to buy more insurance and pay
more premiums than would otherwise have been the case.38
37 Id. at 11.
38 Id. at 135 ("[CGL] insurance offers opportunities for the producer to
increase his own income through the placing of additional insurance .... ); Id.
at 145 ("[T]he producer should do his utmost to place comprehensive liability
insurance with every risk that has a need for it. Few businesses are too small to
need it or to make it unprofitable to the producer to sell it."); Thomas M. Reiter,
et al., The Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying the Course, 59 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1165, 1223-24 (1991) (CGL policy was sold as comprehensive policy
providing "peace of mind" for policyholders for which insurers in turn
demanded and received larger premiums); John H. Eglof, Liability Insurance,
The Outside, BEST'S FIRE & CAS. NEWS, May 1941, at 19-20, 56-57 (arguing that
bundling of liability coverages into comprehensive policy would enable insurers
to obtain greater premium volume by encouraging sale of broad coverage
product rather than more selective insurance purchases by policyholders; citing
example of initial liability insurance premium of $1o/year that could be "built
up" to annual premium of $700 for comprehensive policy; Eglof was Supervisor
of the Agency Field Service of The Travelers Insurance Company.).
It appears that Sawyer and Eglof were not only aware of the potentially
greater profits from CGL sales, but also genuinely saw the broad coverage
product as better for policyholders, and even society. In a bit of hyperbolic
boosterism that now seems part of a bygone era, Sawyer stated that "[i]f every
producer would make a real effort to sell [CGL coverage] to every business on
his books, he would be making a contribution toward the solution of war and
postwar problems of far-reaching importance." See SAWYER, supra note 2, at
145-46. Although Sawyer's appeal seems more than a little overwrought, his
sincerity appears genuine. He consistently argued for the mutual advantage (for
insurer and policyholder) of the comprehensive approach and sought to have
insurance move toward a supremely comprehensive all-risk model.
There seems to be little doubt that the ultimate goal is an "all risk" liability
policy. Such a policy would cover all liability hazards of the insured. It would
not be limited in any way except to tort liability .... [It] is still far in the future.
.. [and requires] a long series of intermediate steps [but is] the general direction
in which we are traveling.
See SAWYER, supra note 2, at 115-16.
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These greater premium receipts could be used by insurers to
earn more money on investment of premium dollars. In the
194os, as today, insurers made much of their profit on the
"float" of holding premium dollars as investments for many
years before they were typically required to pay claims.39
Without a doubt, the object of the insurance industry, in
crafting the CGL, was to offer for sale an attractive product
providing comprehensive insurance protection in order to both
reduce adverse selection and to encourage greater premium
payments by policyholders. An insurance company executive,
writing at the time of the promulgation of the CGL policy,
emphasized its breadth of coverage:
[With the CGL policy form, the] burden of
determining what to insure and what not to insure
is removed from the shoulders of the insured and
39 Insurers make substantial profits because of the time value of the funds
they hold due to premium payments. Insurers profit from this "float" and
investment income for years prior to paying claims. Even where the amount of
claim costs exceeds premium collections, insurers typically make money
because of earnings on these collected premiums prior to payment of related
claims costs. Warren Buffett, who has described his company, Berkshire-
Hathaway, as primarily an insurance company, notes that the insurers owned
by Berkshire-Hathaway earn most of their profits, not from underwriting, but
from the float of premiums collected well before claims are paid under the
policies for which those premiums were charged. See Letter from Warren
Buffet, Chairman of the Board, to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.,
(Feb. 28, 2OO1), available at http://www.berkshirehathawav.com/letters/
2ooopdf.pdf. Buffet makes a similar observation, in varying degrees of detail,
in nearly every one of his annual letters to shareholders issued during the past
two decades. See also Richard E. Stewart & Barbara D. Stewart, The Loss of
Certainty Effect, 4 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 29, 32 (2003) (insurers have
explicitly recognized that "the earnings on funds reserved for claims [are] the
most significant component of earnings for a property-liability insurance
company."). Additionally, "[i]nsurance managements are more than sufficiently
intelligent to see that delaying the payment of claims increases the float period
and denying claims decreases the cost." Id. See generally SCOTT E.
HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 123-25
(Michael W. Junior et al. eds., 1999) (insurers profit on investment income and
delayed payment of claims; underwriting cycles can vary according to changes
in investment return, and in reaction to previous pricing strategies as well as
"capital shocks" from large losses); GREENE, supra note 14, at 147 ("In property
and liability insurance, investment income has accounted for a very substantial
portion of total profits and has served to offset frequent underwriting losses.").
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placed squarely on the producer and the carrier.
How much better it is to say - "We cover
everything except this and this and this" - instead
of "We cover only this and this and this."
No longer will an insured with Owners', Landlords'
and Tenants' coverage in one company and
Elevator coverage in another company take them
both to court to prove where the claimant fell
down....
Since a risk cannot choose the kind of accident
that will give rise to the need for liability
insurance, it is wise to be protected against all
losses under one policy - One policy - one
premium and worry regarding liability insurance
is off his mind.4o
The CGL policy was structured with a broad insuring
agreement, but then utilized exclusions as necessary to protect
insurers from certain risks. The exclusions in the CGL policy are
provisions that narrowed the scope of coverage. For example,
intentionally caused injury was excluded, as was liability
assumed by contract, automobile, aircraft, or watercraft liability,
employee injuries, and damage to the policyholder's own
property or own products.
The insurer impulse to broaden coverage in the CGL policy
(but to be correspondingly paid higher premiums for the greater
coverage), continued during the first quarter-century of its use.
The original CGL policy provided coverage where an injury
giving rise to a liability claim was "caused by accident." The
term "accident" was not defined in the original CGL policy, the
1943 CGL form, the 1947 form, or the 1955 form. Courts are
divided significantly on the question of whether an injury-
producing event must be discrete and isolated in order to
constitute an "accident." An emerging, but not overwhelming,
majority of courts concluded that an "accident" need not be
confined in time and space and could be an injury-producing
40 See Eglof, supra note 38, at 19.
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event taking place over a longer time span.41 Many insurers
were opposed to this perceived judicial trend, arguing that an
"accident" needed to be an event confined in time and space.
During the 1955-1966 period, these insurers either changed
their views, or accepted that this elongated judicial
interpretation of the "accident" trigger of coverage was
inevitable.42 In addition, some insurers offered occurrence-basis
coverage, which was an attractive competing product because it
clearly provided coverage for liability that resulted from ongoing
conditions. In response, as part of the insurance industry's 1966
revision to the standard CGL policy, the term "occurrence" was
substituted for the term "accident," with an "occurrence" being
defined as "an accident, including injurious exposure to
conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily
injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured."43 Regarding the 1966 Form, one
attorney representing insurers commented:
41See ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §1.O8, at 1-33, 1-
36 - 1-37 (1997); ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 117.3,
at 274-76 (2d ed. 1981). Compare Jackson v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp.,
248 N.Y.S. 207, 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931), affd, 259 N.Y. 559 (N.Y. 1932)
(holding that an "accident" must be confined in time and space), with
Hauenstein v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 65 N.W.2d 122, 126 (Minn. 1954),
and Shipman v. Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 125 S.E.2d 72 (Ga. Ct. App.1962)
(holding that an "accident" may take place over time). Hauenstein, a "property
damage" case under the CGL, would have come out differently today because
the 1966 form changed the definition of the term "accident" to require
"physical" injury (not economic injury alone). However, the Hauenstein
analysis regarding the term "accident" remains reflective of the emerging
majority view of the time.
42 See, e.g., John J. Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the
Changes, 33 INS. COUNS. J. 223, 223 (1966) ("The principal reason given for
revision of the policies [from the 1955 form to the 1966 form] was adverse court
decisions."). Tarpey was a partner in the New York-based law firm LeBoeuf,
Lamb &Leiby (which subsequently became LeBoeuf, Lamb & Leiby, a firm that
continued to represent insurers in coverage matters, which then merged with
the Dewey Ballentine Firm prior to the ultimate demise of Dewey LeBoeuf in
2012 due to financial difficulties). He was also a member of the Federation of
Insurance Counsel. Id.
43 BRITION D. WEIMER, CGL POLICY HANDBOOK § 3.Ol[A], at 3-3 (2nd ed.
2012).
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Probably the most significant portion of the
definition [of "occurrence"] is the phrase "during
the policy period". . . . This should remove
problems of interpretation where causative factors
operate over a long period of time before any harm
results and also where the negligent act or the
operative legal fact is far removed in time from the
happening of the injury (e.g., a defect in
manufacture, the sale of the product).44
In other words, coverage was not only comprehensive for a
given policy period, but insurers also accepted the risk of
coverage for injuries taking place over multiple policy periods.45
44 Tarpey, supra note 42, at 224. The language of the 1966 form's definition
of "occurrence" also clarified what had long been the understanding of the
insurance industry and the courts: the bodily injury or property damage caused
by an accident/occurrence must produce injury or damage "during the policy
period" in order to trigger coverage. If a policyholder was negligent (either
episodically or chronically), but the negligence did not harm any third party
during the policy period, there was no insured event and no trigger of coverage.
If, however, this negligence produced injury in a later year, the occurrence basis
CGL insurance applicable to the year of injury would be triggered and would
respond to the claim. With the change from an "accident" policy to an
"occurrence" policy, the focus of the trigger inquiry shifted from some
uncertainty as to timing to a focus on the time at which the third party allegedly
suffers injury due to actions for which the policyholder is legally liable. Id.
45 See Gilbert L. Bean, New Comprehensive General and Automobile
Program: The Effect on Manufacturing Risks 6 (Nov. 15-18, 1965) (unpublished
paper) ("[C]overage no longer attaches when the accident occurs but rather
when the injury or damage takes place. This means that the policy in force
when a particular injury or damage takes place is the one which applies,
regardless of when the causing accident took place."). Bean was an executive
with Liberty Mutual and one of the drafters of the 1966 CGL. Id. at i; see also id.
at 7 (noting possibility that events taking place long ago can trigger coverage in
subsequent policy years if the injury from those events takes place during later
policy years); Richard H. Elliot, The New Comprehensive General Liability
Policy, in LIABILITY INSURANCE DISPUTES 12-3, 12-5 (Sol Schreiber ed., 1968)
("[F]or the purpose of applying coverage - the injury must take place during
the policy period."). Elliot was an insurance industry official. Id. at 12-3; Letter
from E.W Sawyer, Attorney, to Robert L. Mannon, Fireman's Fund (June 8,
1939).
Under the majority of judicial decisions and what appears to be the majority
view of the application of the "accident" trigger, the result would be the same: it
was the injury, not the antecedent negligence or other liability-creating conduct
that triggered the CGL policy. Accidents "in the air," so to speak, did not trigger
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In the 1973 revisions to the CGL form, there was also a technical
modification to the "occurrence" and "bodily injury" terms of the
policy.46 Insurers understood that an occurrence trigger would
potentially provide coverage for gradual, ongoing, or continuous
injury. As one insurer representative put it, although "[iun most
cases, the injury will be simultaneous with the exposure," in
"some other cases, injuries will take place over a long period of
time before they become manifest," citing "[t]he slow ingestion
of foreign matters and inhalation of noxious fumes" as
examples. Thus, in "cases involving cumulative injuries, more
than one policy contract may come into play in determining
coverage and its extent under each policy."47
Using the examples of waste disposal and pollution, one
commentator illustrated the operation of the occurrence basis
trigger and its potential to result in triggering of multiple
policies using pollution liability as an example, noting that "if
the injury or damage from waste disposal should continue after
coverage. However, because in most instances, negligence and injury were
nearly simultaneous (consider, for example, poor driving, a careless workman,
or an exploding appliance), insurers were undoubtedly taken aback when the
asbestos tort arrived. Because inhaled asbestos continues to inflict new damage,
it had greater than ordinary potential to trigger multiple policies.
46 As noted above, the 1966 CGL form stated that coverage was triggered by
an "occurrence" causing bodily injury or property damage "during the policy
period". In 1973, this "during the policy period" language was relocated from
the "occurrence" definition to the bodily injury definition. Beginning with the
1973 Form, "bodily injury" was defined as injury, sickness, or disease "sustained
by any person which occurs during the policy period," including resulting death.
The relocation of this language was not intended to effect a substantive change
in the meaning of the CGL. See ISO Memorandum from Richard H. Elliott, Vice
President, Commercial Cas. Dep't, to Dwight V. Strong, Chairman, WAIB-IBAC
Comm. on Revised Liab. Forms 1 (Sept. 22, 1972) (excerpted in more detail in
Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage, supra note 27, at 366 n.40); Letter
from Richard H. Elliot, Vice President, Commercial Cas. Dep't, to Dwight V.
Strong, Chairman, WAIB-IBAC Comm. on Revised Liab. Forms 1-3 (Sept. 22,
1972) (containing ISO comments regarding 1973 CGL Revision).
47 See Norman Nachman, The New Policy Provisions for General Liability
Insurance, 18 CPCU ANNALS 196, 199-200 (1965) (Nachman, was at the time,
manager for non-automobile casualty insurance and multiple lines insurance at
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters); see also Bean, supra note 45, at
2 (emphasizing that 1966 form is "considerably broader" in providing coverage
for gradual injuries but emphasizing that "coverage, however, is still a casualty
coverage .....
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the waste disposal ceased, as it usually does, it could produce
losses on each side of a renewal date, and in fact over a period of
years, with a separate policy applying each year."48 Further,
because "[tihe policy limits are renewed every year, so the
underwriter of a manufacturing risk may have his limits
pyramid under this new contract. "49
Without doubt, liability insurers understood that the shift
from an accident trigger to an occurrence trigger constituted a
"broadening of coverage"5o even if they were not certain exactly
how this new trigger arising out of gradual or ongoing conduct
causing injury might play out in practice. Insurers realized that,
because of the breadth of the CGL coverage commitment, they
would need to control their exposure through other means such
as the exclusion of specific risks51 (today referred to as "lasering
out" particular risks) and the use of policy sub-limits for certain
types of problematic liability.2 Regular review of policies and
48 Bean, supra note 45.
49 Id.. As this commentator noted, insurers still retained significant
protection in that "the new policy still gives the carrier the right to cancel a
policy on 1o days notice." Id. But although this "may free the carrier from
liability for future injury or damage from a [sic] occurrence which has already
taken place while he was on the risk," this type of "cancellation would be no
escape from consequences of mishaps which had already happened." Id. at 7 ("I
doubt very much whether the courts would permit a cancelling company to
escape the inevitable consequences of what had already happened during their
period of insurance.").
50 See Memorandum from R.H. Elliott, Secretary of the National Casualty
Standards Bureau, to "Regional Vice Presidents," Jan. 4, 1937, attaching
Richard H. Elliott, The January 1, 1973 Changes in the Comprehensive General
Liability Policy and in the General Liability Manuals, Address to Kansas State
Association of Insurance Agents, Jan. 3, 1973, at 2.
51 See SAWYER, supra note 2, at 70 ("[T]here are situations in which it is
necessary to exclude from the application of the policy certain business
locations in their entirety or certain hazards at specific locations.").
52 See id. at 71 ("If higher limits of liability are required for one hazard, such
as elevators, the comprehensive policy may be written for the limits common to
all hazards and the higher limits may be afforded by endorsement for elevators.
If lower limits are required for one hazard than for the other hazards, the limits
must be reduced for the single hazard. In either case the hazard which is to
have different limits must be described in the endorsement in the same manner
as it would be described in a schedule or single cover policy. If the limits for the
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according adjustment of premiums or cancellation were also
seen as important to controlling risk under the more
comprehensive cover of the CGL form.53
In addition, insurers were well aware that expanding the
trigger of the industry's basic liability policy could expose
insurers to more uncertain risk than that presented by other
lines of insurance. Writing shortly before the 1966 revisions to
the standard form CGL policy, insurance authorities noted:
The possible liability loss tends to be much more
fluid and difficult to estimate than some other
types of losses, such as property losses. Changing
law and social outlook continually alter the size of
judgments, mutations being obvious in the recent
trend of verdicts in personal injury accidents. At
the same time, it is virtually impossible to put a
precise ceiling on a liability loss. Property may be
insured for its value, but many forms of liability
know no such easy limitations. The risk manager
of a large pharmaceutical house admitted that its
potential liability arising from products is virtually
a matter of guesswork.
Finally, the liability peril not only involves a loss
but may imply or seem to imply moral
hazard are to be reduced below the policy limits it is not necessary to bother
with the exclusions, because all of the coverage for the hazard is comprehensive
insurance."). See also C.A. KULP, CASUALTY INSURANCE: ANALYSIS OF HAZARDS,
POLICIES, COMPANIES AND RATES 38 (rev. ed. 1942) ("Liability forms have policy
limits which are based essentially not on the amount of insurance required for
full protection (which is incalculable) but on what the insured wishes to pay for.
Soundly selected, the limits will cover all but the most unusual losses. These
limits, however, apply per person and per accident not per year.").
C.A. KULP, CASUALTY INSURANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF HAZARDS, POLICIES,
COMPANIES AND RATES 38 (rev. ed. 1942)
53 See SAWYER, supra note 2 ("In considering surveys and audits one cannot
keep too closely in mind this feature of the comprehensive liability plan .... The
success or failure of comprehensive liability insurance rests almost entirely
upon the thoroughness with which the survey and audit are made."); id. at iio
(providing example of discovery of additional hazards and risks after audit).
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shortcoming of the party who is liable. Consider,
for example, the doctor charged with malpractice,
or the careless driver charged with liability for the
death of a pedestrian, or the defendant charged
with libel or slander or assault and battery. This
aspect, too, may have important implications for
any device to treat the liability risk.54
In essence, liability insurers "knew" that by expanding to an
occurrence trigger, they were increasing their own risk that
liability losses would span more than one policy period and
correspondingly increase their responsibility for losses such as
toxic torts or pollution.55 Certainly, insurers knew that by
adopting an occurrence basis trigger, they could potentially be
covering latent injury cases long after the initial exposure to the
harmful substance and that they were accepting the risk of
changing social and legal conditions as well as new knowledge
regarding the dangers of certain products or substances.
The drafters of the CGL revisions may not have anticipated
the large product liability claims and mass torts such as those
involving asbestos or hazardous waste, but they clearly
anticipated multiple policies being triggered by a liability hazard
and knew that this risk was less predictable than many of the
other risks they undertook. Insurers also knew that the design
of the liability insurance product could affect the tort liability
regime, in particular prompting wider recovery as judges and
jurors became increasingly aware of the likely presence of at
least some liability insurance for the defendant. It appears that
54 See HERBERT S. DENENBERG ETAL., RISKAND INSURANCE 472 (2d ed. 1974).
Accord, GREENE, supra note 14, at 289 ("[o]ne of the most serious financial
risks covered by insurance is that of loss through legal liability for harm caused
others."); KULP, supra note 52, at 78 (liability insurance and legal regime closely
linked).
55 See Nachman, supra note 47, at 199-200; ROBERT I. MEHR & EMERSON
CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 340-41 (4th ed. 1966) (noting that term
"accident" was sometimes not held to apply to injuries such as those "brought
on by repeated exposures to dust from cement" but that term "occurrence"
clearly applied to this type of injury and triggered coverage under a liability
policy) (note, too, the similarity between an injury from cement dust and one
resulting from asbestos dust).
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insurers willingly embraced this risk in the pursuit of broader,
more saleable coverage and corresponding profit.56
II. THE SUCCESS OF THE CGL IN SPITE OF
LIABILITY SHOCKS
Issues of mass tort and long tail liability have tended to
dominate discussion of whether broad form coverage such as
that favored by Elmer Sawyer and other industry leaders of the
mid-twentieth century retains viability. In particular, the
asbestos mass tort is often invoked as an example of the
problems insurers face when attempting to write broad
occurrence-based coverage.7 Although coverage obligations
56 See DONALD S. MALECKI & ARTHUR L. FLITNER, COMMERCIAL GENERAL
LIABILITY 115-16 (8th ed. 2005).
57 Insurers frequently worry that emerging liabilities could be the "next
asbestos." See Douglas J. Giuliano, Comment, Mixed Dust Claims - The Next
Asbestos, or Much Ado About Nothing?, 1 FIU L. Rev. 107 (2oo6); Susanne
Selafane, Homeowners Insurers Could be Named in Chinese Drywall Suits,
Legal Expert Says; Lawyers predict 'litigation explosion," but say drywall not
the 'next asbestos, National Underwriter (Prop. & Cas. Ed.), April 27, 2009.
The concern arises because policies written with any breadth that do not
specifically exclude coverage for a particular type of claim are at least potentially
implicated in coverage for matters that may take years to resolve, or decades as
did asbestos. See Special Project: An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political
Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 573, 709-10 (1983):
The expansive asbestos litigation and corresponding liability of asbestos
manufacturers pose grave problems for the insurance industry ..... When the
insurance industry drafted and negotiated the language in the insurance
policies, the concept of latent diseases was virtually unknown. Also, at the time
the policies were drafted, liability operated differently. Hence, policy language
that requires a single injury is inappropriate for latent diseases such as asbestos-
related illnesses. In addition, the available medical data cannot explain the
exact causes or etiologies of the asbestos-related diseases. The lack of medical
information concerning these diseases makes it difficult for courts to interpret
the insurance clauses and delineate liability clearly.
Because writing policies that provided comprehensive coverage and
accepted the risk of future medical and legal developments turned out badly for
the insurance industry, many of its members have since been resistant to
providing broad coverage, as reflected in fears over a possible "next asbestos"
and continued remembrance of the problems posed by asbestos for insurers.
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related to asbestos (along with pollution and product liability)
has of course adversely impacted the profitability of liability
insurance, it has hardly crippled the industry or the viability of
the broad coverage/bundled risk business model. On the
contrary, the manner in which insurers have weathered the
asbestos storm - despite forty years of tort litigation and 35
years of major liability insurance coverage litigation -
demonstrates the resilience of the comprehensive coverage ideal
as serving both risk management and industry revenue goals.58
See, e.g., In re Plant Insulation Co., 469 B.R. 843, 871 (Bkrtcy N.D. Cal. 2012)
("Asbestos claims present unique problems for courts and insurers" due to the
long latency period before manifestation of asbestos-related disease, which is
covered under the broad-based CGL policy, of which several governing years of
policy periods may be applicable); Jennifer L. Biggs, The Scope and Impact of
Asbestos Litigation, 44 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1045, 1047-55 (2003) (asbestos mass tort
presented substantial litigation volume and risks of large awards against
defendants that "hold insurance policies, so the increase in costs to defendants
also leads to an increase in costs to insurers and reinsurers.") (also noting
second wave of asbestos claims and coverage litigation in early twenty-first
century, as well as initial wave during 198os, each implicating insurance
coverage of broadly written standard CGL form). See also id. at 1071 ("the
United States insurance industry, through year-end 2OO, had paid $23.5
billion and was holding $13 billion in reserves for asbestos claims."); Ben
Berkowitz, The Long, Lethal Shadow of Asbestos, National Underwriter (Prop.
& Cas. Ed.), May 11, 2012) (asbestos claims and corresponding insurance
coverage issues continuing apace "[h]alf a century after the first wave of lawsuits
were filed for illnesses linked to exposure to asbestos and 40 years after new
regulation sharply curtailed use of the insulating and fire-resistant mineral;"
"when insurers AIG and The Hartford announced additions of $1.3 billion and
$290 million, respectively, to their asbestos reserves, the companies blamed
tertiary defendants that never anticipated litigation and now are being sued;"
insurers continually underestimate ultimate insurance losses because of
continued flow of new cases raising potential for coverage.).
When insurers finally realized the scope of the asbestos exposure they
faced, the industry excluded coverage in the 1986 revisions to the CGL form.
Chasten by the asbestos experience, insurers since 1986 have moved quickly to
exclude coverage for specific types of emerging claims such as toxic mold and
Year 2000 computer conversion problems in a manner inconsistent with the
comprehensive approach to insurance reflected in the CGL policy as envisioned
by Elmer Sawyer.
58 See Asbestos Loss Estimate Raised to $85bn, REACTIONS, Jan. 29, 2013,
at 8; see also Mark E. Ruquet, Overall Asbestos Losses to Rise to $85B,
PROPERTY CASUALTY 360: NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://www.propertycasualty36o.com/2o12/12/18/overall-asbestos-losses-to-
rise-to-85b (noting industry's asbestos losses of $2 billion per year).
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Notwithstanding the magnitude of the asbestos mass tort,
CGL insurers survived and have generally profited most years
despite the ongoing asbestos liabilities. Even a severe tort
exposure such as asbestos has significant traits tending to
advantage insurers, as do many other significant liability
coverage exposures. Adjudication and payment of claims has
extended over decades, postponing payment. As has been noted
in the past, "this allows insurers to garner years of investment
income and to pay claims in dollars whose real value has been
substantially reduced by inflation."59 By contrast, property
insurers must usually pay covered claims within a relatively
short time frame after receipt of premiums. The property
insurer thus gets far less benefit from either investment income
or the effects of inflation. And the perception that insurers are
put upon because of claims may help insurers procure favorable
judicial decisions that are perceived as mitigating their pain or
equalizing previous favorable decisions for policyholders.6o
The asbestos and pollution mass torts also enabled insurers
to structure products and operations in a manner that reduced
future exposure; 6' a response, of course, suggesting that
fragmenting risk may in time be necessary in order to protect
the viability of a bundled insurance product. However, it is
59 Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage, supra note 27, at 351.
60 See id. at 351, 443, 463-64; Mike Tsikoudakis & Sarah Veysey, AIG,
Marsh Formalize Seven-day Pledge to Pay Big Claims, Bus. INS., Mar. 11, 2013,
at 10 (describing announced commitment by AIG Group and Marsh to "quickly
pay multimillion dollar commercial property damage claims"); Michael Adams,
Florida Senate to Unveil Property Insurance Reforms, INS. J. (Feb. 1, 2013),
available at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/southeast/2o13/o1/31
(noting political dissatisfaction with dominance of Citizens Property Ins. Corp.
for windstorm policies when insurer was intended to be only a backstop to the
private market, a problem in part owing to the unattractiveness of insuring first-
party property damage windstorm exposures).
61 See Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage, supra note 27, at 351-53
& n.7, 363-68 & n.36, 443-44, 464, 467 (describing degree to which CGL
insurers became more sophisticated in protecting themselves as a result of
lessons learned from the asbestos mass tort. Also describing the degree to which
asbestos-related liability may have played a role in courts adopting doctrine
more favorable to insurers, such as pro-ration of responsibility of consecutively
triggered liability policies, not withstanding "all sums" language of insuring
agreement or expansive construction of pollution exclusion).
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useful to consider what might have happened if the asbestos
mass tort had not fallen largely upon the CGL form but instead
had been borne by a more specialized policy (e.g., a product
liability only policy, a toxic tort policy, an insulation contractor's
operations liability policy). In such a case, the insurer
underwriting such a specialized insurer would surely have fared
far worse than CGL underwriters who had earned premiums on
"winning" exposures such as slip-and-falls or garden variety
products claims sufficient to withstand the onslaught of losing
asbestos claims.
Today, some risks such as pollution liability have been
removed from the CGL form but are still subject to coverage in a
more specialized policy. But these more specialized
environmental impairment policies offer coverage only under
much more limited terms than were available under the pre-
1986 CGL form (e.g., claims-made format, tight temporal
discovery and reporting requirements, lower limits, higher
deductibles, higher premiums). It is a shadow of the hazardous
waste coverage once offered by the CGL.62
Had insurers elected to keep such coverage in the
comprehensive policy (using sub-limits, a co-pay or higher
retention, language akin to the former qualified pollution
exclusion or additional premiums), the risk-spreading impact of
6 2 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE §193 (describing evolution of pollution coverage
under standard CGL policy and specialized environmental liability coverage that
has emerged in the wake of restrictions on pollution coverage in the CGL
policy); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF Toxic TORT AND HAZARDOUS WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES
(1991) (providing overview of pollution coverage and exclusions in general
liability insurance and more specialized liability insurance); KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1986) (same, arguing to a degree that judicial willingness to provide pro-
policyholder construction of pre-1986 general liability insurance prompted
insurers to restrict pollution coverage in the CGL policy, resulting in less
coverage than would have been available under older policy forms construed
more favorably to insurers). See also MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 381-86 (8th ed. 2005)(describing insurer concern
about providing broad pollution liability coverage and use of EIL policies as an
alternative, noting that EIL policies use the more restrictive claims-made format
less useful to policyholders). Professor Dorfman noted the potentially large size
of pollution liability but failed to note that in the marketplace, EIL coverage is
seldom available in the large policy limits found for CGL coverage).
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bundling might have enabled general liability insurers to
continue to offer pollution coverage in an format more useful to
policyholders, using more restrictive policies only for high
pollution risks rather than creating a situation in which many
policyholders presenting only mild pollution risks undoubtedly
forgo EIL insurance because of the cost and limited coverage.
Potentially, insurers could have continued to capture premium
dollars by continuing to offer pollution coverage of some type in
the CGL without imperiling their risk pool
Whatever the scope of the basic property or liability policy,
notable torts and natural disasters aid the ultimate bottom line
of insurers by serving as advertisements for the product. After a
large loss event, the public (both commercial and individual), is
awakened to its need for insurance, tends to buy more of it (both
higher limits and broader coverage to the extent available) and
is willing to pay higher premiums for it. The losses of one bad
year are often recouped within a fairly short time thereafter as
individuals purchase more insurance in response to a
heightened awareness of catastrophic risk.63
Although some claims are commonly thought to be
insufficiently fortuitous to be insurable, actual insurer
operations belie this fact. For example, the purchase of new
63 See Report: Louisiana Homeowners Insurance Rates Rising More
Slowly, INS. J (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
southcentral/2o12/O1/16/231255.htm (describing increase in homeowners'
insurance rates following Hurricane Katrina); see also Todd Wallack, 2011
Storms Trigger Home Insurance Rate Hikes: Increases as High as 20 Percent
Proposed, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 4, 2012, http://www.boston.com/business/
personalfinance/articles/2o12/o3/o4/2O11 storms trigger home insurance_
rate hikes/?page=i (describing proposed increases in homeowners' insurance
rates in Massachusetts following a year that brought tornadoes, severe
snowstorms, and Tropical Storm Irene); see also Lynn Cowan, After Storms,
Insurers' Stock Sales Swell to Shore Up Balance Sheets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12,
2005, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI13435159oo3o19836
(describing insurance company stock sales after hurricanes to "shore up their
balance sheets as the claims come marching in."); see also HOWARD C.
KUNREUTHER ET AL., AT WAR WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISK
IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES 87 (2009) (describing increase in flood
insurance policies following major floods and Hurricane Katrina); Howard
Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather Than Discretion: Lessons from
Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 101, 106-07 (2006) (describing
relationship between consumers' past experience with severe weather with their
subsequent insurance purchases).
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insurance is viewed as unavailable after a loss event, though this
is not necessarily true. So long as there remains some element
of uncertainty, insurers can continue to offer profitable policies.
Consequently, even in the aftermath of a disaster, insurers can
make profitable sales of policies related to the catastrophe.
For example, after the MGM Grand Hotel Fire of 1980, MGM
purchased an after-the-fact CGL policy.64 The policy agreed to
defend and settle claims in return for a premium, one that
obviously increased over what would have been charged in the
absence of the fire because there was no uncertainty about the
risk of an occurrence of fire (it had of course already happened)
and the hotel's clear liability (as an innkeeper it was essentially
strictly liable under prevailing law). But there remained plenty
of uncertainty as to the ultimate net aggregate tally of damages
and the amount of claims adjustment expenses required to
manage the litigation. Rather than continue to manage this risk
based on its package of policies purchased before the fire and its
own resources, the hotel shifted this risk to a liability insurer
that was happy to be paid for accepting the risks posed by the
litigation.5 In essence, the insurer calculated that it could invest
the premium payment wisely enough to earn more than it would
pay out in claims and administrative costs, including defense
costs.
A related and more recent example of the insurance
industry's ability to profit even when accepting a large pool of
risk is provided by famed investor Warren Buffet and insurers
owned by Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway company. 66 They agreed
to take over management of asbestos claims for other insurers
or reinsurers on those risks.67 In essence, Berkshire acquired
64 In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Lifig., 570 F. Supp. 913, 915, 928 (D. Nev.
1983).
65 See id. at 928-29.
66 See RICHARD J. CONNORS, WARREN BUFFETIT ON BUSINESS: PRINCIPLES
FROM THE SAGE OF OMAHA 71-76 (2010) (chapter on 'The Assessment and
Management of Risk").
67 See Erik Holm, AIG Unloads Asbestos Liabilities; Buffett Gets 'Float,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2011, 12:O1 AM, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704658704576274662791668194.html (describing
Berkshire asbestos liability transactions with AIG, Equitas, and CNA Financial
Corp).
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billions of dollars in reserves held by these insurers (and the
ability to have them invested by Buffet) and can profit from the
arrangement even though it faces thousands of asbestos-related
claims. To be sure, Buffett is making a pretty big bet in favor of
his team's ability to resolve claims at a lower cost than what
others had anticipated and on his ability to earn adequate
returns on the acquired reserves. 68 And recent reports suggest
that the arrangement may not be working as well as originally
anticipated.69 But if the insurers can come late to the asbestos
mass tort and still make money, they can probably provide more
inclusive, less fragmented insurance products and make money.
In addition to assisting insurers in selling more coverage in
return for larger premiums, the CGL policy to some degree
saved policyholders from themselves, by forcing them to
purchase broader coverage that they probably should have, but
might be unlikely to purchase if shopping around (even with the
aid of an agent or broker), and selecting among an array of
products. Even fairly experienced or sophisticated policyholders
aided by intermediaries could miss something and have gaps in
coverage that would come back to haunt them in later years
when liability-producing events occur.
A collateral benefit that appears not to have been part of the
Sawyer agenda was the availability of more resources for
68 Buffett himself has acknowledged this. See Andrew Frye, Warren
Buffett's Insurance Growth Engine May Stall, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2012, 7:16
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-02/buffett-s-insurance-
engine-of-growth-set-to-stall.html; Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of
the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway
Inc. 7 (March 1, 2013), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com
/letters/20121tr.pdf ("If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and
eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment
income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of
free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it. That's like your taking out
a loan and having the bank pay you interest.").
69 See Erik Holm, Insurers May Face $11 Billion More in Asbestos Claims,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2012, 10:27 AM, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB100014241278873249072045781852240761221o6.html (discussing how
asbestos claims costs to date are proving higher than anticipated and
investment returns are less than anticipated); see also Ben Berkowitz, Analysis:
New Asbestos Charges Point to Reserve Woes, REUTERS (July 28, 2011, 11:07
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/20n/07/28/us-insurance-asbestos-
idUSTRE76R4CW2ollO728.
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compensating tort victims. The liability revolution of the
twentieth century probably would not have taken place without
the greater amount of insurance becoming available.7o This
exerted at least some hydraulic pressure on the judicial system
to expand liability71 and increase damage awards to tort
70 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 4-5 (2008); Tom Baker, Liability
Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort
Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2005); see also Adam F. Scales, The
Chicken and The Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham's 'The Liability Century," 94 VA. L.
REV. 1259, 1259-60 (2OO8) (book review of ABRAHAM, supra).
71 Or at least to relax or remove barriers to greater recovery. The judiciary
arguably created new rights of recovery or causes of action in cases like Escola v.
Coca-Cola, 150 P.2d 436, 463 (Cal. 1944) (imposing strict liability on
manufacturer rather than requiring claimant to prove negligence in the
product's manufacture or design); Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 689-92
(Cal. 1944) (applying doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to permit recovery by patient,
when medical equipment was left in body after surgery, without imposing
burden of proving negligence or proffering expert testimony); Dillon v. Legg,
441 P.2d 912, 925 (Cal. 1968) (permitting family member to recover for
emotional distress after seeing loved one killed, even though family member
was not physically in danger).
But in many instances, tort liability expanded, not because of new causes of
action, but because of relaxation or elimination of defenses to such claims. For
example, courts gradually restricted or eliminated the fellow servant rule,
assumption of risk, and intra-family immunity. Similarly, courts and
legislatures moved away from a pure contributory negligence regime (in which
any negligence by a claimant precluded recovery) to one of comparative
negligence, most commonly modified comparative negligence in which the
claimant was permitted to recover so long as its negligence was not greater than
that of the tortfeasor. Through a variety of developments, tort liability and the
reach of tort law expanded significantly from the 1940 until at least the 198os
and arguably through the end of the twentieth century. See Anita Bernstein, The
2X2 Matrix of Tort Reform's Distributions, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 273, 280-282
(2011) (analyzing the tort reform movement of the late twentieth century as an
attempt to curtail perceived overbroad expansion of tort law during much of the
century). See generally DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND
COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INJURY (5th ed. 2005); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 (2003); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE
AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (loth ed. 2000); W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984); Stephen D.
Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2403
(2000); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 21 GA. L. REv. 601, 605-09 (1992) (all noting the
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victims.72 And when these victims sought to collect, tortfeasors
that might otherwise be impecunious were able to pay (without
liquidating portions of their business) and continue on with
their work (without seeking bankruptcy protection).
In short, the CGL really does appear to have been a win-win
situation for affected constituencies. Insurers made money.
Policyholders obtained greater protection and more effective
risk management. Injured claimants received more
compensation. Claims processing and litigation also appear to
have become more efficient through an expanded duty to defend
with reduced "Alphonse vs. Gaston" finger-pointing between
insurers arguing over which specific policy covered the risk at
issue in the lawsuit.73 In addition, through the use of panel
counsel and aggregate claims information, insurers became
quite efficient at defending claims and resolving disputes,
almost certainly more so than most of their policyholders.74
expansion of tort liability during the mid-to-late-twentieth century, with some
backlash or contraction emerging in the last decade or so of the century).
72 Even where there was not an expansion of liability or removal of defenses,
courts gradually broadened receipt of evidence related to damages and
permitted higher jury awards to stand. See generally 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET
AL.,, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
UNITED STATES COURTS AND STATES COURTS (1975) (first volume of influential
multi-volume treatise published nearly contemporaneously with issuance of
new Federal Rules of Evidence, which took broad view of admissibility); 1
GEORGE E. DIX ET AL.,, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 11, at 69 (Kenneth S. Broun
ed., 7th ed. 2013) (describing the "gradual relaxation of the admissibility
standard" for opinion evidence); 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5177, at 893
(2012) ("Courts have embraced a number of doctrines, legitimate and
illegitimate, to expand the admissibility of evidence beyond the narrow confines
of Rule 401 relevance."). Some even permitted courts to use additur to increase
jury awards that were viewed as too stingy to claimants. See, e.g., Genzel v.
Halvorson, 8o N.W.2d 854, 859 (Minn. 1957).
73 See Eglof, supra note 38, at 19 (discussing assessment of Travelers vice-
president John Eglof); see also State v. Brown, 781 N.W.2d 244, 245 n.1 (Wis.
App. 2010) (discussing the metaphor of Alphonse and Gaston, two once-
popular cartoon characters engaged in a running joke of each waiting over-
politely for the other to proceed through a door, resulting in neither making any
progress through the door).
74 The insurer efficiency is not without some drawbacks for lawyers, who
often complain that insurance defense practice has become commodified and
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This assessment of the CGL policy may be too sanguine for
the tastes of many. Certainly, it clashes with the public relations
narrative of the insurance industry,75 a story that emphasizes the
tough nature of the business and paints liability insurers as
embattled guardians of sanity in a world dominated by the
"litigation explosion,"76 "jackpot justice,"77 "junk science,"78 law-
less financially rewarding as well as more difficult by insurer-dictated rules,
some of which encroach upon lawyer professional autonomy and effective
representation of the defendant policyholder. See generally Herbert M. Kritzer,
The Commodification of Insurance Defense Practice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2053
(2OO6); see, e.g., In re the Rules of Profl Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing
Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 8o6, 815 (Mont. 2000) (finding litigation
guidelines of insurer interfered too greatly with defense attorney's professional
responsibilities). Worse yet, some insurers appear to have adopted an overly
resistant attitude toward claims resolution, resulting in unnecessary trials and
unduly protracted litigation, with much of the cost externalized to the judicial
system and society even if the strategy is effective for insurers seeking to reduce
settlement payments. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Defining and Confining
Institutional Bad Faith in Insurance, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1 (2010)
(describing excessively sharp practices of major disability insurer).
75 Since the 1950s, and with renewed emphasis since the 198os, insurers
and potential business defendants have funded a fairly aggressive and wide-
ranging advertising and public relations campaign portraying the tort system as
excessively favorable to plaintiffs and unfair to businesses. See VALERIE P. HANS,
BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 70-75
(2000); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, 'The Impact That It Has Had Is
Between People's Ears:" Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers,
5o DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 459 (2000); Edith Greene et al., Jurors'Attitudes About
Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 4o AM. U. L. REV. 805, 805-
o8 (1991); Elizabeth Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Attitudes, A.B.A.J.
68 (Jan. 1979).
76 The "litigation explosion" is a favored term of those criticizing the tort
system as excessively claimant-friendly and hostile to business. As of July 25,
2013, the term appears in more than 2ooo articles in the LexisNexis database of
legal periodicals, a testament to its status as part of the lexicon of public policy
discussions about American liability law. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Day
After the Litigation Explosion, 65 MD. L. REV. 3, (examining claims of litigation
explosion and finding them empirically overstated in spite of widespread
acceptance of concept by public); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The
Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict,
and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 95-97 (1988) (noting
popularity of term and concept and suggesting that fears of a litigation
explosion have fueled support for unwise developments in civil procedure
doctrine).
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77 Although less common than the term "litigation explosion," the pejorative
"jackpot justice" is widespread (cited in more than 12o articles in the LexisNexis
database as of July 25, 2013). It refers to the notion that by submitting a claim
to a jury, plaintiffs are engaging in something akin to gambling in which for a
relatively modest investment in disputing costs they may reap a huge award,
particularly if able to achieve punitive damages. This narrative is flawed, of
course, in that punitive damage awards are relatively rare and seldom very
large. See Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92
IOWA L. REV. 957, 970-71 (2007) ("The empirical data shows that under none of
these tests have punitive damages been acting in a way that one could describe
as out of control. Studies in the 198os and 199os placed the median for
punitive-damages awards between $38,ooo and $52,000 per award. The mean
awards were, of course, very different from the median. For example, according
to the Department of Justice study, the median punitive-damages award in 1992
was $5o,ooo, and the mean award was $735,ooo. This illustrates the effect of
the rare multi-million dollar award--in that study, the mean was so high
because of a handful of extremely high awards. In fact, although the mean was
$735,000, more than 75% of all the punitive-damages awards were less than
2/3 that value (e.g., less than $250,000)." (footnotes omitted)); Robert J. Rhee,
A Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages, III MICH. L. REV. 33, 48-
49 (2012) ("The leading empirical scholars in this field, Theodore Eisenberg and
his coauthors chief among them, have shown that: (I) punitive damages are
infrequently awarded, (2) the amount of punitive damages is highly correlated
to the amount of compensatory damages, (3) the median ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages is less than 1.o, and (4) punitive damages are most
likely to be awarded for intentional torts and economic wrongs. The empirical
evidence shows that punitive damages are infrequent, stable, and predictable,
and that the myth of out-of-control punitive damages is 'groundless."' (footnotes
omitted)).
78 See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991). Huber, a fellow at the conservative, pro-business
Manhattan Institute coined or at least popularized the term and is perhaps the
most prominent of a number of commentators who argued that, during the
198os and 199os, courts had become too receptive to weak or even unfounded
expert testimony proffered by tort plaintiffs. See D. Michael Risinger,
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left
on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 101-03 (2000) (noting Huber's successful
intellectual entrepreneurialism with the term); see also Bert Black, A Unified
Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 604 (1988) (arguing, as
had Huber, that evidence rules were too lax and permitted too much receipt of
baseless expert witness testimony supporting plaintiff claims). These
arguments efforts bore some significant fruit in Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharm.,
509 U.S. 579, 592-97 (1993), in which the Supreme Court imposed significant
new requirements for admission of expert testimony and emphasized the role of
the judge as a "gatekeeper."
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suit "lotteries,"79 and "judicial hellholes."o This tale of woe
trumpeted by defendants and insurers is overstated.1 But even
if it were completely true as an indictment of the tort system or
the inefficiency of civil litigation, it does not undermine the
success of the CGL's bundled approach or the wisdom of
consolidated coverage generally.
Without a doubt, expanded liability such as product liability
claims, including claims involving prescription drugs and
medical devices, increased the exposure of many defendants and
their liability insurers during the second half of the twentieth
century. Hazardous waste claims put additional pressure on
liability insurers. And then there was asbestos - the greatest
mass tort in history. Nonetheless, these challenges to the
insurance industry are independent of the issue of fragmented-
versus-consolidated coverage. Regardless of whether a
defendant's liability insurance was in the form of a specific
policy or in the broader form of the CGL policy, the claims
would have been made and required defense and payment of
successful claims and settlements. Similarly, there would likely
have been coverage litigation of issues, such as trigger of
coverage and allocation of the responsibility, of multiple
insurers regardless of whether the policies at issue were broad
or narrow in scope.
79 A cousin of the term jackpot justice, the words "lawsuit lottery" appears in
more than 150 legal periodicals in the LexisNexis database as of July 25, 2013.
80 See California Replaces Philly Atop "Judicial Hellholes®" List, joined by
Jurisdictions in West Virginia, Illinois, New York and Maryland, ATRA (Dec.
13, 2012), available at http://www.atra.org/newsroom/califomia-replaces-
reforming-philly-atop-judicial-hellholes-%C2%AE-list-joined-jurisdictions. The
moniker "judicial hellhole" is applied by critics of the tort system to particular
jurisdictions perceived to be unduly friendly to plaintiff claims or hostile to
business. It appears in nearly 300 law review articles in the LexisNexis
database (as of July 25, 2013) and has been popularized by the American Tort
Reform Association (ATRA), which publishes an annual list of its perceived
worst ten such jurisdictions.
81 Much scholarly literature makes a strong case that claims of excessive
litigation or undue judicial support of plaintiffs is overstated. See Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
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If liability insurers stuck with the pre-CGL model, the
problems exposed by the liability century would not have been
resolved. Rather, they would have been focused on a few
particular lines of the specific insurance products that
previously dominated the field, including Owners, Landlords &
Tenants insurance or Public Liability insurance. This hardly
would have made the pollution and asbestos "crises" any better,
and may have made them much worse. CGL insurers were able
to weather the storms of these claims, in part because, the
inclusiveness of the CGL worked as a marketing and sales
device. This provided insurers with more premium dollars,
much of which were held during boom years for stock market
and real estate investment, giving CGL insurers vast resources
with which to defend, resolve, and pay tort claims - including
the troublesome pollution and asbestos claims. The same was
true of the reinsurers that backstopped the CGL carriers.
Without the benefits of CGL aggregation, particular insurers,
most saddled with such claims, might not have showed the
resilience of the CGL insurers.82
82 See Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage, supra note 27, at 417
(estimating that asbestos coverage liability is only a three percent drag on
insurer earnings). The business moves of Berkshire Hathaway and Warren
Buffet, acquiring books of business with substantial asbestos exposure in order
to obtain their money for investing is consistent with the view that the asbestos
coverage problem, although significant, has hardly been fatal for insurers.
Accord, Overall Asbestos Losses Reach $85 Billion, 360 ESSENTIALS, Jan. 2013,
at lO. Although $85 billion is, of course, a lot of money, this is the estimated
total liability of insurers stemming from asbestos claims that began during the
196os. After nearly 50 years, this amounts to less than $2 billion per year
during a period when liability insurers regularly wrote hundreds of billions of
dollars in premiums and amassed surplus and reserves of similar magnitude.
See also Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear Is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to
Underwriting Cycles, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 26o (2004) ("[I]nsurers
repeatedly rob the Peter of their present risk pool to pay the Paul of some prior
year's pool whose premiums turned out to be insufficient to fund its liabilities.
This process also works in reverse, of course, when insurers' actual experience is
more favorable than anticipated, allowing them to release excess reserves to
offset poor results experienced in later periods - robbing Paul to pay Peter in
this instance."); Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insurance: The Most
Misunderstood Industry, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Feb. 13, 2013, available at
http://knowledgetoday.whartonupenn.edu/2013/02-insurance-the-most-
misunderstood-industry ("Insurance firms also behave strangely. After they
suffer a severe loss, they may decide that a risk is completely uninsurable rather
than determining whether they should increase their premium. For example,
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Despite the blows of asbestos and other liability events, CGL
insurers remain in good health. As institutional repeat players,
CGL insurers were able to absorb the blows while
simultaneously taking steps to reduce the risk of such losses in
the future. In response to the tort upsurge, CGL insurers added
an asbestos exclusion, pollution exclusions, aggregate limits,
and other coverage-narrowing devices. These included adoption
of a claims-made approach to product liability or the separate
environmental impairment policies that are now offered
separately because pollution coverage is no longer available
under the CGL form.
To be sure, some of these protective reactions in the CGL
form are at odds with the inclusive approach. However, they
hardly make the CGL into a Swiss cheese policy, as long as the
curtailments of coverage are relatively few in number, clearly
demarcated, and expressed in relatively clear, unhidden prose.
The standard CGL can better be described as an insurance
product that now has a few mass tort holes born of experience,
but still provides generally comprehensive coverage. Even in its
modified form after the 1986 changes and influence from mass
torts, the CGL policy provides better protection for
policyholders than the smorgasbord of separate liability policies
that it replaced. And, as always, insurers charge higher
premiums when they offer more coverage, resulting in more
investment income. Compared to a return to more fragmented
general liability coverage, the CGL continues to be a success
preferable to the alternatives.
The liability insurance industry itself has demonstrated that
it is able to continue to use the CGL form as a prime means of
underwriting general liability risk. Most obviously, the CGL
remains offered to policyholders. Although the market may
occasionally experience "hard" periods of higher premiums,
restricted availability, and lower policy limits, the CGL remains
widely available at prices policyholders are willing to pay.
Furthermore, the dominant form of CGL remains an
occurrence-basis policy that policyholders generally prefer
because it shifts more risk to the insurer. In the mid-198os,
prior to 9/11, insurers did not price terrorism risk when providing coverage
against damage to commercial property. After 9/11, most carriers refused to
offer terrorism insurance because they feared catastrophic losses from future
attacks.").
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liability insurers sought to expand use of the claims-made CGL,
perhaps even using it to completely supplant the occurrence-
basis form.83 The effort, however, faltered and today the typical
CGL sold is an occurrence policy. Insurers responded to the
preferences of the policyholder market by continuing to offer a
broader form of coverage that has been sought out by
sufficiently important customers, rather than shrinking or
fragmenting coverage.84
Another example of the continued viability of the inclusive
CGL is provided by the risk in construction defect claims in the
late twentieth century. As the saying goes, they "don't build 'em
like they used to." Booming but frequently defective
construction, particularly in the Southern and Southwestern
United States, led to an increase in construction defect
litigation, sometimes aided as well by legislation and judicial
rulings favorable to homeowners. This in turn led to rounds of
coverage litigation as CGL insurers frequently interposed
coverage defenses based on business risk exclusions such as the
expected or intended injury defense, the "your work" exclusion,
the "your property" exclusion and the like.85
83 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795 (1993) (finding
that state attorneys general may proceed in action alleging conspiracy by
insurers to impose claims-made forms on policyholders in lieu of historically
dominant occurrence-basis form).
84 See O'Shaughnessy v. Smuckler Corp., 543 N.W.2d 99 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) (describing how in reaction to policyholder community opposition,
liability insurers restored substantial coverage by adding a subcontractor
exception to the CGL policy's exclusion for claims arising out of the
policyholder's "own work," a major benefit to construction contractor
policyholders).
85 "Business risk" exclusions refer to a related group of exclusions found in
the standard form CGL policy that are designed to prevent the policyholder
from receiving general liability insurance coverage where the plaintiffs claim
alleges mere failure of the policyholder's work or product to satisfy the plaintiff
customer or otherwise comply with contract specifications. Such cases of
business dissatisfaction between a vendor policyholder and a customer
complainant are considered business risks that should be borne by the
policyholder in a de facto self-insurance of sorts. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at § 14.13 (also discussing "your property," "impaired
property," contractual liability, and other business risk exclusions).
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In this coverage battle, policyholders (typically contractors
involved in the building of the homes at issue) had a major ally
in the "subcontractor exception" to the "your work" exclusion.
As the name implies, the subcontractor exception states that an
otherwise applicable exclusion barring coverage for claims
arising out of the defendant's work is not applicable if the work
was performed through a subcontractor.6 Because this is the
norm in modern home construction, the subcontractor
exception effectively negated the "your work" exclusion for
policyholder defendants who were general contractors or
higher-level subcontractors (e.g., the subcontractor who used a
sub-subcontractor to do the actual work). The subcontractor
exception was one of the few coverage-broadening aspects of the
1986 revisions to the CGL policy. It was adopted at the request
of the building community and agreed to by CGL insurers
because it made the CGL more attractive to builders facing
claims and facing the "your work" exclusion.87 In short, it
broadened coverage but was still acceptable or even attractive to
insurers because builders would continue to buy the CGL policy
and pay escalating premiums for the coverage because it saved
them from shopping around for targeted construction defect
coverage or self-insuring.
Since 1986, construction defect litigation boomed with a
fury, even outpacing asbestos or pollution litigation in states
that were more residential than industrial, such as Nevada and
Arizona. Despite this, there appears to have never been a
86 The "your work" exclusion removes coverage to the extent that the
damage of which a plaintiff complains (when suing a builder) is to work done by
the builder (i.e., the builder's own product, such as a roof, a wall, or in the case
of general contractors, potentially the entire home). The subcontractor
exception restores coverage to the builder if the defective work of the builder-
defendant was performed on its behalf "by a subcontractor," which is frequently
the case in modem construction. See ISO, CGL Form No. CG oo 01 12 07
(2006), reprinted in JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW
1289 (4th ed. 2011) (Appendix E). However, even without an exception, the
"your work" exclusion does not bar coverage where the builder defendant's
defective work causes injury to another part of the home or building. For
example, if a defective roof built by the policyholder allows water intrusion that
damages the walls and floor built by others, coverage exists.
87 See O'Shaughnessy, 543 N.W.2d at 99 (providing background on
subcontractor exception to the "your work" exclusion). See also supra note 84.
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serious attempt by insurers to eliminate the subcontractor
exception. Although there have been some adjustments to CGL
coverage prompted by construction defect litigation,88 insurers
continue to offer the product to builders notwithstanding their
frequent claim in coverage litigation that the CGL is "not a
performance bond."89 This reflects the continued strength of the
inclusive model of general liability coverage.
Despite the contractions of the CGL form, most notably with
the 1986 revisions, we largely continue, at least regarding
general liability, to live in Elmer Sawyer's world, albeit one that
88 The "Montrose exclusion" or "Montrose endorsement," which is really
more of a batching clause, is named for Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins.
Co., 913 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1995), which in essence adopted a continuous actual
injury trigger of coverage for consecutive liability insurance policies where the
defendant policyholder was accused of causing property damage to the plaintiff.
Montrose Chem. Corp., 913 P.2d at 904. As long as some injury to property
took place during each policy period, each policy was triggered. In the wake of
the decision, insurers issuing general liability policies to construction
contractors began including the provision, which states that where there is such
continuing injury, all injury shall be deemed to have taken place during the
policy period in which the continuously occurring injury first took place. This in
turn has the effect of negating the continuous trigger that would otherwise apply
by default rule of law and makes only one insurance policy responsible for the
policyholder's continuing infliction of this type of injury. See MALECKI &
FLITNER, supra note 57, at 116-18.
89 See, e.g., Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 67 A.3d 961, 984
n.31 (Conn. 2013) (insurer makes argument but is not successful); Emp'rs Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Donnelly, 300 P.3d 31, 35-36 (Idaho 2013) (insurer successfully
makes argument); Kvamer Metals v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d,
888, 892 (Pa. 2006) (same); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Wenger, 278 S.E.2d
874, 877 (Va. 1981) (same). The phrase, which is a staple of most all insurer
briefs when defending a coverage denial of a construction defect claim, argues
that if the policyholder's defective work is remedied by the general liability
insurer through paying a third-party claim, the CGL insurer has effectively been
converted into a surety. Unlike a surety, however, the CGL carrier has no right
to seek indemnification against the obligee whose poor construction required
the surety to complete the construction or pay for it to be completed.
What this rallying cry of the CGL insurer in denial fails to acknowledge,
however, is that in many construction defect cases the claimant is not alleging
simply that the work was substandard or unsatisfactory and is not seeking
merely to have it redone. In many cases, the construction defect has caused
injury to other property. In such situations, the CGL insurer is not being asked
to bond the defective work of the policyholder but rather is being asked to
compensate the claimant when other property is damaged by the policyholder's
activity, a classic form of general liability.
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narrowed during the latter twentieth century. The success of the
CGL suggests resisting attempts to constrict the coverage. It
also suggests the need to resist further fragmentation of the risk
in other lines of insurance and to begin to move to a more
inclusive model of coverage for these other insurance products.
Moving to broader coverage throughout the product lines of the
insurance industry holds substantial promise for all concerned
constituencies.
III. THE RISK BUNDLING OF THE EARLY TO MID-
TWENTIETH CENTURY IN OTHER INSURANCE
PRODUCTS AND ITS APPARENT SUCCESS
I dwell a bit on Elmer Sawyer and the CGL story both
because it is one I know better than the history of other lines of
insurance and because it has received considerable attention in
coverage litigation as policyholders typically invoke the history
as a factor favoring broad constructiongo while some insurers
resisting claims argue that the CGL should not be viewed as a
pure "all risk" policyl or a "performance bond,"92 and seek to
90 Despite having seen Sawyer invoked by many policyholders' briefs during
the past twenty years--and often addressed by insurers seeking to refute any
implication that Sawyer's broad approach requires coverage in the instant
matter), Sawyer remains seldom cited in treatises or cases. His work on the
CGL form is prominent in STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §
14.O and in ANDERSON, ET AL., supra note 3, at §1.O1, and is cited in U.S. Fire
Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 893 (Fla. 2007) (holding that CGL
coverage is available in construction defect claim) his CGL work is otherwise
largely overlooked (his treatise on automobile insurance is cited in three cases).
By comparison, Greg LeMond remains in relatively prominent public view.
91 See, e.g., George Tinker, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance -
Perspective and Overview, 25 FED'N INS. COUN. QTRLY 215, 220 (1975) ("The
history of the CGL is significant to an understanding of the policy. The name of
the policy itself gains in meaning when viewed in its historic context. The CGL
is 'general' only in contradistinction to 'automobile.' It is 'comprehensive' only
in the sense that it combines certain historic forms of coverage into an
integrated whole, with coverage being broadly stated in a single insuring
agreement and exclusions circumscribing the limitations of the broad grant.
The CGL is not, and was never conceived to be, an 'all-risk' liability policy.").
Tinker, Associate General Counsel for Kemper Insurance Companies at the time
the article was written, overstates the case. While the CGL policy is not
designed to be a multi-line policy, its structure is largely that of an all-risk policy
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avoid coverage for somewhat out-of-the-mainstream actions
such as negligent misrepresentation,93 breach of lease,94
chemically-connected injury that may or may not succumb to
the pollution exclusion,95 and construction defect claims.96
for the type of risks addressed. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 18
(suggesting that general liability coverage is in essence written on a all-risk
basis, albeit typically with a rather significant list of standard exclusions).
Tinker cites as his primary historical authority SAWYER, supra note 2. Tinker's
reading of Sawyer is excessively grudging.
92 See supra note 89, discussing the "not a performance bond" defense to
CGL claims.
93 See, e.g., Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540, 551 (Md. 1996)
(finding claim of negligent misrepresentation in connection with home sale to
fall within scope of CGL coverage).
94 See, e.g., Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229, 243 (Cal. 1999)
(argument that breach of lease outside scope of CGL ineffective when alleged
breach of lease by policyholder involved pollution that caused physical injury to
tangible property and met policy definition of "property damage." The court
rejected the argument that CGL insurance covers only tort claims and not
claims sounding in contract, focusing instead on whether, regardless of the legal
classification of the claim, it involves alleged bodily injury or property damage);
Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 15 P.3d 223, 233-34 (Cal. 2001) (finding no
coverage under CGL policy for claim alleging breach of easement where court
found no physical injury to tangible property from easement violation).
95 See, e.g., Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Sand Livestock Sys., Inc., 728 N.W.2d
216, 222 (Iowa 2007) (pollution exclusion construed to bar coverage for
worker's death at hog confinement facility due to carbon monoxide poisoning
from propane heater); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1997)
(rejecting insurer argument that pollution exclusion bars coverage for claim of
carbon monoxide poisoning against policyholder policyholder stemming from
faulty maintenance of furnace; Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 609
N.E.2d 506, 513 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting insurer attempt to apply a generalized
pollution exclusion to asbestos claim injury); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the "Absolute" Exclusion in
Context and in Accord with its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS.
L.J. 1 (1998). The question of the apt limits of the pollution exclusion can
produce opinions that appear inconsistent even within the same state and court.
Compare Kent Farms, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 998 P.2d 292, 295 (Wash. 2000)
(rejecting application of pollution exclusion to claim involving value failure that
exposed worker refilling gasoline tank exposed to gasoline spurting from the
tank, which caused immediate injury), with Quadrant Corp. v. American States
Ins. Co., 11o P.3d 733, 735 (Wash. 2005) (finding pollution exclusion applicable
to claim by apartment building tenant of injury from fumes emanating from
sealant used in treating deck). See generally RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY
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But the story appears to be the same regarding other lines of
coverage and other insurance products. After beginning as
relatively targeted products, insurance policies evolved during
the early-mid twentieth century into more comprehensive
covers, most likely for the same reasons that animated the shift
from individual liability policies to the CGL.97 Then, as
discussed further below, the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries saw a move toward more curtailed coverage as
insurers sought to limit exposure and isolate certain risks to a
greater degree.98
STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE: KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE 323-380
(2d ed. 2012).
96 See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 92
(Wis. 2004) (court rejects in insurer invocation of various defenses to coverage
of construction defect claims against policyholder based on purported
intentionality of activity and business risk exclusions where poorly done work
caused injury to other property); O'Shaughessy v. Smuckler Corp., 543 N.W.2d
99, 104-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting insurer interposition of "your
work" exclusion in CGL to claim brought against an architect and general
contractor due to the subcontractor exception that was part of the policy's
exclusion and was part of the standard CGL language due to construction
industry preference and insurance industry interest in serving customer
market). But see Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 791 (N.J. 1979)
(court accepts insurer argument that mere customer dissatisfaction with
appearance of construction work is not a covered occurrence under standard
CGL form). See generally MANILOFF & STEMPEL, note 95, Ch. 11.
97 See generally SAWYER, supra note 2; Tinker, supra note 91. In similar
fashion, automobile, homeowners', and business property policies also
expanded in basic scope during the mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., Weston,
supra note 9 (describing generally the expansion of basic homeowners'
insurance during twentieth century).
98 See Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, supra note
10 (finding substantial movement away from uniformly standard
comprehensive coverage for homeowners' policies and substantial overall
constriction in coverage).
[A]s was the case with CGL policies, the coverage by "all risk" [property]
policies has eroded over the years as insurers learned that certain risks or
policyholders were not as profitable as the profit imperative demanded [citing
examples of exclusionary language concerning earth movement, flood, certain
windstorm damage, cyber loss, and mold].
[I]n addition, . . . ISO's standard form "all risk" homeowners policy also
contains exclusions for losses caused by (i) collapse; (2) frozen pipes; (3) wear
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Automobile coverage provides a good example of both
bundled coverage and a mid-century move toward broader
coverage. For the most part, auto insurance is liability
insurance in that its main goal is to protect policyholders from
lawsuits and to protect their victims from impecunious
tortfeasors.99 All states require drivers to have auto insurance
(or to demonstrate in some other fashion that they are
sufficiently financially responsible to drive a potentially deadly
two tons of steel capable of speeds in excess of loo m.p.h.),oo
But the requirement is primarily that vehicle owners have
liability insurance--albeit at woefully small amounts--with
regulators relatively indifferent to the existence of other
coverages. But most "no fault" states and some others require
that the basic auto policy provide at least a modicum of first-
party medical benefits and compensation for lost work,
necessary domestic services, and the like.o l In addition, the
typical auto policy also provides first-party property coverage on
the vehicle for collision-related injury and damages from
vandalism or the elements, which is styled as "comprehensive"
coverage.
and tear; (4) mechanical breakdown; (5) corrosion or dry rot: (6) settling; (7)
birds, vermin, rodents or insects; (8) ordinance or law; (9) power failure; (io)
neglect; (11) war; (12) nuclear hazard; (13) intentional loss; and (14)
governmental action. In short, as is the case under CGL policies, the profit
imperative has reshaped the "all risk" property policy sold by insurers to
homeowners today so that such policies cover quite a bit less than "all" risks.
French, Profits Over Purpose, supra note 9, at 24, 30.
99 See generally DAVID D. THAMANN, BUSINESS AUTO: COMMERCIAL LINES
COVERAGE GUIDE (2d ed. 2004); DAVID D. THAMANN, BUSINESS AUTO COVERAGE
GUIDE: INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS (1998); DAVID D. THAMANN & MICHAEL K.
MCCRACKEN, PERSONAL AUTO COVERAGE GUIDE: INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS
(1999); see also DORFMAN & CATHER, supra note 16, at 177-78; REJDA, supra
note 18, at 205 ("Liability coverage (Part A) is the most important part" of the
basic auto policy).
100 See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 987 (all states have financial
responsibility laws that require automobile drivers to post security or have proof
of liability insurance in order to obtain license plates and drive owned vehicles).
101 See id. at 897, 1041-43; ERIC A. WIENING & DAVID D. THAMANN,
PERSONAL AUTO: PERSONAL LINES COVERAGE GUIDE 131-39 (2d ed. 2005); JACOB
A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL DAMAGES § 5:69 (3d ed. 2013).
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To be sure, there are some limits on the scope of auto
coverage, particularly when claims arise from something other
than the collision of two moving vehicles that produces a
negligence claim. An oft-litigated issue is whether injuries
alleged arose out of the use of an automobile, with jurisdictions
dividing when faced with claims such as a mishap when using
the car as a beast of burden,,o2 or from injuries incurred while
sleeping in the vehiclelo3 or pulled over on the side of the road.lo4
States also divide as to whether the standard policy covers a
vehicle's loss in value after an accident, as well as the cost of
repairing physical injuryl05 But for the most part, auto coverage
is broad coverage beyond the minimum mandated by the states.
The comprehensive nature of the standard auto policy
appears not to have hampered the insurance industry. To be
sure, auto insurance is not the easiest line to underwrite. Many
prominent carriers occasionally have loss ratios or combined
ratios in excess of loo. But some--such as, GEICO, USAA, and
Progressive--regularly have either or both ratios below loo,
which in essence means they are regularly profitable in spite of
offering bundled coverage.lo6 For the industry as a whole, the
102 See, e.g., Cawthon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1262, 1269
(W.D. Mo. 1997) (vehicle used to attempt to remove tree stump, which had
tragic results for child bystander when hit by flying stump upon its removal
from the ground; no coverage).
103 See, e.g., MacKenzie v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 580 N.W.2d 424, 429
(Mich. 1998) (injuries from inhaling carbon monoxide when vehicle's engine
used to provide warmth to adjacent camper attachment; no coverage).
104 See, e.g., Blish v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 736 So. 2d 1151, 1155 (Fla. 1999)
(driver mugged by hooligans when changing flat tire on car; coverage).
105 Compare State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114 (Ga.
2001) (auto insurer must compensate policyholder for the "inherent diminished
value" loss of value of vehicle that has been in a collision even if fully repaired
physically), and Campbell v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 1O9 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 1959)
(same), with Given v. Commerce Ins. Co., 796 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (Mass. 2003)
(rejecting inherent diminished value argument), and Siegle v. Progressive
Consumers Ins. Co., 788 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla. 2001) (rejecting inherent
diminished value).
106 An insurer's loss ratio is the ratio of loss expenses relative to premium
dollars collected. The insurer with a loss ratio below 1OO is taking more in
through premium receipts than it is paying in claims and is making an
underwriting profit. The combined ratio is the amount of claims payments
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combined ratio for the past decade has been roughly loo or a bit
lower.lo7
Although one might feel sorry for the auto insurers with
higher loss and combined ratios, they seldom go out of business
- or even lose money - because of the time lag between
premium collection and claims payment. There is a significant
delay between the time of premium collection and the time of
payment regarding the liability coverage component of the auto
policy, which is not only the most important part of the policy's
coverage, but also the element of coverage posing most risk
exposure for the insurer. During the time between premium
payment and any collisions and payments, the insurer invests
the premium dollars. The resulting investment income goes to
the insurer and is usually sufficiently large that even auto
insurers with combined ratios significantly in excess of loo can
make money. Insurers with better loss ratios make even more
money. lo8 The same relationship exists for all types of liability
insurers, some of which have much better loss ratios and longer
intervals between premium collection and claims payment,
which boosts investment income and allows the insurer to pay
the claims in dollars that are less valuable due to intervening
inflation.l19
Although generally liability insurers may gain the most from
the time lag between premium collection and ultimate claims
payment, all liability insurers enjoy this advantage. And
combined with administrative expenses relative to premiums collected. A
company with a combined ratio below ioo is making an underwriting and
overall operating profit.
107 See INSURANCE FACTS AND STATS, supra note 16, at 14. This typical
combined ratio and narrow range of variance applies not only to auto insurance
as a whole, but also holds when private passenger and commercial auto
insurance is separately examined. Id.
108 See supra TAN and notes 39 and 62 regarding the role of "float," which
means using premium dollars until necessary for claims payment, and
investment income in the insurer business model.
109 See Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage, supra note 27, at 351,
424, 432-33, 468 (liability insurers earn part of their profit by paying claims in
dollars diminished in value by inflation compared to value of money at the time
policies were sold years earlier).
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although auto liability insurers may face claims sooner because
injuries are more obviously immediate than with chemical,
pharmaceutical, or construction defect injuries, the costs of
defending the typical auto claim are likely to be lower than those
required for the often more complex general liability. Director
and officer, errors and omissions, and professional liability
claims, if written on an occurrence basis, would likely fall in the
middle of the continuum. But the standard practice of writing
these risks on a claims-made basis both shortens the time
between insured event and payment and reduces the carrier's
exposure, particularly to long-tail claims. The net result benefits
the insurer, who would otherwise write the risk on an
occurrence basis.
In short, liability insurers, even those with most of their
exposure in the litigious and plaintiff-friendly United States, can
do pretty well, even though they may experience combined
ratios above loo with some frequency.11o By contrast, property
insurers present a more sympathetic portrait, even if their
combined ratios are often lower than those of liability carriers."'
Unlike liability insurers, property insurers usually have
substantially less time between receipt of premiums and
payment of claims, depriving them of some of the opportunity to
profit from investment or inflation.112
In addition, property insurers can be subjected to a large and
immediate set of connected claims in a more dramatic fashion
110 See INSURANCE FACTS AND STATS, supra note 16, at 15.
ill See id. at 16-23 (property or multi-peril insurers experience combined
ratios above ioo with some frequency, but also often have ratios below ioo,
particularly for some narrower property coverages, such as crop insurance,
inland marine insurance, surety, fire, and earthquake coverages).
112 Property insurance is first-party insurance, which requires that when a
valid claim is presented, the insurer must pay within a reasonable time.
Although property claims disputes can drag on and even result in coverage
litigation between policyholders and insurers, liability insurance generally
entails more time between the insurer's receipt of premiums and the
subsequent payment-requiring events of an injury to a third party, a claim, and
a judgment against the policyholder. See generally M. Elizabeth Medaglia et al.,
The "Concurrent Cause" Theory: Inapplicable to Environmental Liability
Coverage Disputes, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 823 (1995) (comparing first-party and
third-party insurance coverage).
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than normally takes place for liability insurers, even those
exposed to mass tort claims. Consider the example of a
hurricane. Even if the insurer has worked hard to avoid highly
correlated risk--e.g., insuring only beach front homes
throughout the relevant season--a storm such as Sandy or
Katrina can cause widespread injury to the insurer's pooled risk,
and does so in one largely compressed time frame.3 By
contrast, even large-scale torts take longer to erupt and are more
dispersed in time and space. And rather than defending claims
against the policyholder as does a liability insurer, property
insurers are called upon to pay first-party claims within hours or
days of the loss. The result is considerably more cash flow and
financial pressure on property insurers even though (as noted
above) disasters often provide the insurer with the opportunity
to capture premiums that the public is willing to pay after
having the dangers to its property highlighted by a
catastrophe.l"4
Despite these pressures, property insurers generally moved
toward more consolidated coverage during the mid-twentieth
century. Homeowners insurance in particular became broader
and more bundled in scope. Although there are several different
113 This is not to say that large destructive storms do not put a strain on the
capital of even a well-run insurer with a large pool of uncorrelated risk. See
Chad Hemenway & Mark E. Ruquet, AIG Projects $2B Sandy Loss; Chubb,
Hartford, Hanover Among Carriers with Estimated Hundreds of Millions in
Losses, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Dec. 13, 2012, at 6 ("Catastrophe modelers say
Sandy could cause up to $25 billion in losses for the insurance industry-placing
it among the costliest disasters in U.S. history."); Ulrike Dauer, Sandy's
Insurance Bill Estimated at $25 Billion for Industry, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/arficle/SB100014241278873233745o457821929355527
4o84.html (estimating Sandy's losses for the insurance industry at $25 billion
and Katrina's losses at $62 billion).
114 See generally PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS & ROLE OF INSURANCE
AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (Howard Kunreuther &
Richard J. Roth eds., 1998) (tendency to purchase insurance after large loss
rather than before noted throughout book). Although this tendency, a logical
extension of the availability heuristic where people perceive more risk than is
actually present from an event--e.g., shark bite, lightning strike, terrorist
attack--that has been in the news, is almost intuitive regarding property
insurance, it appears that life insurance purchases also increase in the wake of a
natural disaster. See Stephen G. Fier & James M. Carson, Catastrophes and the
Demand for Life Insurance (Manuscript July 9, 2009) (on file with author).
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standard forms of homeowners insurance used, the most
popular during the late-twentieth century was the HO-3 form, n5
which provided comprehensive coverage, albeit through a list of
covered perils on personal property rather than an all-risk
insuring agreement, as was the case with the product's coverage
on the dwelling. In addition, the insurer indemnified covered
losses on the basis of the replacement cost of damaged home or
personal property in the home.116 Like the CGL policy, the HO-3
proved popular with policyholders and a moneymaker for the
insurers, as did the similarly comprehensive HO-2-7
demonstrating that bundled coverage can be profitably written.
As with CGL insurance, insurers in these other lines of
comprehensive coverage appeared to have done well financially
offering this bundled coverage. Although insurers are quick to
point out that they are at significant risk from information
asymmetry, adverse selection, and moral hazard in underwriting
liability risks, insurers are able to control these risks through
effective design of liability policies in order to limit their
exposure."8 Except in the softest of insurance markets, insurers
115 See Weston, supra note 9; French, Profits Over Purpose, supra note 9;
see also DIANE W. RICHARDSON, HOMEOWNERS COVERAGE GUIDE:
INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2002); Schwarcz, supra note 1O, at 1273
("In the homeowners insurance arena, the most commonly used form for stand-
alone homes (rather than condominiums or mobile homes) is the 'HO3'
policy.").
116 See Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Policies, supra note 10, at
1273 ('The distinguishing features of this policy are that it provides 'all-risk'
coverage for one's home and other structures (known as Coverages A and B in
the ISO policy) but "named peril" coverage for personal property (known as
Coverage C in the ISO policy). All-risk coverage protects property against all
perils except for those that are explicitly excluded, whereas named-peril
coverage protects property only against specifically enumerated perils.").
117 See Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Policies, supra note 10, at
1273-74.
118 For a discussion of these basic insurance concepts, see JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS 28-31 (1994); STEMPEL ET
AL., supra note 16, Ch. i; EMERIC FISCHER, PETER NASH SWISHER & JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW Ch. 1 (3d ed. 2004). Regarding insurer
capacity to respond to adverse events, "research has identified five main tools
that almost all insurers use to one degree or another: risk-based pricing,
underwriting, insurance contract design, claims management, and, less
frequently, loss prevention services. In addition, some insurers and their trade
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generally can draft policies to their liking, and of course, refuse
to issue policies absent sufficient comfort with the risk and
receipt of an adequate premium.9
Most important, both liability insurers and other carriers are
the classic "repeat players" of the dispute resolution game.12o If
an insurer loses on a particular coverage point, it normally
remains free to continue to litigate in other forums. Because
insurers, like banks, normally are large repositories of capital,
they are in a favorable position to win wars of attrition with both
third-party claimants and policyholders simply by wearing them
associations also engage in research and education and, sometimes, even
promote public safety regulation." Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by
Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L.
REv. 1412, 1418 (2013). This is a rather powerful array of tools, particularly for
companies that, if well managed, should be able to engage in long-term,
disciplined planning through a diversified pool of risks and portfolio of
investments. But see id. (finding regulation via liability insurance not as
pervasively effective in practice as predicted by theory); Tom Baker & Sean J.
Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors' and
Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1804 (2007) (finding similar
results when examining impact of D & 0 insurance on corporate behavior).
119 A "soft" insurance market is one in which coverage is widely available at
low prices as insurers compete aggressively to capture business and premium
dollars. Conversely, a "hard" market is one in which conditions are not
favorable for policyholders and coverage is restricted or available only at
relatively high premium prices. See MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 332 (8th ed. 2005) ("When insurance premiums
increase significantly and some types of coverage become unavailable ... [a]
risk manager faces what they call a hard market. The opposite portion of the
underwriting cycle, when insurance costs decline or insurers loosen
underwriting standards, they call, logically enough, a soft market. As a rule of
thumb, if insurance premiums equal or exceed 20 percent of the policy limit, the
market is hard.") (boldface in original).
120 A repeat player is one that frequently participates in the dispute
resolution system, while a "one shot" player is one that only occasionally
engages in litigation or alternative dispute resolution. The repeat player has
significant advantages in battling one shot players, including economies of scale,
acquired expertise, institutional memory, familiarity with adjudicators,
knowledge of forums, and the ability to spread losses and take the long view of a
dispute. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc. REv. 95, 98-1oo (1974). Individual
losses normally tend to be of relatively little consequence to the repeat player
while they are often devastating to the one shot player. Id.
220
Fall 2013 Vol111:1
Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy
down to accept sub-optimal settlements--all the while
continuing to earn investment income.121
But because of the pro-policyholder framework for assessing
insurance coverage erected to counteract the inherent
advantages held by insurers, insurers may find themselves with
massive coverage obligations under certain circumstances. To
take an obvious example, after a destructive hurricane, a
windstorm insurer such as Citizens--Florida's hurricane
insurer of last resort--will be paying a lot of claims, and
probably losing money in at least the short term, no matter how
well it may have priced coverage or constructed the policy to
avoid being required to also provide coverage for flooding or
other destructive forces. I- But after large losses come large
premium increases,l23 and for many working class and middle
class Americans, forgoing hurricane insurance is now not likely
to be seen as an option after the disastrous hurricane seasons of
121 See supra notes 39-44 (noting degree to which insurers earn substantial
investment income on premiums with premium receipts predating payment
requirements by years or even decades); Assessing the Coverage Carnage,
supra note 27, at 362-63 (citing V.J. Dowling, Remarks at the University of
Connecticut School of Law Insurance Law Center Symposium: Asbestos:
Anatomy of a Mass Tort (Nov. 3, 2005)) (same).
122 See Liam Pleven, Who Should Pay? As Number of Customers Rises For
Insurers of Last Resort, Rates May Be Headed Up, Too, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1,
2oo6, at Bi, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB113876o697o8o61726 (last visited Nov. 21, 2013) (noting Citizens' losses
after bad hurricane years of 2004 and 2005, but also noting that many Florida
homeowners are "in no position to shop around" because the "only company
offering a policy is Citizens Property Insurance Corp., Florida's insurer-of-last-
resort.").
123 See Susanne Sclafane, Florida Homeowners Rates Could Triple, Citizens
Warns, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CAS., Dec. 5, 2005, at 21, available at
http://www.propertycasualty36o.Com/2005/12/05/florida-homeowners-rates-
could-triple-citizens-war (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) ("We're looking at a
statewide average increase ... of 6o percent, with many coastal areas receiving
triple digit increases," according to Robert Riker, president and executive
director of Citizens Property Insurance Corp. in Florida--the state's largest
insurer of last resort."). Although general liability insurance rate increases have
been more gradual in response to the more gradual onset of asbestos mass tort
insurance coverage, the same economic and marketing factors are at work. See
George J. Church et al., Sorry, Your Policy Is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at
16-18 (describing abrupt rises in select liability insurance premiums).
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2004 and 2005. Consequently, insurers are in a relatively good
position to recoup past losses through future price increases.
Even if this were not the case, there is nothing unfair about a
legal regime structured to give policyholders the benefit of the
doubt in close cases after the policyholder has established that a
claim comes within coverage, or is potentially within coverage if
the question centers on the duty to defend). An insurance policy
is an aleatory contract, one in which the value of the exchange
may be lopsided depending on the contingencies involved.124 In
similar fashion, liability insurers underwriting asbestos
policyholders prior to the advent of the asbestos mass tort may
have been in a favorable business position. From the time of the
CGL policy's introduction in the 1940s until the arrival of
asbestos and pollution claims in the 1970s, the CGL appears to
have been a business success and large moneymaker for the
insurance industry.125 But when the asbestos mass tort arrived,
the basic contractual and legal framework of coverage
determination combined with the peculiarities of asbestos to
require coverage beyond that anticipated by insurers when they
first accepted the risk. This may have made the CGL less
profitable, but it hardly brought the liability insurance industry
to ruin.126
124 See infra TAN 263-270.
125 See supra TAN 61-9o.
126 See supra TAN 61-9o; see also supra note 58 (describing asbestos loss
amounts); see Fitch Ratings, Special Report, Asbestos: Impact on U.S.
Insurance Industry, July 25, 2002 at 9 ("[U]ltimately, the development of
asbestos claims will have a moderately negative impact on insurer ratings
during the next few years.") and at 1 (although asbestos liabilities will produce a
'slow bleed' that will depress future earnings for many years" the "historic
asbestos earnings drag has average 1.7 combined ratio points for the
commercial lines/reinsurance sectors over the past few years" although near-
term future losses may be more significant because of surge in second
generation claims in late 199os and early 2 1st Century); Lehman Brothers Global
Equity Research, Thinking About Asbestos, March 20, 2002 at 27 (insurer
earnings drag from asbestos can reasonably be estimated at 1.5 percent);
Insurance Journal, Fitch Affirms Rating for St. Paul Travelers Ratings After
Asbestos Charge; Outlook is Stable, Jan. 31, 2005,
tttp:/www.insurancedournal.comnews/iational/2050o1/5o493.htm.
But see Asbestos Liability Takes an Insurer Out, RISKPROF (June 8, 2004, 3:26
PM), available at http://riskprof.typepad.Com/tort/2oo4/o6/asbestos-1
iabil.html.
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IV. THE MOVE TOWARD FRAGMENTATION AND
SWISS CHEESE COVERAGE
Despite the seeming profitability of bundled and broad
insurance products, insurers appear to have moved away from
it. As the Conference organizers have observed, there appears to
be a trend toward fragmented coverage and fragmented
coverage may be less useful to almost all affected contingencies
than is broad-based comprehensive coverage. 27 The seeming
move to less comprehensive coverage presents the cluster of
problems previously noted: reduced policyholder knowledge
and correspondingly less efficient markets; gaps in coverage and
consequent ripple effects of inadequate protection and
compensation; increased uncertainty and disputes, including
wasteful litigation.128
Examples of the new world of more fragmented coverage
abound. Perhaps most prominently, homeowners insurance
and other first-party property insurance typically excludes
coverage for water damage and earth movement, as well as
contamination.129 If a small business or homeowner wants to be
sufficiently protected from these risks, as well as those of fire,
wind, theft, and vandalism, these separate coverages must be
127 See Program Announcement for A Conference on Fragmented Risk,
supra note 7 (Sometimes, perhaps increasingly... insurance policies fragment
risk .... Fragmenting allows insurers to exclude coverage for correlated risks
where potential losses are high and to reduce premium costs to respond to
market conditions. Fragmenting also reduces potential liability for new and
unanticipated risks, especially due to technological change or expansive judicial
interpretation of policy language; what began with questions about coverage for
pollution and asbestos has now spread to mold, Chinese drywall, and even
climate change.)
128 See Program Announcement for A Conference on Fragmented Risk,
supra note 7.
129 Standard homeowners' and commercial property policies include
coverage for direct physical injury caused by windstorms, which of course
includes large windstorms such as a hurricane. However, these same policies
expressly exclude coverage for water damage unless the release or discharge of
water springs from an event such as a burst pipe or overflowing dishwasher.
Flood insurance is available through the same agents selling property insurance
policies, but must be purchased via a separate policy sold pursuant to the
federal flood insurance program.
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purchased. This is not impossible. Many insurers offer an earth
movement endorsement in return for an additional premium
and imposition of a larger deductible in connection with such
claims.13o The federal government offers flood insurance at
attractive rates because they are taxpayer subsidized.3l More
difficult to obtain, at least at an attractive price, is
environmental impairment insurance, but a determined
prospective policyholder can usually obtain it.132 But purchasing
insurance in this manner is not efficient and leaves many under-
informed or insufficiently dogged policyholders with significant
gaps in coverage.
In addition, some policy language, if enforced literally by
courts in coverage disputes, seems but a trap for unwary
policyholders. For example, many property insurers not only
have an earth movement exclusion, but also an "anti-concurrent
causation" clause. That clause provides that even if the loss was
130 The standard personal or commercial property policy excludes coverage
for "earth movement," which of course excludes damage from earthquakes, with
exceptions to the exclusion varying by policy type and insurer.
131 The National Flood Insurance Program, established in 1968 and
subsequently modified, allows private insurers to sell federal flood insurance,
collect the premium, and receive an expense allowance from the U.S.
government for policies written and claims paid, with the government
absorbing all underwriting losses. Property owners with federal guaranteed
financing for their property must purchase this insurance if the property is
located in a flood zone as determined by federal mapping of communities. See
REJDA, supra note 18, at 262-63.
132 Although insurers have since 1986 largely excluded coverage for
pollution-related losses, in most markets, Environmental Impairment
Insurance is available for an additional premium. Typically, these policies are
written on a claims-made basis, with coverage limited to relatively abrupt
pollution discharges confined in time and space. The market for these products
is normally relatively "hard," meaning that large policy limits are not often
available and premiums are relatively high. See APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE,
§193.o2[C] (describing specialized forms of environmental liability insurance)
(Chapter 193, Environmental Insurance, by William G. Beck, et al., published in
2008 APPLEMAN volume); MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 332, 381-86 (8th ed. 2005) (defining hard and
soft insurance markets and describing insurer concern about providing broad
pollution liability coverage and use of EIL policies as an alternative, noting that
EIL policies use the more restrictive claims-made format less useful to
policyholders).
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caused in part by covered perils, as well as excluded earth
movement, there is no coverage so long as earth movement was
in any way involved in bringing about the loss.33
A. THE INCREASINGLY INCONSISTENT AND POROUS
HOMEOWNERS POLICY
A recent study of homeowner's insurance found substantial
variance in the policy provisions, with most deviations from the
standard ISO form restricting coverage, often in ways that would
be at odds with the average policyholder's concept of basic
homeowners insurance protection.134 In addition to the frequent
use of anti-concurrent causation clauses, homeowners insurers
frequently reduced coverage through the following: increase of
the hazard clauses;135 mold exclusions;136 water damage
133 See also Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 128o-81 (finding substantial
variance in available homeowners' insurance forms in several states, with a
significant number limit coverage though literal application of a broad anti-
concurrent causation clause); French, Profits Over Purpose, supra note 9, at
23-30 (describing limitations on seemingly broad homeowners and other
property coverage in the standard forms themselves); see e.g., Bentoria
Holdings, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 980 N.E.2d 504 (N.Y. 2012)(enforcing
exclusion precluding coverage for loss due to excavation activities, a type of
earth movement that is far less widespread and threatening to risk pools and
insurer profit than natural earthquakes or mudslides).
134 See Schwarcz, supra note lO, at 1280-1317.
135 See id. at 1282-85 (finding many insurers using such clauses in place of
standard HO-3 language). An increase of the hazard or increase of the risk
clause is one that negates otherwise available coverage if the policyholder has
engaged in conduct that has increased the risk of loss or perhaps even if the
policyholder has failed to protect property that has been endangered. As
Professor Schwarcz observes, a clause of this type might strip the policyholder of
coverage for failing to take action if a nearby tree is on the verge of collapse
while an increase of risk clause could negate coverage because the policyholder
improperly installed an air conditioner.
136 See id. at 1285-86. Mold exclusions, which have become common in the
wake of a rash of mold-related claims in the late 199os and early 2000S,
generally bar coverage for losses arising out of mold or fungus, unless it was
hidden within walls, floors, ceilings, or was caused by either the accidental
discharge or overflow of water.
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exclusions or limits;137 pollution exclusions;138 restrictions on
theft coverage;139 restrictions on collapse coverage;14o limits on
electric current damage coverage;141 sublimits on coverage of
certain property;142 avoiding coverage for ordinance or law
137 See id. at 1293-94. As the name implies, water damage exclusions bar
coverage for losses arising out of water damage, more specifically gradual water
damage, with coverage generally being restored if there is a an abrupt water
release or discharge. Such exclusions were also a common substitution for
standard H 0-3 policy language.
138 See id. at 1287. Pollution exclusions barring coverage for losses arising
out of the release or discharge of a long list of pollutants, such as dust, dirt, any
"chemical" were also common.
139 See Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 1288. Theft was often not covered under
homeowner policies unless there were "visible marks" of physical injury to the
exterior of the covered building. Id. The intent of such exclusions is to avoid
cover fraud losses that do not result from a burglary or where the burglary is an
inside job. But such exclusions are probably not very effective at anything other
than disappointing the reasonable expectations of the policyholder. An
unscrupulous policyholder wishing to stage a burglary and collect for the
feigned loss of inventory or other property need merely break a window or lock
on the way out, presumably while wearing gloves so not to leave fingerprints.
See id.
140 See id. at 1289. Collapse is a peril historically covered by the
homeowners' policy. However, an increasing number of insurers are modifying
the basic HO-3 form to exclude even a total collapse of the insured structure,
unless it is brought about by a specifically enumerated peril. Id.
141 See id. at 1289-90. In what must be a surprise to the average
homeowner policyholder, many policies now exclude coverage for damage
stemming from artificial electric current. Id.
142 See id. at 1290-91. With increasing frequency, homeowners' policies
often have sublimits for coverage of property thought by insurers to present
greater risk of loss or moral hazard than found for ordinary property and the
dwelling itself. For example, there may be substantial reductions in coverage
for damaged or stolen jewelry, electrical equipment, furs, china, or art, although
the policyholder may through additional premium be able to raise these
sublimits. Items such as these present insuring difficulty because they are both
relatively high in value for their size and weight and can be readily moved. For
example, a policyholder tempted to defraud an insurer can secret jewelry or furs
and report a phony burglary, receive compensation, and then unpack the
jewelry or furs from hiding. Fraud of this sort is much more difficult with
regard to claims of loss involving large appliances, furniture, or fixtures.
Consequently, insurers often seek through sublimits to reduce their risk
exposure for items that more easily facilitate false claims.
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related costs;143 restrictions on policyholder recovery due to
subrogation priority;144 and limits on liability coverage for both
bodily injury and property damage.145 In addition, there are
other restrictions on liability coverage such as limitations based
on the nature of alleged injury,146 a constricted definition of an
" occurrence,"'47 an expanded expected-or-intended injury
exclusion,148 criminal acts exclusions,49 or events involving
alcohol or drug use.15o Further, many homeowners policies do
143 See id. at 1292-93. Where rebuilding insured property is made more
expensive because of intervening changes in the laws or regulations affecting the
property--such as a requirement of stronger glass, a raised foundation near
water, etc.--many insurers now include provisions barring coverage for this
increment of the loss. Id. These provisions have not typically been in the
standard form policy.
144 See id. 1294-95. Many insurers have been modifying the standard HO
forms to give themselves increased subrogation priority and the right to be paid
ahead of the policyholder if a recovery can be obtained from a third party that
caused the loss to the insured property.
145 See Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 1295-97. The standard homeowners'
policy has long also provided a modicum of general liability insurance for the
policyholder that has been sued for injuries to a guest or business vendor (e.g., a
dog bit, a slip on a slippery floor). Many insurers have modified this to limit the
range of bodily injury covered by taking away coverage for mental injury claims
or loss of use property damage claims. Id. at 295-96.
146 See id. at 1298. For example, some policies take away coverage for third
party claims of injury resulting from intentional conduct by the policyholder
even if the resulting injury was not intended. Id.
147 See id. at 1297-98. Covered occurrences may take place in multiple
policy periods. However, many insurers now exclude coverage if the occurrence
began prior to its policy period. Id.
148 See id. at 1298-99. Historically, there was a self-defense exclusion to the
intentional injury exclusion found in most liability coverage. Increasingly,
insurers are narrowing or eliminating the self-defense exception. Id. at 1299.
149 See id. at 1299-1300. Injuries resulting from conduct deemed as
criminal may be excluded even if the injury was not expected or intended from
the standpoint of the policyholder. Id.
150 See id. at 1301. For example, social host liability due to a guest's
consumption of alcoholic beverages on the insured premises is now often
excluded. Id.
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not provide coverage for personal injury liability claimsl51 or
liability assumed by contract.152
Homeowners insurance also appears to now provide more
limited coverage than before because of the manner in which
insurers may more aggressively deny coverage pursuant to the
traditional business pursuits exclusion contained in such
policies. The business pursuits exclusion, as the name implies,
bars coverage for losses incurred as a result of business being
conducted by the policyholder in the insured home.53 This can
include damage to the home due to commercial activities being
conducted in the home (e.g., running a bakery out of the kitchen
with an overheating oven starting a fire that damages the home)
or liability claims lodged against the policyholder by a customer
of a policyholder's business run out of a home (e.g., a patron of
the bakery in the home slipping on melted butter in the hallway
and incurring injury).
The overall rationale of the business pursuits exclusion is
perfectly sensible. Commercial enterprises generally pose
greater risks of property loss or third-party liability claims than
do mere residences. The average homeowner's activity is less
likely to lead to fire, explosion, or large theft losses than that of
the average business involved in significant manufacturing,
construction, or storage of a sizeable amount of valuable
inventory or expensive machinery. The average homeowner
151 See Schwarcz, supra note 1o, at 1303-04. In general liability parlance,
"personal injury" is typically distinguished from bodily injury in that personal
injury coverage usually extends to certain intentional torts such as trespass,
defamation, and trademark infringement. Id. Insurers are increasingly
removing this type of liability coverage from the standard homeowners' policy.
Id.
152 See id. at 1300-01. In many instances, standard form contracts shift
liability risk to the party that must adhere to an adhesion contract. "Given the
pervasiveness of these types of agreements, it is not surprising that the standard
H03 policy covers liability resulting from the assumption of another's liability,
so long as this occurs prior to the liability-generating occurrence.... [H]owever,
this is not true of many of homeowners policies .... issued by many insurers.
Id. at 1300.
153 See MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 2o6-07 (8th ed. 2005). The standard homeowners' policy excludes
coverage for losses arising out of business pursuits of the homeowner conducted
on the insurance premises.
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living his or her life is less likely to injure another person than is
the average business that may be dropping, bumping,
despoiling, mis-installing, or manufacturing a defective product.
But the business pursuits exclusion can be carried too far if
applied to only modestly remunerative activity, such as
babysitting, conducted in an insured home. Historically,
insurers appear not to have attempted to enforce the exclusion,
and if they did courts were unlikely to support such efforts to
deny coverage. But insurer and judicial attitudes may be drifting
toward litigation conduct and results that are the functional
equivalent of broader business risk exclusion.
Consider Dwello v. American Reliance Insurance Co., 154 the
homeowner provided regular babysitting for a neighbor,
seemingly as an accommodation to the neighbor's work
demands, and was paid (modestly but enough that it amounted
to roughly forty percent of the policyholder's modest overall
income).55 While the neighbor's child was in the house, the
homeowner's dog bit the child, causing significant injuries.56
The neighbor sued the homeowner, who in turn sought coverage
pursuant to the liability portion of her homeowner's policy.57
The insurer denied coverage, invoking the business pursuits
exclusion - and prevailed before the trial court and the Nevada
Supreme Courtl58 in a decision subject to criticism.59
154 Dwello v. Am. Reliance Ins. Co., 990 P.2d 19o (1999).
155 Id. at 191.
156 1 .
157 1d.
158 See id. at 191-92.
159 See Roger 0. Steggerda, Note, Watching Your Neighbor's Child: Is
Babysitting Really a Business Pursuit? A Comment on Dwello v. American
Reliance Insurance Company, 1 NEv. L.J. 323, 336 (2001). In the same vein are
court decisions denying coverage for what appear to be innocent policyholders
due to criminal misuse of their property. See Gaynor Pengelly, Sorry, Your
Home's a Dope Farm so You're Not Insured: Cannabis Farmers Trashed my
Cherished Buy-to-let, DAILY MAIL (May 11, 2013),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/mortgageshome/article-2323042/Sorry-
homes-dope-farm-youre-insured.html (landlord policyholder not covered for
damage to property where tenants were growing marijuana on premises;
describing general trend toward such strict enforcement of illegal activities or
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As a literal manner, the homeowner was perhaps engaged in
a commercial enterprise by receiving pay for a service, but this
sort of limited, episodic, informal babysitting normally presents
few risks of third party claims greater than what might arise
from simple play dates at the insured home involving friends of
the homeowner's child. Although insurers may be reluctant to
dispense with the exclusion altogether, one might expect a
relaxed attitude toward its invocation and enforcement. But in
Dwello, the insurer treated the neighborly babysitting as the
equivalent of the homeowner's operation of a gymnastics studio
or large-scale nursery--and prevailed, notwithstanding the
questionable persuasiveness of its argument.16o
Insurers also appear to be more aggressively denying
coverage for homeowner liability claims involving criminal
conduct by the policyholder, even in the absence of an express
criminal acts exclusion in the policy. And despite the absence of
such specific exclusions, courts have sided with the insurers on a
disturbing number of occasions, invoking either an excessively
expansive view of the "expected or intended" exclusion or
notions of public policy.
Minnesota Fire & Casualty Co. v. Greenfield 161 presents a
disturbing example. Homeowner Greenfield dealt drugs,162
criminal acts exclusions in insurance policies). Although the particular decision
discussed was in England, a jurisdiction traditionally taking a more formalist
and textualist view of contracts than most American states, it seems an undue
forfeiture of purchased insurance, assuming the landlord really was unaware of
the tenant activities.
160 And insurers have been willing to litigate the exclusion in such small
potatoes babysitting cases, with considerable success. See, e.g., Am. Commerce
Ins. Co. v. Few, No. lo-CV-oo36-CVE-FHM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63037 (N.D.
Okla. June 24, 2010); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, No. 816-12-07,
2009 Vt. Super. LEXIS 79 (May 27, 2009) (applying business pursuits exclusion
to bar coverage for family member's liability incurred during part-time job as
bartender; noting that most courts find exclusion applicable if there is
continuity of business activity and profit motive even where work in question is
not primary occupation of insured).
161 855 A.2d 854 (Pa. 2004).
162 Greenfield appears not to have been a full-time drug dealer. The opinion
refers to him leaving in the morning "for work" in a context that suggests the
work was something other than drug dealing. Id. at 857. The opinion also notes
that Greenfield claimed to sell drugs, though "mostly just weed" only
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including a heroin sale to customer Angela Smith, who ended up
passing out at Greenfield's house for the night. Leaving the next
morning, Greenfield instructed a still-alive Smith to lock the
door if she left.163 She was dead of a heroin overdose when
Smith returned.164 After an abortive attempt to conceal the
death, Greenfield contacted the police anonymously to report
the body, but was discovered by police and pled guilty to
involuntary manslaughter.165 Smith's understandably distraught
parents brought a wrongful death action against Greenfield, who
sought defense and coverage from his homeowners' insurer.166
Minnesota Fire denied coverage, invoking the expected or
intended injury defense and contending that Smith's death was
not a sufficiently accidental offense to fall within coverage.167
The trial court disagreed and held that the insurer was obligated
to defend the claim.168 Invoking public policy based on the
illegality of the use or sale of heroin, as well as a doctrine of
"inferred intent" (the notion that the court could discern an
intent to inflict injury from the policyholder's reckless conduct),
the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed and denied
coverage.169 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected the
inferred intent analysis but affirmed the result, also on public
policy grounds, essentially holding that it would violate public
policy for Greenfield to obtain insurance for liability arising out
of criminal activity. 170
"occasionally," with heroin sales to only a select few customers. See id. at 856-
57.
163 Id. at 857.
164 1(d.
165 Id. at 857.
166 Id. at 858-59.
167 Id. at 858-59.
168 Greenfield, 855 A.2d at 859.
169 id. at 860.
170 Id. at 865-68.
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Greenfield is something of a judicially activist disaster.171 The
court majority concedes that Greenfield did not have a
subjective or specific intent to hurt Smith.172 Drug dealers tend
to make more money off live customers than dead ones. The
majority also conceded that the policy contained no exclusion
for losses or liability arising out of drug use or other criminal
activity.173 Nonetheless, the majority gave the insurer the benefit
of such an exclusion despite its absence in the policy, reasoning
that because drug use is illegal, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania surely would not want drug sellers to have the
benefit of liability insurance if sued by customers (or their
estates or parents).174 Only two Justices dissented.175
171 The opinion is also a pretty ham-handed rhetorical exercise in that it
contains several gratuitous pieces of information or turns of a phrase designed
to convince the reader of Greenfield's essential sleaziness that presumably
justifies stripping him of contract rights. For example, we are told that prior to
Smith's arrival, "Greenfield had been drinking Mad Dog beer and was under the
influence of marijuana and heroin." Id. at 856. Greenfield's drinking of "Mad
Dog" beer was presumably intended as more evil and dangerous than if he had
been quaffing a Leinenkugel Summer Shandy or a Chimay Blue. But
Greenfield's taste in libations is an irrelevant but prejudicial fact.
Similarly, the majority notes that the bag of heroin sold to Smith was
labeled "Suicide." Id. at 857. So, in many parts of the country, is the mixture of
various soft drinks (usually cola, root beer, orange and lemon-lime with perhaps
some Dr. Pepper) favored by pre-teens at junior high basketball games or
county fairs. The majority also provides great detail about Greenfield's attempt
to essentially dump Smith's body away from his home in order to avoid
detection. Id. As another Pennsylvanian, the late Third Circuit Judge Ruggerio
Aldisert put it memorably: "Basta!" [Italian for "enough"]. See United States v.
Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 420 (3d Cir. 1982)(Aldisert, J., dissenting) (arguing
that it is time for a bright line rule against special verdicts in criminal cases
unless requested by defendant). We know that Greenfield is not the kind of guy
you want your daughter to bring home (much less elope with), but none of that
is germane to the coverage question at issue in the case.
172 Greenfield, 855 A.2d at 866-68.
173 Id. 867-68.
174 Id. at 872-73. Showing amazing callousness toward the victim, the
Court majority observed that "Smith was a willing participant in a criminal
transaction." Id. at 868. By this logic, any kid using marijuana would be denied
recovery if injured by a drug dealer, "pot party" host, or other person involved in
use of this commonly consumed but illegal substance.
232
Fall 2013 Vol111:1
Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy
Cases like Greenfield are also something of a public policy
disaster. Although one struggles to find sympathy for the
seemingly careless and callous Greenfield, there is no difficulty
finding sympathy for Smith and her family, which of course is
the group that suffers from the court's decision. Unless
Greenfield was a Pennsylvanian Pablo Escobar, he probably
lacked the personal assets to provide adequate compensation to
his victims. Denying insurance to Greenfield only denied
compensation -- and some small measure of justice--to Smith
and her family. Even in the absence of a textual defense to
coverage, the promised comprehensive protection (and social
utility) of the homeowner's policy may be fragmented by judicial
error.
B. THE INSIDIOUSNESS OF THE "ANY INSURED" EXCLUSION
Denial of coverage to one insured due to the sins of another
presents another area in which homeowner's coverage has
narrowed, and that has implications for other policies as well.176
Historically, most states appeared to apply an "innocent co-
insured" doctrine under which a policyholder who was not
involved in coverage-destroying conduct would at least collect a
pro-rated share of policy proceeds after a loss. 177 A typical
scenario involves one spouse engaged in criminal activity while
the other is unaware or unable to stop it. Another common
scenario is one of divorcing spouses in which one spouse breaks
into, vandalizes, or otherwise injures a home in an expression of
175 Id. at 872-73 (Cappy, J., joined by Nigro, J., dissenting) (accusing
majority of rewriting the policy for the benefit of the insurer that drafted the
policy and also noting concern "about the potential sweeping reach of the
majority's decision," which suggested that insurers need not provide coverage
for any damages arising out of conduct the legislature has defined as criminal).
176 See generally MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 95, Ch. lo.
177 See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply Co., 718
N.W.2d 888, 895 (Minn. 2006) (where insurer chooses to frame coverage
exclusion in terms of conduct by "the" insured, court may conclude that only
misconduct by the named policyholder defeats coverage); Kulubis v. Tex. Farm
Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1986). See generally Brent
R. Lindahl, Comment, Insurance Coverage for an Innocent Co-Insured Spouse,
23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433 (1997).
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anger. A spouse or other co-insured (e.g., a business partner)
who could demonstrate lack of fault could often recover at least
a pro-rata share of available insurance proceeds. For example, if
the husband destroyed the family home in a meth lab explosion,
committed arson as part of insurance fraud, or burned the home
in reaction to an impending end of the marriage, the courts
allowed the innocent wife to receive half the insurance policy
limits.178
But the bulk of these older cases more charitable-to-
blameless spouses and other innocent co-insureds contained
language barring coverage if there was misconduct by "the
insured."179 Most courts faced with this language found the term
either intended to refer only to the named insured on the
declarations sheet of the policy or sufficiently ambiguous that it
must be construed in favor of the innocent co-insured.18o In
response, insurers replaced the "the insured" language with "an
insured" or "any insured. ' 8 Since making these changes
insurers have fared far better, prevailing in the bulk of coverage
actions. 82 Essentially, the innocent co-insured doctrine has
been legislatively overruled via the private legislation of the
insurance industry moving to more expansive exclusionary
language that narrows and further fragments coverage.
A disturbing recent example is Postell v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Co.l83 Faced with impending divorce, the
husband returned to the couple's home (from which he'd moved
out), ignited it, and intentionally committed suicide in the
blaze.i84 The wife sought to obtain coverage for the destruction
178 See, e.g., Kulubis, 706 S.W.2d at 953.
179 See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 95, Ch. io.
180 See id. at 226-27.
181 See id. at 227-29.
182 See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 95, Ch. io; See, e.g., Minkler v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 232 P.3d 612, 623-24 (Cal. 2010).
183 823 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 2012).
184 The Court embraced this hard-core texualist and formalist position
notwithstanding that it resulted in a complete denial of insurance protection
negating the purpose of the policy and the expectations of the surviving wife,
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of the home, which she had intended to occupy after the divorce
was final and the husband moved out. 8 5 A unanimous Supreme
Court of Iowa denied her claim and backed the insurer's position
on the exclusion.186
One can certainly criticize these cases in which the insurer
obtains from courts a broad construction of an exclusion, or text
that operates in the same nature as an exclusion, to reverse a
long-standing doctrine effectively preventing excessive
forfeiture of insurance benefits by innocent policyholders. But
absent jurisprudence more favorable to those policyholders, the
move from excluding coverage for misconduct by "the" insured
to excluding coverage based on conduct by "any" insured is a
significant step toward more restricted and fragmented
coverage. This fragmentation appears in the ascendance for
both homeowners and general liability coverage.
C. CURTAILMENT OF THE CGL POLICY
Even the CGL policy, my comparative paragon of bundled
coverage, has slipped a bit since its glory days in the 196os and
who surely could not imagine either that her husband could do such a thing or
that, in doing so, he would destroy the insurance benefits they had purchased
from years of premium payments. They had lived in the now destroyed home
since 1989 and had been married for thirty years. Id. at 38. In addition, the
husband, who despite having burns over eighty percent of his body, did not die
for three days, was deemed mentally ill by the medical professionals treating
him after the fire. See 823 N.W.2d at 38-39 (providing extensive discussion of
events leading up to husband's immolation, destruction of the home, and
medical treatment).
185 Id. at 27, 39.
186 Id. at 37, 48. In no portion of the opinion, however, did the Court
consider whether depriving the non-arsonist wife of coverage, which effectively
made her homeless absent another source of funds for living expenses, because
of the deranged acts of the husband was consistent with the overall injuring
agreement and the purpose of the intentional injury exclusion on which the
insurer's defense was based. For a more satisfying decision, see Lynn v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 2013 Pa. Super. LEXIS, at *704 (May 1, 2013) (permitting
innocent co-insured coverage because of a recently passed state statute
protecting innocent co-insureds, but not because of any relaxation of judicial
formalism and hyper-textualism in policy interpretation).
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1970s by adding beefed up business risk exclusionsl7 as well as
an asbestos exclusion,88 an absolute or total pollution
exclusion,89 and a cap on the insurer's overall liability under the
policy.19o But the difficulty of these risks, particularly asbestos,19
may have made this inevitable. Although (relative to
homeowners and other property insurance), the CGL policy still
provides essentially broad coverage along the lines of Sawyer's
187 See supra TAN 85-96 (discussing business risk exclusions).
188 In the 1986 revision to the standard CGL form, the insurance industry
added a broadly worded exclusion precluding coverage for liability claims in any
way arising out of exposure to asbestos. Property insurance has since the 198os
similarly tended to expressly exclude coverage for repairs or retrofitting of
property due to the presence of asbestos.
189 Until the 196os, the standard CGL form did not exclude coverage for
pollution related claims, although some insures were adding pollution
exclusions to their policies. A 1970 form endorsement limiting pollution
coverage came into widespread use and the industry in the 1973 revisions to the
standard CGL form, which added a "qualified" pollution exclusion, so named
because it excluded coverage for claims arising out of pollution discharge but
qualified the exclusion with a significant exception that restored coverage if the
discharge or release of the pollutant was "sudden and accidental." These words
became the subject of much litigation with insurers contending that to meet the
exception the discharge must be swift or abrupt, while policyholders argued that
the discharge (or even damage from the discharge) be only unintentional.
Courts split on the interpretative question, prompting insurers in the 1986
revision to the CGL to include a broadly worded "absolute" pollution exclusion
that barred coverage for any claim arising out a release or discharge, with the
term "pollutant" broadly defined. A variant of this exclusion, often referred to
as the "total" pollution exclusion, provides an exception where the claim or loss
is due to smoke from a hostile fire. See generally, Stempel, Reason and
Pollution, supra note 95.
190 The 1986 CGL form also popularized use of an aggregate limit on
coverage. Prior to this time, liability insurance was often sold with only limits
on the amount the insurer would pay per occurrence, presenting the possibility
that a policyholder faced with many sufficiently distinct claims could receive
many times the stated policy limit. Under the modern CGL form with aggregate
limits, the insurer's financial exposure is capped regardless of the number of
claims against the policyholder.
191 The magnitude of the asbestos mass tort and its ripple effect on
insurance is well-chronicled. See, e.g., Asbestos: Anatomy of a Mass Tort,
supra note 121; Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States:
Triumph and Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255 (2006).
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vision, it has also narrowed in scope92 and been plagued with
enough uncertainty to create substantial coverage litigation and
state-to-state variance regarding resolution of coverage
disputes.'93
D. NARROWING AUTO INSURANCE
Likewise, automobile policies have tended to develop gaps or
limitations on coverage, at least if much current coverage
litigation is any indication. For years, auto policies tended to
cover policyholders sued over a traffic accident so long as there
was no significant evidence that the policyholder in fact
intended to injure the third-party claimant. Short of ramming
into another car out of spite, coverage was provided, certainly at
the duty to defend stage where the question is whether a
potential for coverage exists--and probably throughout the
matter as well, so long as there was no evidence of subjective
intent to injure.
Auto insurers have also added additional exclusions to their
forms designed to avoid coverage for errant driving that
arguably went beyond negligence, but stopped well short of the
traditional intentional act limitations. Examples include
exclusions for injury arising out of drunk driving or criminal
acts. In some cases, criminal act exclusions have been
construed literally against the policyholder and in favor of the
insurer--exactly the opposite of the traditional doctrinal
approach to bar coverage in cases of driver intoxication even in
the absence of an express drunk driving exclusion.194
192 See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability
Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 86 (2001); Kenneth S. Abraham, Peril and
Fortuity in Property and Liability Insurance, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 777 (2001).
193 See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 95 (examining twenty-one
prominent coverage issues and differing law of the fifty states on these issues).
194 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Sierra Health & Life Ins. Co., 53 P.3d 904, 905
(Nev. 2002) (enforcing criminal acts exclusion to deny death benefits to the
named beneficiary in the case of an auto accident because policyholder was
intoxicated and could have been prosecuted had he survived); see also Douglas
R. Richmond, Driving Drunk in the Serbonian Bog: Intoxicated Drivers'
Deaths as Insurance Accidents, 32 SEATLE U. L. REv. 83 (2008); Michael E.
Gardner, Note, Accidental Death Insurance Coverage of Drunk Drivers, 69
MO. L. REV. 235 (2004).
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E. NATURAL DISASTERS AS EVIDENCE OF THE POVERTY OF
THE FRAGMENTED APPROACH
The perils of the fragmented approach are most obvious after
natural disasters such as hurricanes. After a storm such as
Katrina or Sandy devastates an area, property insurance
policyholders make claims. Whether the loss is covered typically
hinges on whether the damage was sufficiently caused by either
wind (a covered peril) or water (an excluded peril).195 The all-or-
nothing divide can tempt policyholders to fudge facts in an
attempt to fit as much of a loss as possible under the covered
category of wind. It can also tempt insurers to engage in sharp
practices196 that may even take on an aura of post-loss
underwriting.197 Even where a damaged home is covered by both
195 See James A. Knox Jr., Causation, the Flood Exclusion, and Katrina, 41
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRACT. L.J. 901 (2006); Douglas R. Widin, Katrina,
Causation, and Coverage: Which Way Will the Wind Blow?, 41 TORT TRIAL &
INS. PRACT. L.J. 885, 885 (2006) ("It is no secret to even the casual observer of
these events that the principal battle line will be over whether damage was
caused by 'wind' or 'flood' within the terms of the policy, since the former is
virtually always a covered peril and the latter is frequently excluded.").
196 See Phil Gusman, Sandy Impact 'More Severe' Than Irene; Interests Tie
Storm to Larger Issues, PROP. CAS. 36o (Oct. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.propertycasualty36o.Com/2012/10/3o/sandy-impact-more-
severe-than-irene-interests-tie ('The Consumer Federation of America,
meanwhile, criticized insurers' response to 2005's Hurricane Katrina and
warned against a similar response to Sandy."); Chad Hemenway, Mississippi
Jury Finds State Farm Defrauded NFIP After Katrina, PROP. CAS. 36o (Apr. 9,
2013), available at http://www.propertycasualty36o.Com/2013/04/09
/mississippi-jury-finds-state-farm-defrauded-nfip-a.
197 Post-loss underwriting, a term disfavored by insurers but used by
policyholders, refers to insurer efforts to engage in hard-edged claims and
coverage practices in an effort to avoid or minimize coverage for a policyholder,
risk, or account that they in retrospect wish they had not agreed to underwrite
by issuing the policy. See Great Am. Ins. Cos. v. Subranni, 332 B.R. 690, 727-29
(Bkrtcy D. N.J. 2005) (regarding post-loss underwriting as unfair claims
practices that insurer utilizes to avoid payment in connection with risk it now
wishes it had not assume but rejecting policyholder's claim that insurer engaged
in impermissible post-loss underwriting); Eugene R. Anderson, Richard G.
Tuttle & Susannah Crego, Draconian Forfeitures of Insurance: Commonplace,
Indefensible, and Unnecessary, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 825, 848, n.145 (1996)
(characterizing post-loss underwriting as opportunistic behavior by insurer
through sharp claims practices that seek to revise insurance arrangement in
favor of insurer).
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a homeowners' policy and a flood policy, there may still be
disputes as each insurer attempts to place the bulk of coverage
responsibility upon the other.198 As discussed below, this
situation is inefficient, unfair, and untenable.199
The situation is further exacerbated by the failure of many
agents and brokers to piece together the fragmented coverage
available. Even when clients live within yards of an ocean, lake,
river, stream, or wash, it appears that agents or brokers
frequently advise them that they "don't need" flood insurance
and can save the comparatively small premium cost that would
have purchased the government-subsidized product.oo
Sometimes this is because the intermediary has misread
available flood mapping, though government maps of flood
198 See, e.g., J.R.A. Inc. v. Essex Ins. Co., 72 So. 3d 862 (La. Ct. App. 2011)
(Katrina water/wind dispute); Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350 (5th Cir.
2010) (Katrina water/wind dispute); Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
523 F.3d 618, 624-25 (5th Cir. 2oo8) ("[A] stipulation that the Broussards'
personal property was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina is insufficient to
establish that it was destroyed by a windstorm, since Hurricane Katrina
unleashed both wind and water forces."); Gainer v. Specialty Risk Assocs., Inc.,
977 So. 2d 1O89 (La. Ct. App. 2oo8) (Katrina water/wind dispute).
199 See Adam Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market
Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 Miss. C. L. REv. 3, 3 (2007) ("Our current
systems for preventing, mitigating, and allocating these losses are fractured,
diffuse, and maddeningly counterproductive."); Rachel Lisotta, Comment, In
Over Our Heads: The Inefficiencies of The National Flood Insurance Program
and the Institution of Federal Tax Incentives, lo Loy. MAR. L.J. 511, 512-13
(2012). See also Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky, Managing the Next
Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 1-5
(2011).
200 See Scales, supra note 199, at 7-21 (noting problem, exploring
alternative explanations, and concluding that modern practice of selling and
bundling mortgages has likely played a major role in underinsurance in that it
diminishes the initiating lender's motivation to ensure that property is
adequately insured). See, e.g., Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d
419, 423, 425 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The Leonards' home lies twelve feet above sea
level on the southern most edge of Pascagoula, Mississippi, less than two
hundred yards from the Mississippi Sound.... [Nationwide agent Jay] Fletcher
allegedly assured [Paul] Leonard that he did not need additional flood coverage
because Leonard did not live in an area classified Zone A for flood risk by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency ('FEMA').").
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plains themselves may be of questionable accuracy.2o Other
times it is because the agent is correct in finding that the insured
property is not in a flood plain, but mistakenly concludes that
this is proof positive of the property's invulnerability form water
damage risk.202
Whatever the circumstances, flood insurance is undersold to
a surprising degree.2o3 One possible explanation is that agents
do not earn enough commission on the comparatively low cost
flood insurance premiums to properly incentivize them to sell
201 See, e.g., Nast v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 82 S.W.3d 114, 118-19
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002) ("[In 1997,] Billie explained to [licensed agent Barbara]
Taylor that she needed to talk about getting some flood insurance. After
requesting Billie's address, Taylor told Billie that she did not live in a flood zone.
Billie replied, 'Try telling my neighbors that. They had 18 inches of water in their
house.' Taylor then corrected herself by stating, 'Well, you do live in a flood
zone, but you do not live in the one that qualifies you for FEMA flood
insurance.'... In 1995, however, a bridge was constructed over Cibolo Creek,
creating an obstruction in the waterway. As a result, the FEMA flood plains
were redrawn. The new map indicated that the Nasts' home was eligible for
flood insurance.").
202 See, e.g., Buente v. Allstate Ins. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 690, 697 (S.D. Miss.
2006) ('That is, I accept as true the plaintiffs' allegations that they asked
Allstate's representatives whether they needed to purchase a flood insurance
policy; that the Allstate representatives told them that the purchase of a
separate flood insurance policy would not be necessary because their house was
situated outside the flood plain and that all damage attributable to a hurricane,
including damage caused by 'storm surge,' would be covered by the
homeowners policy at issue."); Jones v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., No. 06-9874,
2007 WL 1428705, at *3 (E.D. La. May 11, 2007) ("[S]he was advised that, since
the Delery Street property was in a no flood zone, that flood insurance was not
necessary; plaintiff relied upon this advice and, therefore, did not have flood
insurance on her property at the time water, from levee breaches, destroyed her
home on or about August 29, 2005.. ."); Mladineo v. Schmidt, No. 1:o6CVl138
LTS-RHW, 2007 WL 1459445, at *1 (S.D. Miss. May 16, 2007) (' The concluding
allegations are that 'Schmidt also advised John that the property was not in a
flood zone, and that a mortgage lender would not require a separate policy of
flood insurance. Schmidt did not suggest that Plaintiffs obtain flood
insurance."')
203 See Jeffrey Manns, Note, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509,
2510-11 (2003) ("The federal government has a long history of offering
subsidized insurance programs, such as flood insurance, that are rife with
moral hazards and have often served no one's interests save the insured
beneficiaries.") (footnote omitted).
240
Fall 2013 Vol111:1
Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy
flood insurance.2o4 Indeed, they may have a problematic
incentive to keep premiums lower by avoiding it so that they can
offer their customers a total premium at or below that of
competitors. If flood insurance were a mandated part of
homeowners' and other first-party property coverage, much
agent discretion--and with it much error--would be
removed.2o5
Earth movement coverage presents a similar, but less vexing,
fragmentation of property coverage. The typical consumer and
commercial property policies bar coverage for earth movement,
save for exceptions when the ground shifts due to a broken pipe
or other more confined causes.2o6 Earth tremors or worse are
effectively excluded, but additional coverage can be purchased
for an additional premium so long as the policyholder accepts a
high deductible or co-insurance of such claims.2o7 Because of the
cost or lack of appreciation of the risk, most policyholders, even
those in high-risk zones, pass on the opportunity to purchase
204 See Steven Plitt & Daniel Maldonado, When Constitutional Challenges
to State Cancellation Moratoriums Enacted After Catastrophic Hurricanes
Fail: A Callfor a New Federal Insurance Program, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 41, 85-86
(2012) ("As a result of catastrophic flooding which occurred along the
Mississippi River in 1927, the private insurance industry abandoned the market
for flood insurance. The catastrophic flooding jeopardized the solvency of many
property insurers. The industry's aversion to flood risk stemmed from a variety
of factors, including: '[p]oor, [i]nadequate, and [i]naccurate [i]nformation
[a]bout [fWlood [r]isks;' '[r]isk [c]orrelation;' and '[a]dverse [s]election.' . ..
Regarding adverse selection, flood insurance presented a vexing problem
whereby the people most likely to buy the insurance against flood losses were
also the people most likely to suffer that type of loss.").
205 See Scales, supra note 199, at 8-9.
206 See REJDA, supra note 18, at 164 ("Property damage from earth
movement is excluded. This includes damage from an earthquake, shock waves
from a volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide or mudflow, subsidence or
sinkholes, or earth sinking or shifting. However, an ensuing loss caused by fire
or explosion is covered. An earthquake endorsement can be added to the
policy."); DORFMAN & CATHER, supra note 16, at 54, 97-98; VAUGHAN &
VAUGHN, supra note 16, at 465-77.
207 See REJDA, supra note 18, at 164; DORFMAN & CATHER, supra note 16, at
54, 97-98; VAUGHAN & VAUGHN, supra note 16, at 465-77.
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the coverage.2o8 There may also be underselling by agents and
brokers.2o9
As a result, when earthquakes take place, most of those
affected are effectively uninsured.21o Although FEMA and other
208 See, e.g., Approaches to Mitigating and Managing Natural
Catastrophe Risk: H.R. 2555, The Homeowners' Def. Act Before the H. Comm.
on Financial Services, i1th Cong. 3 (2010) (statement of Glenn Pomeroy, Chief
Exec. Officer, Calif. Earthquake Auth.) ("Frustrated in their efforts to control
their earthquake exposure, insurers responded by severely restricting, or simply
refusing to offer, sales of homeowners' insurance in the state, and with those
efforts eventually reaching some 94% of the market, their actions threatened to
deprive Californians of homeowners' insurance altogether."); Rick Swedloff,
Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721,780 (2012) ("[I]ndividuals tend
not to purchase insurance for high-risk, low-probability events. Individuals tend
not to buy insurance against earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, or major medical
events even when the government subsidizes the insurance such that the
premiums are less than the expected loss. In both experimental settings and
surveys, insurance purchasers act as if low probability results are unlikely to
occur at all."); see HOWARD KUNREUTHER& MICHAEL USEEM, LEARNING FROM
CATASTROPHES: STRATEGIES FOR REACTION AND RESPONSE 6-7(Howard
Kunreuther & Michael Useem et al. eds., 2010).
209 Although insurers have perhaps more commercial incentive to seek
earthquake coverage than is the case with the federal government's flood
program, there remains a strong incentive for agents to under-market earth
movement coverage for fear that creating a higher priced product will lead to
lost sales. Customers and prospective customers will take their business to
other providers who offer a cheaper insurance package, even if that package is
one that makes less sense in terms of sound risk management.
210 See Jacqueline Young, Note, Efficient Proximate Cause: Is California
Headed for a Katrina-Scale Disaster in the Same Leaky Boat?, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 757, 783 (2011) ("While the [California Earthquake Authority] is sound
enough to withstand a 25o-year earthquake event, to date, only twelve-to-
thirteen percent of California homeowners have actually purchased earthquake
insurance.") (footnote omitted) (citing Approaches to Mitigating and
Managing Natural Catastrophe Risk: H.R. 2555, the Homeowners' Defense
Act: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2555 Before the Subcomm. on Hous. And Cmty.
Opportunity and the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts,, Ins. and Govt Sponsored
Enters. Of the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., iii Cong. 12-14 (2010) (testimony of
Glenn Pomeroy, Chief Exec. Officer, Cal. Earthquake Auth.)); Approaches to
Mitigating and Managing Natural Catastrophe Risk: H.R. 2555, The
Homeowners' Defense Act: Hearing on H.R. 2555 Before the Subcomm. on
Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity and the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and
Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., i1th Cong. 4 (2010)
(testimony of Glenn Pomeroy, Chief Exec. Officer, Calif. Earthquake Auth) ("In
earthquake-prone California, 88 percent-88 percent-of homeowners have no
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government programs usually ride to the rescue with disaster
aid, the current status quo is one in which an insufficient
number of people with property at risk fail to get coverage,
which in turn shrinks the risk pool and results in under-
insurance and a post-quake system of compensation that
essentially forces a massive taxpayer subsidy. l If insurers
instead provided comprehensive property coverage that
included coverage for quakes, with apt premiums collected, the
burden of post-quake repair could be more evenly distributed
and solidly funded, with much less free-riding by large parts of
the population at risk for quake-related losses.
V. REDISCOVERING THE SAWYER LEGACY AND
RETURNING TO BROADER INSURANCE
PRODUCTS
Sawyer and the other architects and supporters of the move
from disaggregated liability coverage to the CGL format had an
almost utopian vision, if that is possible in the sometimes
mundane halls of business. The breadth of the CGL would
earthquake insurance at all. Increasingly, insurance companies are treating
homeowners across the country like they have been treating Floridians for
years, canceling policies and doubling or tripling rates in the wake of a single
claim.").
211 See Eric Lipton et al., Flood Insurance, Already Fragile, Faces New
Stress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at At (describing how claims have exceeded
the $3.5 billion annual premiums for the federal flood insurance program four
out of the last eight years: "The fact that many homeowners hit by Hurricane
Sandy have no flood or homeowners insurance could prompt Congress to
provide assistance to the uninsured, too, as happened after Hurricane Katrina,
further raising the cost to the federal Treasury."), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/11/13/nyregion/federal-flood-insurance-
program-faces-new-stress.html?smid=pl-share; see also Judith Kildow & Jason
Scorse, Op-Ed., End Federal Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2012, at
A31, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/opinion/end-federal-
flood-insurance.html?smid=pl-share (claiming that taxpayers are "on the hook
for at least $527 billion of vulnerable assets in the nation's coastal flood
plains."); Editorial, U.S. Taxpayers Need Break from Underwater Flood
Insurance, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-11/u-s-taxpayers-need-break-from-
underwater-flood-insurance.html.
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provide greater protection for both insurers and policyholders.
It would protect insurers from information asymmetry: the risk
of some policyholders purchasing only the insurance they were
more likely to need, thus increasing claims relative to premium
dollars (adverse selection). It would also resist the risks posed
by moral hazard. Although every policyholder would be subject
to the generic human tendency to be less careful if insured, at
least the risk pool would be large enough and the premiums
increased sufficiently through bundling that moral hazard would
not have as much effect on the insurers' bottom line.212 Today, a
similarly comprehensive approach across insurance offers the
prospect of significant benefits to policyholders, victims, the
public, and even to the insurance industry.
A. BENEFITS FOR POLICYHOLDERS
The CGL has benefitted policyholders by reducing gaps in
coverage. It has provided increased funding for compensating
victims, funding that has also improved and speeded dispute
resolution and settlement. Other insurance products can also
reflect the benefits of a more comprehensive approach. Most
prominently, policyholders would benefit for many of the same
reasons they benefitted from the CGL form. Gaps in coverage
would be reduced.213 Disputing costs prompted by the need to
212 1 align with scholars who contend that the angers of adverse selection
and moral hazard are overstated. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in
Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1261 (2004);
Tom Baker, On the Geneaology of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237, 252-53
(1996); Ellen S. Pryor, The Economic Loss Rule and Liability Insurance, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 905,908 (2006); Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 199, at 31; Tom
Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 373-74 (2003). Particularly for
policyholders that are flesh-and-blood individuals, it is a bit much to think that
they will recklessly expose themselves to physical pain, death, or the destruction
of their abodes or most precious belongings simply because they are insured.
Consequently, the moral hazard risk posed in selling life, health, homeowners',
and auto insurance logically is not all that great. I am not suggesting moral
hazard is not an important concern, but it may not be nearly as important as
traditionally theorized.
213 Policyholders would correspondingly be more likely to find that actually
available insurance coverage conforms to their pre-loss expectations of
coverage. See James Davey, Fracturing and Bundling Risks: The Coverage
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characterize losses for coverage purposes would be reduced.
Policyholders would be protected from their own cognitive
errors in failing to appreciate either the need for sufficient
insurance coverage or engaging in penny wise/pound foolish
behavior by unwisely forgoing coverage simply to save a modest
amount in premiums.
A classic example of the opportunity for large social gains
through consolidation is the staple homeowner's policy. As
discussed above, the dangers of disaggregation were laid bare in
the coverage litigation related to Hurricane Katrina losses.
Despite the pain of that episode, it is likely to be replayed again
through coverage litigation in the wake of Hurricane Sandy or
storms taking place during 2013. Once again, we will be treated
to protracted litigation over whether losses were caused
primarily by wind or water. We have seen this movie before and
it gets no better with age.
Instead of continuing to stumble along in this area through a
quilt of fragmented coverage, insurers should move, or courts
and regulators should force them to move, toward more
inclusive coverage. A homeowners' policy should include not
only the array of fire, wind, and vandalism coverage found in the
HO-3, but also include flood and earthquake insurance. Like
the CGL, this type of comprehensive homeowners' coverage will
provide needed protection to policyholders while greatly
reducing disputing costs.
Adam Scales has already made a compelling case for
mandated flood coverage.214 His argument seems to me
unassailable, yet there has been no progress toward this during
the eight years since Katrina. Instead, the limited legislative
activity has revolved around whether to continue the federal
flood insurance program and on what terms.
The typical homeowner's policy expressly excludes flood
coverage. If you want flood coverage, you need to purchase it
Expectations of the "Real" Reasonable Policyholder, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y (2013) ("[h]uman beings are often poor judges of risk" and thus are
vulnerable to underinsurance as well as likely to expect coverage though without
significant scrutiny of policy provisions).
214 See Scales, supra note 199; see also Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 63
("Fewer than half the residents in flood and hurricane-prone areas were insured
against water damage from Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy.").
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through the federal government's program that,
notwithstanding its existence as a federal program, involves
purchase of the coverage through the agent selling homeowners'
coverage. As discussed above, agents have been shockingly
reluctant to push clients to purchase the flood coverage, even
when the property at issue is close to the sea, rivers, or other
bodies of water. Explanations vary from outdated or inaccurate
flood plain maps, simple ignorance (e.g., the agent who thinks
that a property outside a flood plain is invulnerable), consumer
cognitive error (e.g., policyholder reluctance to pay a higher
premium for contingent protection when the risk is seen as too
remote), misaligned incentives (the agent earns less commission
with a flood insurance sale and thus invests less effort in making
the sale), or inadequate monitoring by stakeholders (mortgage
lenders sell notes downstream to financiers so quickly that no
lender with a close connection to the community has adequate
incentive to insist that property be adequately insured).215
Whatever the reason, there is no question that flood
insurance is undersold. Requiring all homeowners' policies to
provide the coverage would slice this Gordian Knot. Insurers
and some policyholders outside flood-prone areas object on
grounds this would needlessly increase premiums for some. On
closer analysis, the objection is not compelling. First, although
property closer to the ocean is generally at greater flood risk
than inland property, the imbalance is not as dramatic as
commonly supposed. Inland rivers flood with considerable
frequency and ferocity. Floods in the Red River Valley along the
North Dakota-Minnesota border provide a particularly good
example of flood damage a long way from the ocean.216 Similar
havoc frequents Wayne, New Jersey, which is inland some
215 See Scales, supra note 199, at 7-21 (addressing potential explanations
for under-purchase of flood coverage). See also id. at 13-17 (describing
National Flood Insurance Program, which although revised since 2oo6 has
same fundamental characteristics); see also supra TAN and notes 214-23.
216 See generally Douglas C. Friez & Kathleen Donahue, North Dakota After
Action Report: A Historical Perspective, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 193
(1997); see also Joshua P. Fershee, The Rising Tide of Climate Change: What
America's Flood Cities Can Teach Us About Energy Policy, and Why We
Should Be Worried, 39 ENVTL. L. 1109 (2009).
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twenty miles from the sea, causing significant losses.217
Tallahassee, Florida is a long way from the beaches normally
associated with the state. Indeed, there is no river of
consequence nearby. But in 1995, entire neighborhoods flooded
simply from unusually heavy rains that overwhelmed the slow-
draining red clay soil.218 Flooding is not just a coastal problem.
Of course, some insurers will undoubtedly counter that
whether coastal or inland, flooding risk differs across the
country. To state a truism, property on high ground is less
susceptible to flooding wherever it is located geographically.
When policy debate is posed as a rhetorical question, we can
(and probably should) ask why a homeowner on a hill
overlooking Aspen, Colorado should have to pay a higher
premium for flood coverage more likely to be invoked by a
policyholder with a farm in the Missouri River Valley or a beach
house in Pensacola, Florida.219
To me, the answer is fairly obvious. Aspen aeries may not
flood as much (although some properties on even seemingly
high ground can be flooded based on drainage patterns that
217 See Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public Choice
on the Beachfront, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 324 n.285 (1993) (discussing
chronic flooding in Wayne, N.J. and the proposed response); Laura
Incalcaterra, Ramapo Watershed Council Outlines River-Protection Efforts,
THE JOURNAL NEWS, April 20, 2007, at iB ("But Wayne has long had a flooding
problem, mainly because it is nearly surrounded by the Passaic, Pompton and
Ramapo rivers.").
218 See Ronald Smothers, Hurricane Slams into Florida with Winds of 145
M.P.H., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at B16 ('"Tom Roche, the emergency planning
director for Santa Rosa County, said the wind was whipping trees, tossing signs
about and causing widespread flooding in the area."); see also Kevin Sack,
Storm Leaves a Tapestry of Ruin on Florida Panhandle Beaches, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1995, at At.
219 Although, it should be remembered that mandatory flood coverage in the
homeowners' policy does not mean that all policyholders will pay the same
premium for this more comprehensive, less fragmented coverage. Insurers
would remain free to charge higher premiums to lowland homes than highland
homes and would likely do so. The apt actuarial calculation of these different
premiums for these different exposures lies beyond the scope of this article. But
it should be noted that highland properties may pose different risks that even-
out the overall exposure of the insurer. For example, homes in the California
hills face significant wildfire risk absent from most waterfront homes.
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laypersons are ill-equipped to detect), but they probably
produce many more frozen pipes, snow-caused roof collapses,
and wildfire losses than a beach house on the Gulf Coast or a
three-bedroom rambler in Phoenix. Aggregate these different
risks across the Snowbelt, areas of higher crime, earthquake
zones, Tornado Alley (the area of the American Midwest
frequented by tornadoes in Spring and Summer), and the like,
as well as coastal and low-lying country, and it becomes less
clear which way runs the subsidy. If something as basic as
homeowners' insurance is broadened through required coverage
and larger aggregations of risk, there may be some intra-pool
subsidization of policyholders, but so what?
The very nature of the aleatory insurance product makes it
something of a gamble for both sides, albeit a wager worth
making. A policyholder may pay years of premiums without
ever having a claim of any type. Is this unfair? Hardly.
Protection has been received should it ever have been needed.
The policyholder still obtained that for which he paid. Even if
one were to classify the claimless policyholder as a "loser" in the
transaction because it never suffered a loss that triggered a right
to be indemnified (for the loss, most sane policyholders would
just as soon wish it never had happened), this would not
undermine the wisdom of requiring broader coverage to provide
broader protection, and the risk management and disputing
efficiencies flowing from a less fragmented approach.
Whether premiums may have been slightly higher because of
bundled coverage is not nearly as important a financial issue to
this "disappointed" policyholder as the fact that he paid
premiums for what he wrongly views as nothing in return. Had
there been one or more claims under the policy, the additional
premiums paid over the years would likely be miniscule in
relation to the indemnity benefits received in connection with
even a single serious loss claim.22o
220 The "endowment effect" is a tendency to which most humans are
susceptible and seems to strengthen this common sense observation. People
have a tendency to place greater value on what they already have than they do
on the same object prior to purchase. For example, test subjects regularly state
that they are willing to pay X for an object but then as soon as they own it
regularly demanded X + quite a bit more as the price for selling it. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83 (2008); see also WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL
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To be sure, there is a price break point of sorts that would
make me think twice before advocating mandated flood
coverage, earthquake coverage, replacement cost
indemnification, and the elimination of other exclusions or
coverage deductions. If homeowners' premiums were to double
or triple, the case for consolidating all risks into one policy
would need rethinking.221 But this is unlikely. Consider a typical
Sun Belt homeowner with a $250,000 house paying roughly
$1,200 per year, perhaps less, for an HO-3 policy that lacks
flood and earthquake insurance. Adding this coverage is likely
to increase premiums perhaps as much as 10-20%, but not
loo%.222 And although $250 is not a trivial sum, neither is it a
ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 209-10 (2007); BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS 223-25, 261 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). Consequently,
the policyholder will place a greater than rational value on the home or other
property owned, and presumably would prefer to protect it even at the cost of
paying higher premiums over the years. The effect may be a bit muted in that
the money used to pay premiums is, of course, also the policyholder's money
(although not necessarily, as sometimes premiums are financed). But it appears
that the endowment effect applies to objects, but not to the more readily
fungible wealth of cash. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H.
Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,
in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 55-74 (Colin F. Camerer, George
Loewenstein & Matthew Rabin eds., 2004).
221 But even an enormous increase in premiums charged for insuring high
risk properties (e.g., the "McMansion" on the beach) is an arguably acceptable
cost of better linking insurance costs to the actual risks presented. Perhaps
most important, a spike in property insurance premiums that creates a new
normal does not mean that rates will continue to skyrocket. More likely, they
will stabilized after the spike. Going forward, the newly normal higher rates for
high risk property will make for a better informed, more efficient market
regarding the pricing of such properties and insurance on them.
222 We know, for example, that flood insurance is relatively inexpensive,
with typical flood premiums running at only a small amount (10-15%) relative
to the premium on an entire owners' or renters' policy. Earthquake coverage,
which lacks the government backing enjoyed by flood insurance, also adds only
a relatively small percentage of the overall policy premium (although the
coverage has a higher deductible than other components of the homeowners'
policy). Thus, even if there was no economy of scale from requiring flood and
earth movement coverage as a part of the standard homeowner or business
property policy, the net increase in premium cost would likely be something on
the order of 25% if the national government wishes to continue to subsidize
flood losses. Although policyholders in outside high risk flood and earthquake
zones might complain, they would be forced to accept paying for this more
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substantial additional burden upon this solidly middle class
citizen in return for both his own greater protection
(earthquakes do happen in Nevada and Arizona as well as
California, and desert washes223 occasionally overflow or breach
comprehensive coverage, which in turn, they might need someday. That will in
any event lead to sounder risk management and disaster compensation far less
dependent on FEMA and related post-catastrophe remedial action by the
government that is funded by general taxpayer revenues.
Of course, continued government subsidy of flood loss may be bad public
policy. In addition to generally encouraging excessive development of coastal
and waterfront areas, it certainly encourages purchase of such property in
circumstances where the purchasers might well decline if they were forced to
pay the true cost of waterfront ownership. See Hornstein, supra note 9. Even
under the current situation of subsidy for flood insurance, homeowner
insurance premiums have risen more than 50% in Gulf Coast states, with
hurricane victims self-insuring for 15-20% of losses in 2004; if flood premiums
were completely market-based, cost to waterfront homeowners could
approximate $30,000 per year, subject to reduction to range of $3,500-$7,000
per year for building at higher elevation or taking other preventive measures,
such as raising the existing structure.
In commentary at the Conference, Dr. Weisbart suggested that increases of
this type are so large as to undermine my argument in favor of mandating flood
and water damage coverage in homeowner policies and in favor of more
integrated, non-fragmented coverage. Even under a worst-case analysis, I am
not sure I would agree. Someone who builds a McMansion almost at the water's
edge probably should pay the market rate of insurance and internalize the full
cost of being this type of high-end property owner. More likely, however, is
something other than a worst case analysis. If flood coverage is part of all
homeowner coverage, there will be some subsidization of the waterfront owner
by the owners of three-bedroom ramblers in midwestern suburbs, although
some of this will be muted by additional underwriting and imposition of
additional premiums. Return subsidies may come from a waterfront owner to
suburban Midwesterner in the wake of ice storms, tornadoes, and frozen pipes.
To the extent a subsidy takes place, my position is that it is a necessary evil to
have more coherent insurance coverage for natural disasters.
In response to a particular Weisbart criticism wondering whether I propose
that flood coverage be mandatory in renters' policies, the answer is a resounding
"yes." Renters insurance is cheap, even for starving college students.
Mandating comprehensive coverage--and it must be mandated so that cut-rate
insurers do not unfairly underprice more comprehensive policies--is not likely
to add much to the cost of such policies.
223 For the benefit of readers who do not reside in the Southwestern U.S.: a
"wash" is a normally dry river or creek bed that contains run-off water (that can
fill or even overflow the wash) after a rainstorm. Regarding earthquakes,
although the Western U.S. generally experiences more tremors, the New Madrid
Fault, which passes through the heartland of the nation, is viewed by geologists
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aging walls) and as part of a sounder national risk management
policy.
Those complaining that mandated inclusive coverage forces
cross-subsidization of policyholders overlook the cross-
subsidization that takes place today in the aftermath of natural
disasters. The same policyholders with property on high ground
or well away from fault lines may have paid lower premiums for
their homeowners' insurance, but they surely pay tax dollars
used to deliver emergency aid to disaster victims who lack flood
coverage, earthquake coverage, or full indemnity protection.224
Even if broadened coverage results in higher premiums that are
seen as unfair to property owners facing lower risk, the net cost
of a new system may be lower overall, and would likely place less
of a drain on government resources by shifting much of the risk
to the private sector. The U.S. government heavily subsidizes
today's federal flood insurance program225-and that subsidy is
financed by the same taxpayers who are also policyholders.
In proposing broader coverage, I am not suggesting that
insurers offer the additional coverage at cut-rate premiums.
Insurers should be permitted to charge fair market-based
premiums and-within reason-to make distinctions based on
as a likely future source of significant earthquakes that would do most of their
damage in the South-Central U.S. and possibly the Eastern Seaboard. If this
occurs, everyone will be quite happy that the nation prepaid the costs of such
losses through widespread mandatory insurance and years of accumulated
premiums.
224 See Congress Passes $5o.5B Superstorm Sandy Aid Bill, WASH. POST,
Jan. 29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congress-passes-
505b-superstorm-sandy-aid-bill/2013/01/28/99a13262-69ab-11e2-95b3-
272d6o4aloa3_story.html; David Lawder, Senate Approves $50.5 Billion in
Long-Delayed Superstorm Sandy Aid, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/O1/29/us-usa-congress-sandy-
idUSBRE9oR1o620130129.
225 See RAWLE 0. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4285o, THE NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: STATUS AND REMAINING ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 17
(2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R4285o.pdf ("The NFIP
was self-supporting from 1986 until 2005, covering all administrative expenses
and claim payments out of premium income and fees. Since Hurricane Katrina
struck in August 2005, FEMA has had to borrow $19.64 billion, which includes
$2.6 billion over the 2007-2009 period, to pay claims from Hurricane Ike and
the Midwest floods of 2oo8.")
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the risks presented. Recipients of broad coverage in Florida
may need to pay significantly more than those in Nebraska if, as
an actuarial matter, the Florida homes face greater risk of loss
overall from the totality of perils covered pursuant to bundled
coverage.
Similarly, insurers can protect themselves and help reduce
premium costs by requiring higher deductibles or co-pay
requirements for certain difficult risks. Today's common norm
of a higher deductible for earthquake coverage, which tends to
be available for the property insurance policyholder willing to
pay for it even if flood coverage is not absent the federal
program, makes sense as a means of risk-sharing between
policyholder and insurer. The key is that such measures be
reasonable and actually necessary for protecting insurance risk
pools rather than being a means by which insurers simply build
capital without providing sufficient protection to policyholders.
One criticism of the comprehensive approach is that it
creates a product that is too expensive for many, particularly
those of low or moderate income. At the risk of sounding
unsympathetic, I am relatively unmoved by this argument. For
decades, the minimum amount of automobile insurance has
been low ($15,000 per claimant/$3o,ooo per accident in some
states). Although this reduces the premiums paid by the poor
and the frugal, it has produced decades of unnecessary litigation
(both tort claims and underinsured motorist claims) when
victims are unable to receive adequate compensation from
tortfeasors with such minimum policy limits. Higher limits
would increase insurance costs, which would fall more heavily
on those with less wealth, but the amounts are not so large as to
be insurmountable; forcing purchase of adequate insurance
would bring the benefit of forcing those who want to drive to pay
their way for the privilege, which may in turn have the collateral
benefit of reducing driving and attendant energy and
environmental costs. Mandating sufficiently comprehensive
insurance would likely have similar positive impact for society
as a whole sufficient to overcome the inconvenience or hardship
imposed on the poor.22 6
226 See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 63 (unduly low premiums or
inadequate coverage forces taxpayer-funded aid in the wake of catastrophe). At
the risk of sounding unduly Republican about this, I also note that many cries of
excessive poverty are ill-taken. People routinely say that they "can't afford" to
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B. BENEFITS FOR VICTIMS
Liability insurance is acknowledged to have many purposes
other than protecting policyholders and insureds from the
burden of defending claims and the consequences of liability. It
also serves to provide a means of compensating victims, as well
as a socio-economic function in assisting with risk management
and mitigating the consequences of injuries.
Individual tortfeasors, like errant drivers, are often without
the financial resources to remedy the consequences of their
actions. Consequently, if not for liability insurance, these
impecunious drivers would be without means to compensate
their victims. Even a middle class tortfeasor often has few liquid
assets,227 and, thus, obtaining compensation would involve
pay a socially useful cost such as taxes, user fees for parks or athletic facilities,
etc. But many of these same people manage to purchase alcohol, cigarettes,
multiple daily cappuccinos, a vehicle more expensive than necessary for their
transportation needs, new clothing, and-perhaps most infamously-homes
with unrealistically high mortgage payments.
The housing collapse of 2008/2009 illustrates the harm that can occur
when vendors are unwilling to act as gatekeepers or at least price products
appropriately. Just as some of the earliest twenty-first century home purchasers
would have been better off being denied a mortgage and making a more modest
purchase or renting rather than buying, many consumers and businesses will
benefit from being forced to purchase adequately comprehensive insurance,
even if this means redirecting additional amounts of their income toward
payment of premiums. In similar fashion, government and market failure to
require adequate environmental care due to lack of will or fears of stifling
economic growth often carry a long-term cost far greater than would have been
the regulatory burden. See, e.g., Edward Wong, Life In A Toxic Country, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.Com/2o13/o8/o4/sunday-
review/life-in-a-toxic-country.html?_r=o (describing how pollution and
inadequate food safety not only impose psychological costs, but also result in
wasteful and inefficient economic behavior prompted by efforts to mitigate
safety problems created by lack of regulation).
227 See Allison K. Hoffman & Howell E. Jackson, Retiree Out-of-Pocket
Healthcare Spending: A Study of Consumer Expectations and Policy
Implications, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 62, 64 n.9 (2013) ("Studies report savings
shortfalls, healthcare costs as exacerbating retirement risk (defined as a
substantial and detrimental decrease in standard of living) or healthcare costs
consuming a large portion of household assets."); see also Annie Duflo & Dean
Karlan, Changing Savings Habits, STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV., 2012, at 7,
available at http://www.ssireview.org/pdf/Fall 2012_Changing-Savings
_Habits.pdf ("We've overborrowed, with average credit card debt more than
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executing on real or tangible personal property or garnishing
wages. Liquid assets such as savings accounts or brokerage
accounts can be located and executed upon, but only with some
effort.228 This is because a determined tortfeasor judgment
debtor may be able to hide or immunize assets.229 For example,
filing for bankruptcy often permits the discharge of the debtor's
personal liability.23o Although when an individual or business
files for bankruptcy the insurance policy is technically
considered a part of the debtor's estate, it remains available to
pay claims as needed, thus protecting the debtor (without
diminishing the size of the estate for purposes of attempting to
satisfy commercial obligations) and tort victim claimants, who
might otherwise find the debtor without sufficient assets to
provide compensation.231
$5,ooo; and 50 percent of Americans haven't adequately saved for
retirement.").
228 See generally DAVID F. HERR, ROGER S. HAYDOCK & JEFFREY STEMPEL,
FUNDAMENTALS OF LITIGATION PRACTICE chs. 1, 30 (2013 ed.) (describing the
execution process after obtaining a judgment).
229 See Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 1o6 YALE L.J. 1, 14-32
(1996) (describing vast range of options debtors may have for secreting assets or
removing them from the reach of creditors).
230 See WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 58:1 (3d ed., 2010). The basic purpose of the
bankruptcy system is to provide debtors with the opportunity for an economic
"fresh start." Id. at 58-2. "The most significant element of the 'fresh start'
concept is the discharge of the debtor's personal liability for debts. In fact, in
most consumer Chapter 7 cases, the prospect of discharge of existing liabilities
is the major, if not the only, goal of the debtor." Id. at 58-2-58-3. In a Chapter
13 bankruptcy case, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a) discharge is available only after
completion of all payments under the plan, a process usually satisfied when the
debtor makes all the required payments to the trustee as part of confirmed plan.
Id. at 58-5. However, discharge provided by § 1328(a) does not include any
debt "for restitution or a criminal fine," including debts from drunk driving
under § 523(a)(9). Id. at 58-5 n.n.
231 See In re Titan Energy, Inc., 837 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1988) (although
product liability insurance policies were considered property of the debtor's
estate, available policy proceeds in connection with covered claims do not flow
into the estate but are paid to product liability claimants); Louisiana World
Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1987) (same re directors
& officers liability insurance of debtor); Appleman on Insurance § 3342; Barry
L. Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 373 (1989).
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For commercial tortfeasors, liability insurance may permit a
reputable business to continue to flourish by curtailing the
potential for liability claims to attach to their assets-a major
goal of liability insurance. Although these commercial
policyholders have the wealth to pay settlements and judgments,
as with individual financially stable tortfeasors, issues of access
to funds often present themselves. Even successful businesses
may not have the cash flow or liquidity to pay large or numerous
liability claims in a timely fashion. Insurance gives victims of
commercial tortfeasors more ready access to compensation
without disrupting the business of the commercial policyholder.
First-party insurance protects victims of mishaps because
the first-party policyholder and other insureds are also victims
of fire loss, wind loss, theft loss, and the like. The loss of
property of course most acutely affects the property owners, but
it also affects those in the community connected to the property
such as suppliers of a business, customers, or even lawn, pool,
and domestic workers connected to an individual's residence.
The sooner damaged property is restored and operations
resume, the better off are these impacted parties. To the extent
the absence of insurance or inadequate insurance retards the
rebuilding process, these constituencies suffer injury. And
although it may not be as concrete an injury, neighbors and the
local community are aesthetically and psychologically injured
when eyesore-like property damage remains unrepaired for
longer than necessary.
C. BENEFITS FOR THE PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Even if insurance did nothing more than protect its
policyholders, assist in the management of claims, and provide
victim compensation, it would serve the public interest in
multiple ways. Consider liability insurance. When a victim is
injured, there are collateral costs externalized to society as a
whole, such as medical expenses and costs associated with
police, fire, and other government services. Additionally, traffic
is disrupted; productivity is diminished; and the general spirit of
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the community may suffer, particularly if property damage is
widespread, or if the damaged property is crucial to local
operations or infrastructure (e.g., a town hall, church, or
basketball arena).232
In addition to compensating the victim, both liability
insurance and first-party insurance compensate vendors, who
may have provided help through features like the medical
payments provisions of auto insurance policies as well as
medical, disability, and life insurance. By providing funds for
health care professionals and compensating for lost economic
activity, insurance will help the victim and his or her family,
employer, and community.
To the extent that insurance is not available for a loss, the
costs associated with it are more likely to be externalized.33
Again, flood risk provides a good example. As discussed above,
because flood insurance must be purchased separately, there is
too little in place relative to the risks of flood damage. The
national government provides significant subsidization of flood
insurance coverage.34
When floods affect uninsured property, the victims
predictably turn to the government for disaster relief. In effect,
FEMA relief and related assistance in the wake of a flood,
hurricane, or other major storm provide a backstop insurance
program funded not by its beneficiaries, but by taxpayers
generally, regardless of their risk profile.35 Having such
232 The many ways in which insurance permeates society are well-
chronicled. See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY,
INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003). See also Shauhin Talesh, Insurance Law as
Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 985, 992-1005 (2012); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495 (2010).
233 See, e.g., Marty Schladen, West, Texas blast reveals lack of insurance
rule, EL PASO TIMES, May 5, 2013, http://www.elpasotimes.Com/Ci-23169464/
blast-reveals-lack-insurance-rule (noting problems posed by lack of adequate
insurance covering fertilizer plant that exploded in West, Texas, on April 17,
2013).
234 See supra TAN 203-213.
235 See Scales, supra note 199, at 3-7. See generally Kunreuther & Pauly,
supra note 63.
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protection funded on an ongoing basis by those who will benefit
from such programs of de facto "coverage" would be an
improvement of both efficiency and equity by requiring those
who benefit to contribute to a system of risk distribution and
rebuilding.
Insurance serves the public interest to the extent insurers
work to reduce losses that harm society. History provides
several examples of the insurance industry pursuing
underwriting practices or political goals that made the world
safer or less wasteful. Underwriters Laboratories, as the name
implies, began as a property insurer's effort to encourage safer
appliances.36 Risks such as overheating coffee pots or frayed
lamp cords, which once caused substantial fire damage, are now
comparatively rare because of the improvement in the safety of
electronic products that began with Underwriters
Laboratories.37
236 Concerned about the number of fires started by malfunctioning
appliances, property insurers during the early 2oth century created an
organization for testing lamps and other products, resulting in enhanced
attention to safety by manufacturers seeking to receive approval from
Underwriters Laboratories. This approval was important, as it meant that
companies could display the "UL" label, a symbol of safety, on their products.
See Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. History, FUNDING UNIVERSE COMPANY
PROFILE DATABASE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/
underwriters-laboratories-inc-history/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); see also
History, UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES, http://www.ul.com/global/eng/pages/
aboutul/history/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
237 See Donald R. Ballman, Comment, Software Tort: Evaluating Software
Harm by Duty of Function and Form, 3 Conn. Ins. L.J. 417 (1996) ("The
insurance industry has a long history of encouraging its insureds to minimize
their exposure to third party claims. The famous Underwriters Laboratories,
best known for their ubiquitous UL symbol on manufactured products, was
created as a joint venture of several insurance companies as a means of testing
the quality of the products which their insureds produced. Because higher
quality products posed less risk exposure, the insurers could pass along a
portion of their savings to the insureds via reduced premiums. The consuming
public enjoyed higher quality products, less risk of injury and prices moderated
at least in part by the lower premiums the manufacturer[s] were required to
pay. More recently, insurance companies have instituted 'loss control"
programs in which insurance specialists work closely with insureds to identify
and eliminate avoidable exposures for business claims, property claims and the
like.). But see Peter Molk The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 Tulane L. Rev.
18 n.81 (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=226348o (noting the modern trend of insurers
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Seat belts and air bags, both of which were supported by the
insurance industry238 before they were embraced by automakers
or the body politic, have helped reduce the number of vehicle-
related deaths in half, as well as reduced vehicle-related injuries
generally, even as the population has grown by tens of millions
since the initial mandated use of these devices in 1968 and 1980,
respectively.239 Today, insurers have been important supporters
paying less attention to loss reduction and more attention to loss prediction and
minimization of their exposure to risk). See also Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at
the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 Wash.
U. L.Q. 491, 507 ("UL has not survived and prospered during the last century
exclusively because of its reputation for quality; instead, it has derived great
value from monopoly property rights based on regulatory requirements and
preferences related to UL labels.") (footnote omitted). But Professor Partnoy
also notes that his "argument is not that UL labels necessarily are inaccurate;
instead, it is that UL's dominance is only partially sustained by its reputation for
quality certification." See 79 Wash. U. L.Q. at 508.
238 See Robert Kneuper & Bruce Yandle, Auto Insurers and the Air Bag, 61
J. RISK & INS. 107, 107 (1994) ("Of particular interest were the opposing
positions taken by automakers, who preferred mandatory seat belt laws, and
auto insurers, who preferred a passive restraint mandate."); see also Joan
Claybrook & Benjamin Kelley, Air Bags for All Cars, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1991,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/o7/3o/opinion/air-bags-for-all-
cars.html ("At the behest of insurers and safety groups, the Supreme Court in
1983 ordered an end to the 'regulatory equivalent of war against the air bag');
see also Richard W. Stevenson, Insurance Reform in a Deadlock, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/o9/23/business/
insurance-reform-in-a-deadlock.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm ("On both the
national and state levels, insurers and consumer groups are banding together to
help control costs by pushing for more stringent safety laws, including lower
speed limits and stricter enforcement of seatbelt laws, and by lobbying for other
mutually beneficial changes like stronger bumpers.").
239 See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: 2O1 DATA (2013), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811729.pdf (use of seat belts and airbags have resulted
in substantial reduction of driving-related deaths and injuries). ("Research has
found that lap/shoulder seat belts, when used, reduce the risk of fatal injury to
front-seat passenger car occupants by 45 percent and the risk of moderate to
critical injury by 50 percent. For light-truck occupants, seat belts reduces the
risk of fatal injury by 6o percent and moderate-to-critical injury by 65 percent;"
Among passenger vehicle occupants age 5 and older, seat belts saved an
estimated 11,949 lives in 2011.") (p. 4 of Occupant Protection section of Traffic
Safety Facts) ("Frontal air bags, combined with lap/shoulder belts, offer
effective safety protection for passenger vehicle occupants. NHTSA analyses
indicate a fatality-reducing effectiveness from frontal air bags of 14 percent
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of measures to limit or forbid cell phone use while driving,
particularly through public awareness campaigns.24o Where
insurers take on risk, they have a strong incentive to reduce it,
which, in turn, can increase consumer and public safety. For
example, one recent study found significant insurer impact in
reducing risk associated with consumer goods, food safety, and
financial statements.241
when no seat belt was used and 11 percent when a seat belt was used in
conjunction with frontal air bags;" In 2001, an estimated 2,204 lives were saved
by frontal air bags. From 1987 to 2011, a total of 34,757 lives were saved") (p. 5
of Occupant Protection section of Traffic Safety Facts). See also NHTSA, Traffic
Safety Facts: 2oo8 Data, Overview (altos available at NHTSA website) at p. 3
(fatality rate per million vehicle miles travels has fallen from 1.58 in 1998 to 1.27
in 2oo8, a time during which the number of states mandating seat belt use and
enforcing seat belt use laws grew to 2oo8 figure of 49 states and D.C.) ("From
1975 through 2oo8, NHTSA estimates that seat belts saved 255,115 passenger
vehicle occupants age 5 and older, including 13,250 lives saved in 2oo8.").
240 See The Rules of Distraction, ADVOCATE (American Ins. Assoc.), Winter
2012, at 13, 15, available at http://www.aiadc.org/AIAdotNET
/docHandler.aspx?DocID=347498 ("Multitasking while driving, whether it be
texting or talking on a cellphone or checking the directions on a GPS locator, is
'the most hazardous thing that a typical person does in a typical day,' says David
Snyder, vice president and associate general counsel of the American Insurance
Association."); see also Christina Bramlet, Texting While Biking: Darwin
Would Not Approve, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360 (May 30, 2013),
http://www.propertycasualty36o.com/2013/05/3o/texting-wile-biking-
darwin-would-not-approve ("[C]ompanies across the board, from insurers to
automakers such as Volkswagen and Audi, to cell-phone providers-including
AT&T, which recently created the #ItCanWait distracted driving campaign-are
trumpeting safe driving practices via public awareness campaigns."). Insurers
have supported laws both barring cellphone use altogether and requiring the
use of hands-free devices for cell phone use while driving. See, e.g., id.
241 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing
Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197
(2012); see also 19 States Approve ISO's Telematics-Based Auto Rating Tool,
INS. J. (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national
/2o13/o4/o2/28676o.htm (reflecting insurance industry's efforts to set
premiums based on monitoring of policyholder driving behavior). I concede
that, even in a regime of fragmented risk, insurers have an incentive to
encourage risk-minimization as a means of reducing claims. For example, the
Institute for Business & Home Safety receives substantial support and credit
from insurers. See Remarks of Steven Weisbart, supra note 222; see also New
Swiss Re sigma study puts the spotlight on the role that insurance can play in
improving food security for over 850 million people globally, ENP NEWSWIRE
(Jan. 18, 2013), http://fpn.advisen.com/articles/aricle191877793-
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Although recent scholarship suggests that insurers continue
to play a risk-reducing, safety-enhancing role, it seems harder to
find such dramatic examples of insurer-led safety advances
today, at least in terms of tangible consumer products such as
the UL-approved appliance, the seat belt, or the air bag. This
may be the result of mere historical coincidence or
misperception by observers. But it also may stem from the
decrease in the comprehensive approach to insuring and
perhaps from a decline in the industry's civic consciousness as
well.242
To the extent that insurers can avoid risk through
fragmentation and Swiss cheese approaches to underwriting and
sales, they logically have a reduced incentive to seek to reduce
risk in general. By contrast, where insurers provide coverage
that is more comprehensive, they have more motivation to seek
improvements that are more comprehensive in safety. When
insurers provide broad coverage, they have an incentive to
engage in broad efforts to reduce risk and loss. This in turn
logically produces more public benefit than is produced by the
efforts (or non-efforts) of insurers marketing more limited,
fragmented insurance products.
This is not to say that insurers have lost all interest in
improving safety. In addition to the modern examples cited
above, auto insurers appear to be making substantial efforts to
encourage safer driving by offering policyholders a discount in
return for their willingness to be monitored and to drive safely
87475629o.html (noting potentially useful role of agricultural insurance).
Notwithstanding the fragmentation of property coverage, property insurers-
particularly the large European reinsurers such as Munich Re and Swiss Re-
have devoted significant study to problems posed by increasing levels of carbon
in the atmosphere and attendant climate change. See Eduardo Porter, For
Insurers, No Doubts On Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, available
at http://www.nytimes.Com/2o13/o5/15/business/insurers-stray-from-the-
conservative-line-on-climate-change.html.
2420 One arguable exception to this trend is that insurers have, to a degree,
led the business community in noting the danger of climate change due to rising
carbon levels in the atmosphere due to human activity. See Porter, supra note
241. However, insurers have largely tended to support adaptation efforts (e.g.,
stronger building codes, flood control projects) rather than mitigation efforts
designed to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., a carbon tax, higher gas mileage
standards, wind and solar power). See id.
2 6 o
Fall 2013 Vol111:1
Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy
(as verified by the insurer monitoring).43 However, in
comparison to many insurance products, auto insurance
remains largely a broad and comprehensive product despite
some recent curtailments. The Swiss cheese aspects of
contemporary homeowners policies and other insurance
products may have drained some of the risk-reducing zeal from
these insurers.
Supporters of fragmented coverage undoubtedly will respond
that fragmenting risk does not necessarily relieve insurers as a
whole from the risk. For example, a property policy may
exclude pollution coverage, but, if environmental impairment
insurance is sold to augment the now-reduced basic coverage,
the environmental insurer retains substantial incentive to
reduce risk through underwriting, monitoring, and other
techniques. However, the market and risk pools for these more
targeted and fragmented insurance products is thinner,
resulting in policies that are less attractive to policyholders and,
hence, less prevalent. A good deal of the impetus towards
fragmenting risk appears not merely to direct the risk to
insurers more adept at managing the risk, but to avoid the risk
altogether unless the policyholder can pay high premiums.
To some degree, this makes economic and perhaps even
ethical sense. No one is very excited about having the business
community at large subsidize a subset of enterprises that pose
substantial pollution or similarly difficult risks. But to the
degree that these offenders fail to obtain insurance, or have only
inadequate or very expensive insurance, the total social costs of
this approach may be just as bad as the cross-subsidization that
can take place through a comprehensive approach to insurance.
With the relatively easy availability of bankruptcy and other
debt avoidance techniques, the consequences of deadbeat
polluters walking away and leaving taxpayers or victims with the
243 See Randall Stross, So You're a Good Driver? Let's Go to the Monitor,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.Com/2012/11/
25/business/seeklng-cheaper-insurance-drivers-accept-monitoring-
devices.html; Joseph B. White, Auto Insurance Enters the 'Pay-per-View' Era,
WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB0001424o527o23o39o15o4577462382411135766.html; see also Todd
Wallack, Privacy Is the Price for Lowering Car Insurance: Insurers Test
Devices to Monitor Driving, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2012, at Ai (examining
insurers' efforts to monitor policyholders and encourage safe driving).
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bi11244 may be as or more negative than mandating broader
coverage priced accordingly among a wider risk pool that
includes many less risky entities.45
This counter-argument in favor of fragmentation may have
some force in the commercial sector, where some entities
regularly conduct riskier business than others and where many
policyholders have the capacity to self-insure or otherwise craft
apt risk management programs if not included in
comprehensive policies. However, it seems far less persuasive
when applied to the consumer context.
Consider the many limitations of some homeowners policies
as discussed above, such as mold exclusions, the visible marks
definition of theft, the criminal acts exclusion as applied to
drunk driving, and the misconduct by "any" insured exclusion.46
In many or most of these instances, the policyholder is not
involved in planned activity that creates the risk or loss. The
244 See LoPucki, supra note 229, at 78, 85.
245 1 realize that Ken Abraham disagrees, at least implicitly, which of course
gave me pause. See Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability
Insurance, supra note 192 (noting that expansive coverage decisions by courts
had the unintended consequences of prompting insurers to narrow coverage,
particularly with the 1986 revisions to the CGL form, in effect resulting in
reduced general liability protection for commercial entities going forward even
though those expansive coverage decisions aided policyholders and victims
regarding past problems with asbestos, pollution, and government-mandated
waste clean-up). Applied to my proposed strengthening of the comprehensive
approach, his analysis suggests that if forced to engage in comprehensive
underwriting (by legislators, regulators, or courts), insurers will likely respond
by exiting some markets or imposing lower policy limits and sufficiently high
premiums, deductibles, or co-insurance requirements to make for a net welfare
loss for policyholders and the public. Although I acknowledge this as a risk for
commercial insurance, for the reasons set forth in text, I see it as not very
threatening in the consumer context.
246 See supra TAN 137-98. Drug dealing spouses present a closer question.
But it is often unrealistic to expect one insured to shut down another insured's
legal activity-and certainly unrealistic to expect the an insured aware of
coverage-excluding activity to find the strength to stand in the way (perhaps at
grave personal risk) in order to preserve insurance coverage. Optimism and
self-serving biases make it likely that a co-insured will underestimate the risk of
loss, and, if the co-insured is completely innocent by virtue of lack of awareness
of a co-insured's coverage-destroying activity, the exclusion or limitation creates
no incentive for safety or precaution.
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policyholder usually has had essentially no control over mold
problems or the stealth and smoothness of the burglar who
came to call-and certainly no control in most cases over the
aberrant co-insured who goes insane or becomes unhinged over
a divorce.47 Flood and earth movement exclusions to basic
homeowners and other property coverage present the same
situation, except to the extent that society is willing to embrace a
position of "blaming" those who live near water or too near a
fault line-and blame them enough to discourage insurance
through the current Rube Goldberg system that denies
comprehensive coverage in favor of ineffective fragmented
underwriting.248
D. BENEFITS FOR INSURERS
In advocating for more inclusive insurance products, I
confess to worrying primarily about unprotected policyholders
and victims and the degree to which the costs of insurance
failure are externalized upon society and government. But I am
not insensitive to the interests of insurers, in particular their
need to turn enough of a profit to offer the more inclusive
policies sought.
The movement toward fragmenting coverage appears driven
by factors of both ideology and business. Ideologically,
247 Some will argue that felony drunk driving is a different matter. Perhaps,
but in many cases, an inebriated driver was simply someone who was
insufficiently careful about alcohol intake (e.g., drinking strong cocktails instead
of the usual wine or beer, drinking on an empty stomach, drinking on top of
being tired at the end of the week) who then had the misfortune to be in a
vehicular collision that caused serious injury or death. Although society should
of course refrain from praising such errors in judgment and their consequences,
treating these events as uncovered due to a new Puritanism merely deprives the
victim of compensation and forgoes a sensible opportunity to spread the risk,
particularly in the United States where automobile use is so widespread, and
public transit and livery service are not always widely available.
248 To be sure, one can have a serious public policy debate about whether so
much expensive property should be built so close to beaches, lakes, rivers,
mountain tops, cliffs, edges, and the like (although this proximity is often a large
part of what makes the property more expensive). Certainly, premiums should
reflect the increased risk posed by such properties, but exempting such
properties from risk distribution or creating a situation ripe for post-loss
opportunistic behavior is not an apt response to the perceived problem.
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advocates of fragmentation argue that policyholders ideally
should pay only for the coverage they need rather than being
forced into larger risk pools where they may be subsidizing
riskier members of the pool and, hence, paying higher
premiums than necessary.
Although this objection can seem well-taken, it stems from
an erroneous, excessively sanguine view of the risk management
capabilities of most policyholders. Although some individuals
and commercial entities have a realistic view of the risks they
face and make rationale calculations as to their risk
management goals and insurance needs, this is hardly the norm.
Policyholders, like all human beings, will often err in estimating
their risk exposures and their insurance needs. Even the
perfectly rational person or entity can simply miscalculate.49
Such is the nature of risk, at least if not dealing with a
sufficiently large risk pool over a sufficiently large time. Add in
the occasional unanticipated cataclysm, and the policyholder's
estimate of what it "needs" for adequate protection can be very
wrong.
Moreover, most policyholders are not perfectly rationale.
Cognitive error abounds, both for individual humans and the
humans who make risk management decisions for entities.
They are afflicted by optimism bias, self-serving bias, short-term
focus, and other heuristic errors5o that in turn will produce
often-substantial miscalculations as to necessary insurance
protection. Although these errors sometimes run in the
direction of purchasing too much insurance,251 more often, these
249 Regarding the types of common cognitive error exhibited by humans,
see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011); SUNSTEIN &
THALER, supra note 220; BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 220, at 1-
1O (reviewing literature regarding cognitive traits, many of which often lead to
reasoning errors such as constructed preferences, extremeness aversion,
hindsight bias, optimistic bias, status quo bias, anchoring, the availability
heuristic, loss aversion, and self-serving bias).
250 See JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR
LAWYERS 70, 71, 76, 77 (2012); BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 220,
at 1-10; FARNSWORTH, supra note 220, at 21-26. See generally KAHNEMAN,
supra note 249; SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 220.
251 See Kent Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1629, 1647-49 (1994); Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The
Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REv. L. & ECON. 1, 541-42 (2009).
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cognitive deficiencies are likely to result in obtaining too little
insurance relative to the risk and the policyholder's ability to
bear it because of the general tendency toward optimism bias
and the tendency to undervalue more distant dangers while
focusing on immediate problems.
Further degrading the insurance calculations of many
entities is the problem of defective agency and misaligned
incentives. Entities purchase insurance through risk managers
and brokers. These parties often are dominated by the short-
term incentive to keep premiums (which are paid from current
funds) as low as possible, even if this may come at the risk of
larger costs incurred later, i.e. if the fragmented Swiss cheese
policy does not cover claims or if the lower cost insurer quibbles
over the claim.
A risk manager who saves funds now is more likely to get a
raise, a bonus, a promotion, or job retention during a recession
or time of corporate downsizing. Procuring more insurance or
insurance from a more reputable carrier with a better claims-
handling reputation is less likely to serve the risk manager's
immediate career goals. When claims subsequently arise and
the entity policyholder is confronted with no coverage or an
insurer wrongfully disputing coverage, dragging its feet, or
quibbling over valuation, the risk manager who was a hero a
placement time may be one or two employers down the road.
The insurer brokerage house used by the policyholder has
long-term interests in performing well and keeping business.
But like the policyholder entity, it does its work through human
agents who are often subject to the same short-term forces of
self-interest that may cloud the broker's judgment and impair
performance.
Policyholders may become dissatisfied with a broker and can
always change brokers, but the competitive pool is limited. A
handful or perhaps a dozen major brokers service nearly all the
major commercial policyholders.252 Although there are many
252 See INS. INFO. INST., THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2012, 1, 4-6, 9-1o, 12,
14-15, 20, 23 (2012), available at http://iiky.org/documents/Insurance-
Factbook 2012.pdf; see also Best's Review's Top Global Insurance Brokers,
BEST'S REVIEW (2012), available at http://www.fci-benefits.com/fci/fci.nsf/o/
10775CAAC76586F186257A4D00730C3A/$file/TopGlobalBrokers% 202012.pd
f; see also The Reactions guide to insurance markets 2012, REACTIONS (2012),
available at http://www.reactionsnet.com/pdf/2012Directory.pdf; Commercial
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regional and small brokers, they often cannot fully serve
commercial policyholders. In turn, policyholders must work
with wholesale brokers or the same dozen or fewer
national/international firms with which the policyholder may be
dissatisfied.53 Smaller brokers, even if authorized to fully
handle a commercial account, are widely viewed by insurers and
policyholders as having lower competence and expertise,
making it unrealistic that a commercial policyholder can
realistically do too much shopping for a new broker after losses
start coming in, due to arguable oversight by a large broker now
seen as having failed the policyholder.
Although policyholders may not gain from fragmented
coverage, insurers currently appear to believe that they do-at
least if the coverage is not so obviously fragmented as to
discourage potential policyholders. Consequently, the Swiss
cheese model can be economically attractive for carriers.
Policies can be offered that look reasonably broad, but are
riddled with coverage restrictions in the form of exclusions, sub-
limits, narrow definitions, or demanding conditions. Less
discerning brokers and risk managers-or discerning ones
overcome by short-term financial considerations-will fail to
realize the holes in coverage. Or they may be convinced that
these coverage limitations are not holes but instead are ways of
"tailoring" the policy (a favorite word of insurers not wanting to
concede narrow coverage) to the needs of the policyholder in
return for a lower premium.
Although I remain skeptical that this model is wise for any
but the most knowledgeable policyholder freed of cognitive bias
or agency concerns, I concede that it is probably a profitable
mode of operation for the insurer. In return for some modest
reduction in premium (which still leaves plenty of premium to
invest), the insurer can excise entire categories of risk exposure.
Lines, INS. INFO. INST., available at http://www.iii.org/facts statistics
/commercial-lines.html#.UfvvK6n9CE8.email flast visited Nov. 22 2013);
Insurance Company Rankings, INS. INFO. INST., available at
http://www.iii.org/facts statistics/insurance-company-rankings.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2013).
253 Regarding the organization and delivery of insurance brokerage services,
see generally BERTRAM HARNET, RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSURANCE AGENTS AND
BROKERS 2 (2013).
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But my argument is not that fragmented risk is necessarily a
bad deal for insurers. Rather, I contend that bundled or
comprehensive risk can be an equally good or even better deal
for insurers. For the same reasons articulated by Elmer Sawyer
and his contemporaries at the dawn of the CGL form, bundling
has both a marketing attractiveness and a pricing and
investment attraction.54
The marketing advantage of the comprehensive policy is that
it offers one-stop shopping to policyholders (at least for that
particular risk), and it frees the policyholder and broker from
much of the work of putting together a program of interlocking
coverage, or determining whether the policyholder can forgo
coverage in order to self-insure or simply "go bare" regarding
the risk. To the extent insurers sell "peace of mind" and
convenience as well as protection, there are some obvious
advantages to the comprehensive policy that seem at least
compatible with those offering tailored coverage marketed as
being only what the policyholder "needs."
As Sawyer and his contemporaries further noted, offering a
bundle of comprehensive protection in turn permits the insurer
to charge increased premiums.55 Although offering fragmented
coverage to land is one business model, the more attractive
model of offering more coverage in return for a higher premium
seems advantageous. That is, so long as the policyholder is not
paying for coverage far in excess of its needs, and the premium
is not absolutely unaffordable. Then, the policyholder gets
additional protection, convenience, and comfort, and the
insurer, in return, receives increased funding for investment.
The importance of obtaining increased premiums cannot be
overlooked. Berkshire Hathaway and its CEO, Warren Buffett,
became wealthy largely due to the incoming premium dollars or
"float" Buffett's seemingly preferred term) generated by
comprehensive liability insurance. National Indemnity Co. and
National Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (both purchased by Buffett in
1967) provided a substantial part of the cash used by the
billionaire investor to burnish the bottom line of Berkshire
Hathaway. Armed with accumulated premiums invested by
254 See TAN 38-57.
255 See TAN 36-40.
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Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway and its insurers have done
extraordinary well during the past four decades. Although other
insurance executives may lack Buffett's fame and reputation,
general liability and auto liability insurers offering relatively
comprehensive coverage have also performed well during that
time period, even though there have been more than a few years
in which they shouldered combined ratios in excess of 100.256
Building premium receipts through offering more
comprehensive coverage puts the insurer in a position similar to
one who begins saving in youth. Even if the amounts are only a
little bit larger, if left invested for many years the insurer will see
something like the impact of the opening a Roth-IRA by a fifteen
year-old. Even slight additional investments result in
substantial wealth over time.
In addition, many of the insurer restrictions on coverage do
not involve particularly problematic or grave risks. Insurers
could include them in comprehensive coverage, even if not
extracting a great deal more premium, and still face little
increased risk exposure. These risks do not, even when
aggregated, appear to present the types of problems that
resulted in the asbestos and pollution exclusions. Insurers can
absorb them, probably with no increase in premium and
certainly with only a modest increase in premium.
For example, the burglary and theft coverage found in most
property policies effectively requires (in the definitions section
or another provision in the policy) that there be visible marks of
forced entry in order to have coverage. Insurers have interposed
this limitation on coverage with some success,57 but also some
256 See INSURANCE FACTS AND STATS, supra note 16, at 14-24; see also Top
loo Groups Ranked By Net Premiums Written, PROP. CASUALTY 360, supra
note 16, at 34 (Berkshire Hathaway insurance operations had combined ratios
below OO in both 2011 and 2012); Kristin Jones, Berkshire Hathaway's
Earnings Climb 46%, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI000142412788732399700457864441
2264377072.
257 See, e.g., Lumbard v. W. Fire Ins. Co., 381 N.W.2d 117 (Neb. 1986)
(enforcing and rejecting public policy challenge to insurance policy definition of
burglary that required visible marks of physical injury); see also Cochran v.
MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 331 (Neb. 1978) (rejecting reasonable
expectations challenge to enforcement of isible marks language).
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well-known failures,258 as courts have on occasion involved the
reasonable expectations concept to invalidate the restrictive
language, reasoning that so long as the loss was not an inside job
perpetrated by the policyholder, the visible marks requirement
wrongly deprives the policyholder or coverage reasonably
expected.59
Although this perhaps prompts the question of why insurers
have not stayed with and expanded the comprehensive, Sawyer-
esque model, my view is that the question is more likely
answered by the intellectual Zeitgeist and cognitive error, rather
than inexorable business forces. Although they were not fatal to
the liability insurance industry, there is no doubt that asbestos,
pollution, and Superfund claims put stress on the industry,
prompting perhaps justified laser exclusions. In reaction,
insurers became considerably more careful, perhaps even
skittish about continuing the comprehensive approach. Once
(or more often) burned, twice shy. This in turn activates the
availability heuristic, the cognitive error that prompts people to
think a risk is larger than it really is because they are now aware
of it. Having witnessed the ravages of the asbestos mass tort,
insurers are quicker to see (erroneously in my view) subsequent
problems (e.g., mold) as presenting a similarly large-possibly
even uninsurable-risk.
Meanwhile, a business Zeitgeist promoting fine-tuned
customer products and consumer choice has become popular.
In contrast to the spirit that animated the original CGL form,
258 See, e.g., Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d
271 (Minn. 1985) (recognizing clarity of policy text requiring visible marks of
forced entry but ordering coverage based on objectively reasonable expectations
of policyholder in light of hidden and surprising aspects of the visible marks
exclusion, which was contained in a definition rather than a denominated
exclusion); see also C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169
(Iowa 1975) (same; also concluding that literal enforcement of visible marks
language effectively made policy one failing of its implicit purpose).
259 To illustrate the weakness of the use of a visible marks requirement as a
deterrent to inside jobs, consider theft by a savvy but unethical policyholder.
Such a policyholder might simply load up a truck with valuables, even large
quantities of inventory, intending to later claim that they were lost or stolen. If
the hypothetical fraudulent policyholder wishes to enjoy the proceeds of the
policy, he or she need merely break a window or kick in a door on the way out in
order to have coverage.
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which was one of trying to do the thinking for the policyholder
and provide blanket coverage, the current ethos places more
emphasis on selling coverage particular to the policyholder and
attempting to interject more choice and potential premium
savings. While this is laudable in the abstract, this modern
conventional wisdom of insurance product design and
marketing is at odds with similarly modern research on human
perception, thinking, and choice-much of which frequently
suggests that people are not good at making these decisions, and
that they would be better served by being "forced" to accept
more comprehensive products that did not permit them to error.
Insurers can profit by providing less fragmented, more
inclusive coverage that eschews the Swiss cheese approach. The
seventy-five years of experience with the CGL form attests to the
ability of insurers to make money by bundling coverage and
enjoying the marketing, pricing, and investment benefits of such
products.
VI. OPERATIONALIZING THE MOVE TOWARD
BROADER INSURANCE PRODUCTS: THE
RESPECTIVE ROLES OF LEGISLATORS,
REGULATORS, AND COURTS
A. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF IMPROVED TRANSPARENCY
As is now apparent, I lack the confidence many have in
greater transparency and disclosure. Under this school of
thought, mandated bundling of coverage is unnecessary.
Rather, attention should be focused on providing prospective
policyholders with more information about the coverage
provided by various policies offered by various insurers.26o
260 See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding
the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2014); see also Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized
Policies, supra note 1o, at 1337-40 (also suggesting mandated minimum
coverage and greater use of default rules or provisions providing adequate
protection to policyholders). Transparency often is a politically attractive
solution to a perceived consumer protection problem because it provides at least
theoretical benefits to consumers without imposing direct regulation on
vendors. See, e.g., NJ. Law Requires Insurers to Provide 1-Page Summary of
Homeowners Coverage, INS. J. (May 7, 2013), http://www.
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When presented with an adequate opportunity to comparison
shop, policyholders will gravitate toward purchasing broader
with fewer gaps, either by opting for policies that bundle or by
themselves purchasing the necessary array of policies.
Although a world with more transparency and available
information is generally better than one with less, disclosure
alone will not fix the problem of excessively fragmented risk. In
some cases, expanded information may only confuse
consumers.261 Consider the privacy notices mandated by HIPAA
and the package inserts found in prescription and over-the-
counter medicines. They go unread, or, if read, may only induce
decision paralysis or prompt incorrect decisions (e.g., spurning
use of a helpful drug because the package insert mentions a rare
side effect about which the patient is abnormally skittish).262
A substantial body of cognitive research, much of it
addressed by contract scholars, makes a powerful case
insurancejournal.com/news/east/2013/05/07/291128.htm (law requires
"clearer" explanations by insurer according to co-sponsor but does not require
policies to be available on line and does not establish minimum coverage
requirements).
261 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1272 & n.271 (2003); see also
Fisher v. Ford Motor Co., 224 F.3d 570, 574 (6th Cir. 2000) ("NHTSA feared
'information overload,' i.e., that additional warnings would distract from the
warnings it had determined were critical, leading consumers not to focus
properly on the latter. It was also concerned that additional warnings might
simply lead people to pay no attention to any of them." (citation omitted));
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 305 (1986) ("My
thesis is that consumers who are faced with the dense text of form contracts
characteristically respond by refusing to read, and that it is reasonable for them
to do so.").
262 See Nathan Cortez, Do Graphic Tobacco Warnings Violate the First
Amendment?, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1467, 1497-98 (2013) ("Textual consumer
product warnings are becoming more and more stale and ineffective. First, they
are probably overused. As Lars Noah observed almost twenty years ago, the
'proliferation of warnings may dilute the impact of truly important cautionary
information.' The FDA, in fact, has long recognized the need to resist diluting
its warnings and overloading consumers with information. Other agencies have
recognized the problem too. Media often mock our propensity to overwarn."
(footnotes omitted)). See generally Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn:
Disentangling the "Right to Know"from the "Need to Know" about Consumer
Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293 (1994).
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suggesting that disclosure simply is not very effective and that
prohibition of unfair contract terms or promotion of useful
terms holds substantially greater promise for improving
consumer welfare.63 Based on this research and analysis, it
seems certain that disclosure alone is insufficient. Although
greater information and transparency have an important role to
play in improving insurance markets, the case for inclusive
insurance is probably best made through mandated coverage
and limiting undue restrictions on coverage.
Transparency might be helpful, however, not so much for
facilitating consumer understanding of policy terms, but for
apprising consumers of insurer track records regarding
coverage, claims processing, payment, and customer
satisfaction.64 Although the tendency toward cognitive error
263 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 666 (2011) ("There is much evidence that
consumers do not read [Truth in Lending Act of 1968] disclosures, are
overloaded by the number of disclosures, and do not understand the basic
disclosed features of the loan."); see also Cortez, supra note 262, at 1498
("[M]any widely accepted disclosure requirements are demonstrated to be
ineffective. For example, many physicians disregard the warnings in
pharmaceutical labels, even so-called 'black box' warnings required for the most
severe risks. In fact, the FDA has 'openly chastised physicians for disregarding
instructions in the labeling for newly approved drugs,' and has turned to more
aggressive mechanisms like requiring risk management plans. Likewise, in
2007, the Institute of Medicine concluded that cigarette warnings, last updated
in 1984, had become stale and ineffective." (footnotes omitted)); Omri Ben-
Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2011) (noting the
prevalence of unfair contract terms and arguing that law should impose
minimally fair or "tolerable" terms for consumers); Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin
Davis, Empty Promises, 84 SO. CAL. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2010) (vendor contractual
promises of decreasing utility to consumers because vendors reserve right of
unilateral modification; consumers fail to adequately appreciate the risks posed
and potential injury; legal system provides insufficient protection for consumers
in such situations); Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer
Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 749 (2OO8) (noting degree of consumer
cognitive error and concluding greater legal protection of consumers is
desirable). See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer
Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 33 (2OO6) (consumers may have cognitive
limits on ability to evaluate products and services and are often unable to
determine whether bundling or unbundling of such products and services is in
their best interests).
264 See Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque, supra note 26o (discussing the
benefits of disclosure, particularly, its ability to facilitate comparison-shopping
272
Fall 2013 Vol111:1
Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy
and short-term maximization65 may yet prompt policyholders to
foolishly choose the cheapest insurer even if it has a horrible
track record in paying claims, there is at least a fighting chance
that if insurer performance information and consumer
complaint information is more widely available that it will
influence purchasing decisions.
B. LEADING WITH SENSIBLE REGULATION
Ideally, most of the impetus for change would come from
regulators. Despite concerns over industry capture of insurance
regulators, administrative solutions would be most effective.
Regulators could require that basic insurance policies include
the breadth of coverage necessary to provide what experts
regard as essential protection in particular lines of insurance. In
doing so, regulators could police the policy language to ensure
that what is provided in the "large print" of the insuring
agreement is not taken away by the "small print" of unknown or
difficult to decipher exclusions, conditions, and definitions.66
Although policies could of course be customized to
accommodate policyholder needs and requests through
endorsements and riders, these would also be subject to
insurance department scrutiny.
In particular, state regulators should require that property
policies, particularly those sold to consumers, include coverage
for the major external perils, i.e. risks such as water damage,
flood, and earthquake which historically have been thought too
difficult for private insurers to bear. But as part of this process,
and result in greater market discipline for insurers); see also Schwarcz, Re-
evaluating Standardized Policies, supra note 10, at 1337-40; Ed Beeson,
Demystifying insurance: put policies online for anyone to see, Rutgers
professor says, THE STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 10, 2013, http://www.nj.com
/business/index.ssf/2o13/02/demystifying insurance put pol.html
(discussing Jay Feinman's views on access to insurance policies).
265 See TAN 256-259 regarding cognitive error and short-term
maximization distorting individual judgment and entity insurance decisions.
266 State insurance regulators generally have substantial power, even if it
not always well deployed. See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 16, at ch. 3. Because
of longstanding national custom largely codified in the McCarran Ferguson Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015, the locus of insurance regulation is state-centered. Id.
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regulators must permit carriers to charge an adequate premium
and at least do nothing to retard insurer pursuit of adequate
capital and reinsurance.
Part of the regulatory effort must also work to ensure that all
similarly situated insurers compete on a level playing field, so
that some are not allowed to gain customers by providing
inadequate but less expensive coverage. If, for example, all
homeowners' insurers are required to provide flood and
earthquake coverage, all will have to price accordingly. No
insurer should get punished for "doing the right thing" in
offering inclusive coverage. Nor should insurers be required to
offer more comprehensive coverage at a loss because regulators
will not approve adequate premium rates.
Regulation in this area needs to be improved so that policy
provisions and differential treatment of risk is adequately
supervised, with insurers required to justify disparate treatment
of risks. If state insurance departments fail to adequately
shoulder this task, as discussed below, courts should be willing
to apply a stronger version of contract doctrines such as
reasonable expectations, estoppel, reformation,
unconscionability, and public policy to prevent insurers from
imposing unreasonably favorable or excessively risk-
fragmenting terms on policyholders.
Conversely, regulators must be willing to let genuine market
forces set prices and permit insurers to price bundle coverage in
a manner that ensures their effectiveness and industry solvency.
A long-running problem of insurance regulation is that it tends
to be toothless, often completely failing to provide policyholders
with sufficient information to make informed choices, and it
typically lacks any real effort to police oppressive contract terms
or to improve the insurance placement process.2 67 For example,
many-if not most-policyholders are unable to even see the
insurance policy they purchased until it arrives in the mail
weeks or even months later.268 When regulators become
26 7 See Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque, supra note 260.
268 See id. (policy delivery usually two to three weeks after purchase). This
is also an issue in commercial insurance. For example, the lessee of the World
Trade Center assumed control of the property on July 1, 2001 and was insured
pursuant to oral agreements and an short written binder - but the actual
written policies had not yet been issued at the time of the September 11 terrorist
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invigorated to regulate something beyond carrier solvency, their
core concern,269 it is usually to seek public approval in
advocating to keep lower premiums, something more likely to
happen if the state insurance commissioner is positioning to run
for higher office.27o
But regulation that seeks or obtains artificially low premiums
only hurts the cause of intelligent risk management and
affordable insurance-at least if one counts all of the costs. If
insurers are denied the ability to charge an adequate premium,
they can engage in destructive behavior even if not moved to exit
the state or to cease offering the insurance product at issue.
Consider a hypothetical insurer seeking a 2o% rate increase in a
Gulf Coast state due to heavy hurricane losses the previous year.
The insurance commissioner, with the senatorial primary only
weeks away, makes a big splash in the press by approving only a
attack on the buildings. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of
September 11: Myriad Claims, Multiple Lines, Arguments over Occurrence
Counting, War Risk Exclusions, the Future of Terrorism Coverage, and New
Issues of Government Role, 37 Tort & Ins. L.J. 817, 833-34 (2002). See also id.
at 833, n.64 (time lags of this sort between purchase of insurance and
production of written policy itself are not unusual. See also Schwarcz,
Reevaluating Standardized Policies, supra note 1o, at 1319-28 (criticizing
insurance regulator failure to require that policy forms be available for
inspection by prospective policyholder prior to purchase and finding other
sources of information inadequate substitutes for regular-forced increased
transparency); Beeson, supra note 264 (discussing lack of consumer access to
fine print of their policy).
269 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 122 (5th ed. 2010).
270 See Kunreuther & Pauly, Insurance: The Most Misunderstood Industry,
supra note 82 ("State regulators often constrain insurance premiums because
they are concerned that insurance will not be 'affordable,' especially to those
who are at higher risk .... Behavior of this kind defeats the three principal
purposes of insurance: to provide information via premiums as to how serious
your risk is; to provide motivation for undertaking financial protection against
an event that could produce a significant loss but has a low probability of
occurrence; and to offer incentives in the form of premium reductions to reward
people who invest in risk-reducing measures."); see also STEMPEL ET AL., supra
note 16, at ch. 3. See generally NAT'L ASSOC'N OF INS. COMM'RS, STATE
INSURANCE REGULATION 3 (2011), available at http://www.naic.org/
documents/topics white paper hist ins reg.pdf ("regulators may seek to
ensure that policy benefits are commensurate with the premiums charged").
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5% increase. The rational insurer (assuming it was also an
ethical insurer that really needed a 20% increase and was not
just posturing) will, if it stays in business in the state, react by
being tougher on claims and paying them more slowly. When it
has a chance to revise its standard policies, it will restrict
coverage if possible or use revised policy language more
favorable to disputing, reducing, or denying claims.
In the end, the consumer may be much worse off than if the
insurer had been permitted the 20% premium increase sought.271
Put another way, which situation would the average person
prefer: paying one-fifth more in premiums and being promptly
covered via a fair claims process in the event of a loss; paying
only 5% more in premiums but having to wait for claims
payment; accepting a lowball offer (but not so lowball as to
make litigation worthwhile); or having a borderline or mixed
claim denied rather than receiving the benefit of the doubt from
the insurer? Although policyholders might at first favor lower
premiums and short-term interest, most would, upon reflection,
probably rather have longer-term protection and not claim
hassles. "You get what you pay for" may be a clich6, but it has
become so because of its general accuracy.
Although homeowners' insurance and its typical lack of flood
or earthquake coverage provides perhaps the best example of
fragmented risk coverage that needs change, nearly every
insurance product can provide more comprehensive coverage,
provided that all insurers are required to offer a minimum of
coverage and are permitted to charge apt premiums for the
coverage. In this way, regulators can prevent Swiss cheese
policies or insurers from unfairly stealing market share from
insurers and products that provide the protection consumers
expect or need.272 Under the current regime, insurers are able to
271 In the interests of equilibrium, regulators should also be willing to
demand rollbacks in premiums if conditions change in favor of insurers and the
market is insufficiently competitive to create momentum for reduced prices.
Generally, however, it appears that insurance pricing does respond to soft
market conditions, making it likely that the insurers who increased premiums
20% in Year 1 will be required to reduced premiums in Year 4 in response to
market conditions that resulted in their competitors offering lower prices.
272 Although objectively reasonable policyholder expectations are not a bad
yardstick for determining the proper amount of coverage that should be
available in a type of policy (e.g., homeowners expect coverage if mold
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offer products that policyholders incorrectly perceive as broader
than they are, and to price Swiss cheese insurance as though it
were comprehensive coverage. Insurers have incentives to offer
increasingly limited coverage under the guise of broad coverage
and can easily fool most policyholders most of the time,
including the sophisticated ones. Under these circumstances,
the market is inadequate to the task of providing sounder risk
management unless regulators insist on adequately
comprehensive coverage.
Even insurers receptive to mandated coverage for flood will
argue that this requires government-backed reinsurance to
permit them to accept the risk of widespread losses with the
potential for clustered damages. Insurers taking this position
implicitly suggest that risks such as flood and earthquake are
akin to war and nuclear incident in that they are too great to be
shouldered by the insurance industry alone.
I remain skeptical and continue to think that if all policies
must provide coverage, and the market for coverage is robust,
that bundled coverage can be accomplished through adequate
pricing by insurers (assuming that regulators will not stand in
the way of proper risk-based pricing). For homeowners'
insurance, the private sector logically should need little
assistance. Most homes are purchased with mortgages, and
lending banks require insurance, creating a steady demand.
Homeowners will not be allowed to forgo insurance and will be
forced to buy the more comprehensive products including flood,
earthquake, and perhaps additional coverage. This may be
paternalism or even a "nanny state" approach, but it sure
appears more attractive than the status quo. In addition,
reinsurance should be widely available in the private sector,
particularly if insurers are pricing the product at levels attractive
to quota share reinsurance.73
spreading through their drywall causes property damage or makes the dwelling
uninhabitable), it is not the only yardstick. Consumers and less sophisticated
commercial policyholders often simply lack enough knowledge of risk to know
what coverage should be available in a basic policy. Insurers and regulators
often have that knowledge and, consequently, should bring it to bear in crafting
the amount of minimally comprehensive coverage that insurers must offer.
273 Reinsurance is often written on a "treaty" basis with the ceding company
(the insurer wishing to obtain reinsurance on the risk ceded to the reinsurer),
which is essentially a reinsurance agreement as to an entire book of business
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If the insurance industry is not able to take on flood or
certain other big risks without government reinsurance,
government-reinsured flood and earthquake coverage may be a
necessary government supplement to the private insurance
market. By analogy, life insurance proved impossible for active
duty soldiers to purchase, requiring the U.S. government to at
least subsidize such programs.74 Notwithstanding some
problems with the operation of those programs by the insurers
with whom the government works,75 this was a positive
held by the ceding insurer. This is contrasted with facultative reinsurance that
is a contract designed to cover a narrower and more specific risk (although it
may involve many policies and many million dollars. The reinsurance
agreement itself may be a "quota share" agreement, in which the insurer gives
up a portion of its premiums in return for the reinsurer's commitment to share
in an equivalent portion of any losses incurred under the policy or group of
policies. By contrast, an excess of loss reinsurance agreement involves the
insurer's payment of a premium in return for the reinsurer's commitment to
provide coverage if the insurer's losses on the risk exceed a specified triggering
or attachment point. See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 1180-85; see also
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 18 at ch. 14; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 18, at §17.01; Patrick L. Brockett, Robert C. Witt & Paul R. Aird, An
Overview of Reinsurance and the Reinsurance Markets, 9 J. INS. REG. 432
(1991) (outlining the types of reinsurance). See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER &
MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed., 2000)
(discussing quota share and excess of loss).
274 Servicemember's Life Insurance is life insurance made available to U.S.
Military personnel who would otherwise be able to obtain only life insurance
containing a war exclusion, which, of course, would be of limited utility to active
duty military personnel (but would nonetheless have some utility as servicemen
can die of disease, auto accidents, or other causes that are not sufficiently war-
related to be subject to the exclusion). These life insurance policies are offered
by a private insurer under contract with the U.S. government, with the
government agreeing to provide funds if the program suffers more losses than
revenue. See Emmet J. Vaughan & Therese Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk
and Insurance 239-40 (8th ed. 1999); Patrick M. Callan, et al., Analysis of
Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) Program: History, Current
Issues and Future Implications (MBA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June
2011) at p. 9-1o.
275 See David Evans, Fallen Soldiers' Families Denied Cash as Insurers
Profit, BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2o1o-o7-28/fallen-soldiers-families-denied-cash-payout-as-life-insurers
-boost-profit.html; see also David Evans, New York Said to Require Payments
After Fallen Soldier Story, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2012, 3:14 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-23/new-york-said-to-require-life-
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development for military personnel and their families. If an
analogous effort is required to make flood and earth movement
coverage part of the basic homeowners' policy or business
owners' property policy, government should take on the task.
Legislators logically have less of a role unless regulators
prove inadequate to the task. Most states already have extensive
insurance codifications that will not require much modification
to spur the cause of comprehensive coverage, except to the
extent that regulators may need more express power to mandate
certain coverage, bar certain restrictions, and police policy
provisions. To the extent that insurers backslide on their
commitments during the claims process, states may need to pass
stronger bad faith laws with greater penalties or enlarge the
successful claimant's right to payment of counsel fees by
insurers.7 6
Executives other than those in the relevant insurance
regulatory administrative agency also would presumably have
less of a role beyond that of appointing competent insurance
commissioners and judges, particularly judges with a more
functionalist or instrumentalist approach to insurance
coverage.277
insurer-payments-after-fallen-soldier-report.html; Matthew Sturdevant, Life
Insurance Practice Under Fire: Retained-Asset Accounts Draw Scrutiny From
Veterans Affairs and New York's AG, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Aug. 2,
2010, http://articles.courant.Com/2oio-o8-02/business/hc-life-insurance-
controversy-2ooo8o2 1 retained-asset-accounts-insurance-prudential-
financial/2.
276 See generally FEINMAN, supra note 12, at 202-22.
277 Judicial formalism tends to look for set rules that are then enforced as
literally as feasible. In insurance matters, it often employs textualism, which is
the view that contract disputes should if possible be decided according to the
text of the insurance policy or other contract documents if the text is sufficiently
clear. See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 16, at § 2.03. This approach is slow to
concede linguistic ambiguity and tends to resist consideration of the reasonable
expectations of the policyholder, considerations of public policy, and the
implications of the product-like status and social instrument functions of
insurance. By contrast, functionalist or instrumentalist approaches to insurance
are receptive to consideration of these other factors and are more willing to see
sufficient textual ambiguity to consider extrinsic evidence and are also less
willing to read policy text literally. See id. at ch. 2.
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C. THE ROLE OF COURTS
In restricting fragmented insurance to its proper scope,
courts also have a role to play, particularly to the extent that
legislators, regulators, governors, and the insurance industry do
not take sufficient action. As compared to current
jurisprudence, the role of courts will likely be more expansive in
that courts are often directly faced with problematic insurance
policy provisions or claims-processing behavior. After
something of an apogee of functionalist contract construction
culminating in the Second Restatement,278 most modern
contract decisions have taken a more formalist, textualist tone
overall,279 which, as a practical matter, has been favorable to
insurers seeking to restrict coverage or create Swiss cheese
coverage.280
Insurance law's healthy regard for the contra proferentem
principle of construing ambiguities against the drafter and of
appreciating the reasonable expectations of the insured have
278 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
279 See Peter N. Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting
Off the Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1047 (1991) ("Legal
Formalism continues to exist as a viable rationale for judicial decisionmaking in
insurance law, which is largely based upon a traditional contractual
interpretation of insurance policies generally."); see also Edward L. Rubin, The
Nonjudicial Life of Contract: Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
107, 107 (1995). G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81
CAL. L. REV. 433, 495-96 (1993).
280 See Peter N. Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract
Disputes: Toward A Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543,
579-85 (1996). To the extent a court is more formalist, textualist, and literal in
its approach, this tends to advantage insurers. Insurers normally are the final if
not the sole authors of policy text and can often add coverage limiting language
to standard forms or predecessor forms at will, limited by market conditions
and policyholder sophistication and resources. Thus, for Swiss cheese policies
such as some of the homeowners' policies discussed in Schwarcz, Reevaluating
Standardized Insurance Policies, supra note 1o, at 1277-1303, a formalist court
is likely to enforce coverage-limiting language in the insurers favor, while a
functionalist court is more likely to interpret the policy adverse to the
policyholder through methods of interpretation beyond the text. See STEMPEL
ETAL., supra note 16, at § 2.03.
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muted formalism to some extent,281 but there is no shortage of
insurance coverage cases taking an over-literal approach to text
(decisions giving broad application to the CGL pollution
exclusion282 are a good example) or misunderstanding the
nature of insurance when applying policy provisions.283 An
approach to insurance policy construction more sensitive to the
non-contract traits of insurance policies284 and the role of
insurance on modern society28s can improve judicial analysis
and case outcomes.
In addition, courts can advance the cause of more inclusive
insuring through greater use of concepts such as
unconscionability and public policy. Both of these concepts can
be used to reform or strike down policy provisions that, if read
and enforced literally, would do too much damage to the anti-
fragmentation project as well as to the reasonable expectations
of policyholders. A recent federal district court case provides an
example of a useful judicial approach to limiting language in a
policy.
281 See Swisher, Judicial Interpretations, supra note 280, at 586; see also
ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
§§ 25A-F (5th ed. 2012) (discussing insurance contract interpretation and
describing insurance version of contract law that tend to favor policyholders);
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at §§ 4.o8-4.14 (same);
ANDERSON ETAL., supra note 3, at §§ 2.01-2.09 (same).
282 See generally Stempel, Reason and Pollution, supra note 95 (reviewing
background and application of the pollution exclusion); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the Wrong Approach to Construing the
Liability Insurance Pollution Exclusion, 50 FLA. L. REv. 463 (1998) (examining
particularly bad decisions of Florida Supreme Court in this regard).
283 See, e.g., Minnesota Fire & Casualty Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A.2d 854
(Pa. 2004); see also STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 74-76 (criticizing
Greenfield and noting that the impact of the decision merely deprives drug
overdose victim's family of source of compensation).
28 4 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL &
INS. PRAC. L.J. 813 (2009); see also Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability
Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1389 (2007). See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as
Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 203 (2010).
285 See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social
Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010).
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In Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Chicago Title
Insurance Co.,286 the court provided an example of the type of
judicially enforced broader coverage in the face of policy
language to the contrary, in effect, mandating a minimum
degree of coverage. The court required the insurer to provide
the policyholder/defendant with a complete defense to the
entire action rather than fragmenting the duty to defend and
restricting it only to certain claims against the
policyholder/defendant.87 The case involved a series of complex
commercial controversies, but the insurance question was
relatively simple: did a primary insurer have a duty to defend
the entire case against a policyholder, or could it rely on quite
clear language that stated the insurer was required only to
defend potentially covered claims?88 An excess insurer, anxious
not to be required to defend when coverage pursuant to the
underlying primary policy had been triggered, challenged the
primary carrier's limitation.89 The primary policy contained
fairly clear language that seemingly limited the insurer's duty to
defend to only the "claims" that were potentially covered, rather
than to the entire lawsuit, which is the standard insurance
industry approach to the duty to defend.29o
286 871 F. Supp. 2d 744 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
287 Id. at 756.
288 Id. at 751-56.
289 Id. at 747.
290 Id. at 748. Specifically, the provision in question stated:
Upon written request by the insured,... [Chicago Title], at
its own cost and without unreasonable delay, shall provide
for the defense of an insured in litigation in which any third
party asserts a claim adverse to the title or interest as
insured, but only as to those stated causes of action alleging a
defect, lien or encumbrance or other matter insured against
by this policy. [Chicago Title] shall have the right to select
counsel of its choice (subject to the right of the insured to
object for reasonable cause) to represent the insured as to
those stated causes of action and shall not be liable for and
will not pay the fees of any other counsel. [Chicago Title]
will not pay any fees, costs or expenses incurred by the
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After initially denying the excess carrier's motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the court granted summary
judgment to the excess insurer on the issue based on "the well-
settled Illinois rule" that an insurer required to defend any claim
against the policyholder was obligated to defend "'all counts in
the lawsuit.'291 The court found-as a matter of law-that the
limiting language of the primary policy was ineffective to narrow
the insurer's duty to defend because the duty was indivisible as a
matter of law.292 In so ruling, the court rejected the primary
insurer's argument that the duty to defend the entire case was
only a default rule that could be contracted around by the
parties through the policyholder's purchase of a policy providing
for defense of only covered claim.
Although it might have found other grounds for refusing to
enforce the limiting language of the Chicago Title policy,93 the
court prevented enforcement of the limiting language more
forcefully by effectively holding that a liability policy with a duty
to defend feature was not legitimate unless it defended the
entire action against the policyholder. Despite its earlier denial
of the excess insurer's judgment on the pleadings motion and
accompanying statements supportive of the primary insurer, the
court, "[u]pon further research and careful consideration of the
parties' arguments ... conclude[d]" that Chicago Title could not
insured in the defense of those causes of action which allege
matters not insured against by this policy.
Id.
291 Id. at 751 (quoting Pekin Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 93o N.E.2d 1011, 1015 n.2
(Ill. 2010)).
292 Chicago Title, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 751-53.
293 For example, the court could have determined that it would be unfair to
apply the language against the policyholder due to the fact that the policy
arriving weeks after placement and was probably unread when it arrived, or
because the language was deceptive or hidden. See supra TAN 266-70
(describing such factors as a basis for the reasonable expectations approach to
insurance policy construction and noting its application in cases refusing to
enforce clear language requiring "visible marks" for forced entry for burglary
coverage with this limitation contained in a policy definition rather than a policy
exclusion).
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legally contract around the complete defense rule" mandated by
Illinois law.294
While the precedent upon which the court relied is arguably
not as compelling as it suggested, Chicago Title is absolutely
correct in refusing to allow the insurer to avoid the obligation to
provide a total defense when one considers the overall structure
of liability insurance, the purpose and function of liability
policies, and the role played by liability policies in commercial
risk management and the overall economy. If the primary
insurer's language had been given effect, the policy at issue
would be a defective insurance product that should not be
permitted-both because it defeats the objectively reasonable
expectations of most policyholders and because it fails its
essential purpose of providing efficient "litigation insurance."
As cases like Chicago Title reflect, even a policy with clear
text may be unworthy of enforcement by courts. Although
insurance will always be primarily a subset of basic contract law,
courts must do more than merely scrutinize text not only to
provide better adjudication generally,95 but also to minimize the
modern trend toward risk fragmentation. Courts should decide
coverage cases with sufficient regard for what might be deemed
an "anti-fragmentation principle." Cases like Chicago Title may
be viewed by some as undue judicial activism, but judicial
willingness to depart from a more circumscribed role of merely
reading policy language without thought about policy impact,
function, and party intent and expectations can be an important
part of resisting insurer efforts to manufacture Swiss cheese
policies plagued by coverage gaps.2 96
294 Chicago Title, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
295 See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONTRAcTS: MAKING AND DOING DEALS 1 (3d ed. 2011) (the
"contract" between the parties is their agreement or understanding, not the
piece of paper on which that agreement is memorialized).
296 For additional recent examples of courts sensibly rejecting insurer
attempts to avoid coverage (or, more specifically, the duty to defend)
notwithstanding arguably favorable policy language, see, e.g., Greystone
Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 661 F.3d 1272
(loth Cir. 2011) (general liability insurer must defend construction defect suit
against policyholder notwithstanding insurer's company-specific exclusions
purporting to narrow coverage beyond exclusionary language in standard CGL
policy); Newman v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., 301 P.3d 348 (Mont. 2013)
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D. THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP BYAN INDUSTRY WITH
ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST
Although fragmenting risk can be an effective business
model or technique for improving profits, the story of Sawyer
and the CGL form, as well as other broad based insurance
products such as auto insurance and homeowners' insurance (at
least prior to the recent advent of departure from
standardization and gaps in coverage), shows that
comprehensively written products can support a profitable
insurance industry. Bundled, comprehensive products will be
more attractive to many consumers, particularly those less
sophisticated consumers with fewer risk management resources.
These consumers will prefer broader protection to the potential
opportunity to save some premium dollars and the attendant
additional risks this entails. This should facilitate more efficient
and improved marketing by insurers, as well as streamlined
policy issuance. Underwriting may at first be more difficult with
more comprehensive products, but, ultimately, the actuarial
calculation of risk should be as easy for bundled products as for
fragmented products. Bundled, comprehensive products will
therefore command a higher premium, better supporting the
insurer's ability to profit from playing the float on premium
dollars used for investment.
Some insurers may contend that they could earn more
money over the long haul by selling fragmented coverage rather
than bundled coverage. However, it seems unlikely that
whatever loss ratio gains may come from insurer's narrower
targeting of risk will be much greater than the marketing,
premium sales, and investment gains more likely to be had
under a more comprehensive approach. In either event,
insurers are likely to be significantly more profitable than most
companies in most other industries.297 So long as the profit
(insurer must defend parents' claim arising out of girl's death while at "tough
love" academic boot camp). See also Michael Buck, Fla. Court Rules Insurer
Cannot Limit Sinkhole Coverage, BEST'S NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://www.programbusiness.com/news/Florida-Court-Rules-Insurer-Cannot-
Limit-Sinkhole-Coverage (court enforces state insurance department regulation
barring exclusion of sinkhole coverage).
297 Although some (e.g., Dr. Weisbart; supra note 222, argue that insurance
companies are not all that profitable (or at least not as profitable as I suggest),
2 8 5
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difference between fragmenting and bundling, even if running
in favor of fragmented risk, is not large, rational insurers can
pursue either model.
It has perhaps become something of a clich6 that insurance
is "affected with a public interest."298 But that statement, though
a bit trite, remains meaningful. Insurance is a fulcrum through
which many human activities (commercial and personal) gain
leverage to commence and succeed.299 It is no accident that the
most industrialized and advanced countries of the world are also
largely the most insured countries in the world.3oo If regulators
there seems to be no doubt that they are quite profitable and quite capable of
prudently taking on whatever increase risk may result from more
comprehensive, socially useful underwriting and sales. See Kate Smith, Feeling
flush: despite Sandy, the U.S. reinsurance market remains rich in capital and
capacity, BEST'S REVIEW (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/
Feeling+flush%3A+despite+Sandy,+the+U.S.+reinsurance+market+remains...-
a03318o5342; see also Travelers' Q2 Profit Climbs 85% to $925M; Auto Unit
Layoffs Planned, INS. J. (July 23, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2o13/O7/23/299359.htm; Travelers Q1 Profit Up 11% to
$896M; CEO Says 'We Will Keep Going' on Rate Hikes, INS. J. (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2o13/o4/24/289517.htm;
Liberty Mutual's 2012 Profit Jumps 132% to $829M Despite Q4 Net Loss, INS.
J. (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013
/o3/o1/283292.htm; Susanne Sclafane, Insurance Ops 'Shoot the Lights Out'
At Berkshire, Buffett Says, CARRIER MANAGEMENT (Mar. 2, 2013),
http://www.carriermanagement.com/news/2013/03/02/101235.htm.
298 See 2oth Century Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 1O9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 625 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist. 2001) ('"The field of insurance so greatly affects the public interest
that the industry is viewed as a 'quasi-public' business, in which the special
relationship between the insurers and insureds requires special
considerations."); see also German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 415
(1914) ("[T]he business of insurance, it having become 'clothed with a public
interest,' and therefore subject 'to be controlled by the public for the common
good."'); Daniel v. Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co., 93 S.W.2d 372, 374-75 (Tex. 1936)
('"The business of insurance generally is now recognized to be one affected by
public interest."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.01.030 (West 1995) ("The
business of insurance is one affected by the public interest").
299 See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note
232.
300 See THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
GLOBAL INSURANCE MARKET TRENDS 2012 (2012), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/GloballnsuranceMarketTrends2o12.p
df.
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put in place a level playing field for insurer competition, the
insurance industry will do fine economically, just as it did in the
wake of the work of Sawyer and others who championed
bundled coverage as something good for insurers, policyholders,
and society.
Excessive fragmenting of risk effectively reduces insurance
protection and the certainty and confidence sought by
socioeconomic actors. More bundled and comprehensive
insurance products are more socially useful insurance products.
Insurers should be more inclined to offer them, as they were
during the mid-twentieth century, than they have been for the
past quarter-century. Rather than engaging in a war with
regulators (or legislatures or the courts), insurers would save
disputing costs and serve the public interest (and, I continue to
think, their bottom line) by moving toward a more
comprehensive approach rather than fighting a rear guard
action in favor of fragmenting risk.
The primary argument against the comprehensive approach
appears to be that it does not do enough to fight moral hazard:
Research has identified five main tools that almost
all insurers use to one degree or another: risk-
based pricing; underwriting; insurance contract
design; claims management; and, less frequently,
loss prevention services. In addition, some insurer
and their trade associations also engage in
research and education and, sometimes even
promote public safety regulation.3ol
At first blush, these approaches seem to have more in
common with fragmenting risk rather than bundling it.
However, on closer examination, they can be used as well to
support a comprehensive approach. For example, risk-based
pricing can involve either fragmenting risk to calculate
301 See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 118, accord CAROL A. HEIMER,
REAcTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE
CONTRACTS (1985); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 241. But see Fitzpatrick,
supra note 82 (finding that although it is not a rational "tool" as such, most
insurers are highly motivated by anxiety about claims responsibility
mushrooming out of control if insurers do not act to curtail risk exposures in
response to adverse claim developments).
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premiums more finely, or it can involve accurately assessing the
claims the insurer will incur under a bundled approach and
pricing the more comprehensive product accordingly.
Underwriting can be undertaken either with an eye to finely
subdividing risks or with an eye to assessing the claims likely to
be presented by comprehensive coverage. The risks may be
larger under the latter approach, but so too should be the
premiums received and corresponding investment return.
When coverage is fragmented, this may avoid issuing coverage
to a riskier applicant, but it also increases the risk that the
applicant will forgo coverage and the insurer will lose premium
dollars.
Insurance contract design such as the Swiss cheese
limitations discussed throughout this paper can limit risk. And
that can save costs. But so, too, can comprehensive contract
design that eliminates much of the expense of assessing
coverage under more fragmented products. More
comprehensive products not only can command a higher
premium, but also can be used for marketing advantage and
easier actuarial calculation.
For similar reasons, claim management is likely to be easier
and less expensive for the comprehensive insurance company as
compared to its fragmented counterpart. Loss prevention
services appear to be a useful response under either model. In
fact, if the insurer provides bundled, more expansive coverage, it
has an incentive to undertake broader and more far-reaching
loss prevention policies that eventually should be to the
insurers' monetary advantage.
Further, insurers can profit and enhance social welfare by
means other than controlling moral hazard. To be sure, insurers
cannot be so vulnerable to moral hazard that they fail, but
neither is moral hazard their only concern. And neither is it
essential that insurers drive moral hazard to its lowest point in
order to succeed. But another way, insurers can suffer a good
deal of moral hazard and succeed, just as they can suffer a good
deal of adverse selection and expansion in liability while
succeeding. In order to thrive, insurers offering comprehensive
coverage need simply underwrite a large enough and diverse
enough risk pool while collecting adequate premiums and
investing wisely-provided that they are not losing business
unnecessarily to fragmenting competitors. In that sense, I
2 8 8
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propose a forcing of the comprehensive approach as necessary
through minimum mandated coverage or limitations on
exclusions.
VII. CONCLUSION
To a degree, insurance has lost its way in the modern trend
toward more fragmented risk and restrictive coverage. Although
such strategies may be profitable for insurers, they run counter
to sounder risk management approaches as well as the history of
insurance as reflected in the work of Elmer Sawyer and other
architects of the CGL policy. Rediscovering the sound logic,
public spirit, and business sense of this era can broaden and
improve insurance overall, which would provide greater
protection for policyholders and victims, efficiency in risk
management and dispute resolution, and profit for insurers.
Rather than being forgotten in the manner of a retired athlete,
Sawyer deserves to be remembered and his approach again re-
injected into the insurance game.
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